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CROZER QUARTERLY

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMUNITY FOR THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION

MAYNARD L. CASSADY

Crozer Theological Seminary

The Religious Situation

THE BOOK value of the churches in the United States is pretty high. The year 1947 shows the largest inclusive church membership in the nation's history, over 77¼ millions, more than the total of all labor, business, farm, fraternal, and veterans organizations put together.[1] It represents fifty-three per cent of the total population, a massive proportion compared with the bagatelle of twenty-two per cent in 1890. Financially the picture is rosy. A leader of one of the major denominations said privately that his church was embarrassed by a surfeit of funds which it was unable to use. Two denominations since the war raised beyond their regular budgets $28,000,000 and $27,000,000, respectively, for relief and reconstruction. Church debts are melting like snow in the sun, new construction keeps pace with availability of materials. And even a pastor's salary now and then is raised.

Church literature and program materials are lively in mood, more colorful, creative. They seem to say with a jaunty air: "Look, we're up to the minute." There are important new developments in church school curricula, publishing ventures, summer camp establishments, educational plants and facilities, audio-visual aids, released time programs in the public schools, and phenomenal growth of young adult groups and summer adult education.

Coöperative Christianity has also made remarkable strides. Since 1941 the number of State and local Councils of Churches has grown from 247 to 596 in 1946,[2] and gross budgets from $1,800,000 to $6,100,000. The consolidation of eight interdenominational agencies into a National Council of Churches is under way. Church unions involving eight denominations have marked the last decade. The World Council of Churches has just come into being at Amsterdam, Holland. While a Hooperating

[1] *Christian Herald,* Vol. 71, No. 8 (August, 1948), p. 25.

[2] *Yearbook of American Churches, 1947,* Federal Council of Churches, p. 162.

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for the Sunday morning feast of radio's invisible religion may not be high, the prestige of the church and general respect for it are grade A.

The reverse side of this coin is not so encouraging. Church contributions, measured by the real buying power of the dollar, are about one half their value in 1923.[3] Membership statistics provide no qualitative clues as to the character of Christian social attitudes and conduct. Polls on vital questions show significant differences among denominations in terms of varying economic and social status factors; and in political opinion, church members vote more conservatively than citizens in general.[4] Coöperative Christianity often maintains itself on a narrow margin of general agreement on public issues, which differs slightly if at all from generally accepted public opinion on such issues, for example, as peace, race relations, industrial harmony, and conditions of employment. Still on the debit side must be noted the intensification of denominational loyalties and imperialisms, the heartbreaking failure of local comity committees to eradicate wasteful denominational rivalries, and the palpably slight results in local mergers of national church unions.

But more significant than quantitative measures of church growth is the rate of adjustment by churches to a rapidly changing environment. An amazing illustration of adjustment lag may be observed in the rural church field. During 1900-1946, the American rural population shifted from sixty per cent to forty per cent of the total. Accompanying readjustments in rural life have been far-reaching: school consolidation; farm-size increase; farm mechanization; rural electrification; farmers organizations; youth groups, such as 4-H Clubs and Future Farmers of America; recreational and cultural programs; government services to provide credit for small farmers, for soil conservation, home management, crop and seed improvement, adult education, and mental health. The rural church shared few of these vast new changes in the rural community.

According to the 1936 Religious Census, three out of four Protestant churches in the United States were in rural communities, although they included but forty-five per cent of the total Protestant membership. Instead of consolidation, churches have steadily increased in number, and the size of the rural church has changed but slightly compared with the urban. According to a recent study,[5] between 1857 and 1937 the average urban church increased from 143 to 415 members while country parishes of two or more churches increased but from 254 to 307 members. The number of ministers has also increased, mainly through a growing number of men without training to fill the pulpits of small churches unable to sup-

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 156. For dollar value see *Economic Almanac 1948*, Industrial Conference Board.

[4] *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March, 1948), pp. 84-89.

[5] Ralph A. Felton, *The Size of the Rural Parish*, American Baptist Home Mission Society, 1946, p. 6.

port a trained man. A comprehensive study of theological training in 1934 indicated that since 1870 the number of college trained ministers has relatively declined, perhaps as much as forty per cent.[6] A similar more limited study revealed also that increase in ministers is due mainly to men having neither college nor seminary training.[7]

As to salaries of ministers, fifty-one per cent of all full-time employed Protestant pastors in 1939 received incomes ranging from $1,200 to zero, annually, and 24.4 per cent received incomes under $600.[8] In another study by Felton[9] of 5,797 rural pastorates, it was found that sixty-nine per cent had annual incomes under $1,500. He states that the minimum salary should be $1,800. On the basis of the figures for 1939 above, it is estimated that only twenty per cent of all ministers received that amount.[10] Estimates for rural ministers would be much less. One result of this situation has been a large number of pulpits vacant or with occasional supply. One major denomination reports forty-five per cent of its churches without full-time pastors.[11] The quality of rural church leadership has undoubtedly declined. There are fine examples of parishes and consolidated churches. But these are exceptions. A plethora of poorly trained ministers stands in the way of consolidation. A study of ninety consolidated rural parishes in 1944 revealed that eighty per cent of them had merged because of a shortage of ministers.[12] Actually, seminary graduates prepared for the rural ministry have not been able to find charges, either because pulpit committees preferred an untrained (cheaper) man or because the salary offered was too meagre for him and his family.

Consolidation, coördination, improved facilities, and vital new organizations are the key to modern rural community organization. The church used to be the central institution in rural America as it was in the mediæval village. But it is losing ground so rapidly that a leader of one important denomination stated recently that his denomination is in danger of losing the entire rural field. In 1946, one half of the approximately 212,000 Protestant churches had less than 172 members each; the average Roman Catholic church has 1,214 members. The key to a change in this situation lies not with national denominational boards, which fully understand the critical situation, but with local communities, pulpit committees, church officials, congregational attitudes, local pastors, the stereotyped anachronistic modes of church finance, lack of vision of the possibilities for the church in rural America.

[6] Mark May *et al.*, *The Education of American Ministers,* Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1934, Vol. II, p. 25.
[7] Maynard Cassady, *Comparative Study of Theological Graduates,* 1934, p. 2.
[8] *Yearbook of American Churches, 1945,* Federal Council of Churches, p. 155.
[9] R. A. Felton, *op. cit.,* p. 10.
[10] *Yearbook, 1945,* p. 155.
[11] *Minutes* of the General Assembly, Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., 1947, Pt. I, p. 1062.
[12] R. A. Felton, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

Other examples of social lag by the churches may only be named in passing. There are the "blighted areas" in larger city centres, due to a decline in real estate values. Churches have followed their middle class constituencies to the suburbs, leaving the low-income immigrants without Protestant institutions and services. New war-created industrial populations have brought the need for very rapid adjustment by the churches. In the Los Angeles area, one denomination alone was assigned by the Comity Committee of the Council of Churches fifty-four sites for new churches. There is a dearth of leadership, skillful in meeting these new situations locally, and a plethora of graduates of short-term Bible schools. Recruitment for the ministry continues to be uncoördinated, haphazard, and poorly conceived, based upon school rivalry, denominational competition, and emotional appeals.

As a result of World War II, one of the most important social effects has been the increased mobility of the population. The largest migration in the nation's history took place, 30,000,000 or more people changing their residence. A phase of this vast uprooting of community life was social mobility, *i.e.,* movement up and down the social ladder. Sociologists who have studied this phenomenon[13] suggest some of its social consequences: on the one hand, intensive social mobility produces an increase in plasticity of behavior, open-mindedness, intelligence, progress, discovery, and invention. On the other hand, the result is that an increase in mental disease, superficiality, insensitivity, skepticism, cynicism, idiosyncrasies, diminishes the intimacy of interrelationship of individuals, increases social isolation, creates restlessness and the hunt for sensual pleasures. At first it facilitates atomism and increased individualism; then it demands collective action, group discipline, and strong leaders. If this analysis is correct, then we may expect that the real stresses and strains of postwar America will be felt most directly in family life, in close-knit friendship groups, in daily face to face relationships of community living.

Perhaps the most serious, far-reaching aspect of the present religious situation is the growing separation of Protestantism from the working-class movements, especially in Europe but also in the United States. Cameron Hall reported this summer after his return from Britain that although sixty to seventy per cent of the babies there are baptized in the Anglican Church and most weddings and funerals are held there, church attendance is at the very highest ten per cent of the population at any time in a year; in the larger cities this is at the highest five per cent and in the crowded industrial centres, one per cent. He says: "There is a general friendliness [toward the churches] accompanied by a strong sense of their irrelevance to life. The church holds primarily a ceremonial position." He points out

[13] Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* Harper, 1928, pp. 751 f.

that although there have been prominent leaders in the Labor Party (like George Lansbury and Sir Stafford Cripps) who are Christian, they were all middle-class. Practically no leadership from the Trade Union Movement (working-class) is in the church.[14]

In the United States the unfortunate class distinctions separating Protestant denominations constitute a serious barrier to community integrity. Their predominant middle-class outlook preclude any genuine understanding of the revolutionary forces in ferment among the great masses of people around the globe.

Significance of the Community

By community is meant a given territory, within which people live together, sharing daily a common life. They possess a common language, means of transportation, a web of custom, folklore and tradition, and a marked degree of social coherence.[15] There are various community types: agricultural rural, industrial rural, small towns, large cities, suburban areas, metropolitan communities. Three out of five Americans live in communities of less than 25,000 population. These small communities where the majority of Americans live were regarded during World War II with serious interest in Washington by agencies responsible for maintaining the "home front." The more widely the war extended, the more heavily responsibility rested on local communities. It was easy to develop some national program, but the real test was "Will it work in Prairietown, Hillsboro, and Wumpus?" For there old habits, long-standing prejudices, local custom dominated. And of course, that was really where the *work* was actually done; so people were tired and not eager-beavers about national plans. A common phrase to be found in thousands of mimeographed wartime documents was "If it doesn't happen in a local community, it doesn't happen at all."

Churches have largely ignored this principle, as evidenced by the lack of a Protestant philosophy or a theology of community. The denominational pattern fosters vertical rather than horizontal structure; it may nurture strong local congregations, but not strong local communities. The local congregation is oriented for its fellowship, leadership, program materials, and other paraphernalia, to the denomination, not to the community. With the exception of a community chest or church federation drive (where these exist) appeals for support of causes are channeled through the denomination. The local church organization of official boards, committees, etc., functions almost entirely as internal organs either of the congregation or of its denominational outreach. Rare it is to find a

[14] *Information Service,* June 19, 1948, Federal Council of Churches.
[15] See Robert MacIver, *Society,* Farrar and Rinehart, 1937, pp. 8-11.

church with a genuine community program, not oriented to increasing the church membership. I know of one church which is organized in two major divisions of operation: one concerns the inner organization and program of the church and its denomination; the other concerns the local community. One half the budget, one half the program emphasis is the share of each. This makes sense.

The reason the community is central and primary in national life is not because a wartime government believed it to be, but because of its inherent nature. For the community is the place of family living. In the family life early emotional patterns and social attitudes are formed before children are of school age. These early years are so crucial in affecting behavior in adult years that psychiatrists attribute primary influence to the home in determining the rate of social change and in overcoming "cultural lag." Franz Alexander[16] says the individual's first learnings are crucial and stand as a model for all later training. In Erich Fromm's[17] analysis of the Nazi mind it is the repressed and punished habits of childhood in the families of lower middle-class Germans which created the subconscious forces which fed upon the myth of race superiority and the worship of brutality.

In the community also are the school, the gang, the clique, the church, all formative for youth. And adults find reinforcement for their established emotional pattern in fraternal orders, clubs, labor and professional organizations, pool and beer joints. These patterns become so powerful in all conduct that they condition every external pressure that comes from outside the community. At election time, when great issues seem to be at stake, the key man is the ward heeler, who, from door to door, translates the national ticket into the local prejudicies, fears, hates, attachments, needs, and thus gets out the vote.

Americans like to package everything. This even extends to packaging the solution of social problems in a neat resolution. Unless the Amsterdam World Council produces a string of resolutions on world problems, it will be for many a "holy flop." Much effort has been expended among churches in improving race relations by a lot of paper work. But race prejudice is learned through very specific training in the family, social clique, school, and community *mores.* In an extensive study of Negro adolescents the American Youth Commission has this to say about how race attitudes are formed:

> In general the Negro child learns from white people that he cannot be a member of their social, economic or educational groups; he also learns that he must not be aggressive toward them but must dramatize his subordinate position by very explicit

[16] Franz Alexander, *Age of Unreason,* Lippincott, 1942, p. 134.
[17] Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom,* Farrar and Rinehart, 1941.

forms of deference. From his own family he learns that white people are extremely powerful and dangerous and that therefore he must not display aggression toward them. . . . He is taught that within the bounds of his caste he may adopt substitute modes of aggression toward whites; for example, certain well-disguised forms of getting even, such as sabotage in his work for white people (slowness, lack of punctuality, clumsiness) the use of flattery, humor, secretiveness, "ignorance," and other behavior for outwitting people, are learned at an early age. . . . The actual behavior of the parents themselves appears to be more important in determining the child's type of accommodation to white people than does verbal instruction. . . . As in other forms of learning . . . the child discovers what behavior will be punished and what rewarded by observing his parents and listening to their accounts of experiences with white people.[18]

If the church seeks to change racial attitudes, if it is in real earnest about removing the American caste system, then it must go to the source of the problem, the family pattern, the neighborhood social cliques, community custom, school practices. A few steps in this direction will reach farther than all the paper resolutions and interracial dinners placed end to end. In fact, the family life, the school and the social clique of the community, are so basic in their total effect upon youth and upon the far-reaching decisions and actions of adults that except the churches change their entire strategy of social action, their influence upon the social outcomes of our time will be dissipated.

A second characteristic of the community, of its inherent nature, is that it is a major source of sustaining comradeship. Man's inner peace and sense of security are an intimate part of the familiar. How the men away from home during the war thought of the old town, the home folks, and idealized them both beyond all reality! The deep longing for the familiar served many a man well who sensed the insecurity of life and his own insignificance in being only a number among a million men. And then the homecoming from the war, in ecstasies over slight details, such as: familiar language and accent; backfence gossip; folklore and traditions, familiar figures and fashions; old scenes; and in the home, mom's same hair-do, the picture in the dining room, the clock, the bed. The whole web of intimate, interior responses in the person's character give evidence of deep emotional dependence upon the "home town," whether Brooklyn or Boston or Bluster.

Now this factor of sustaining comradeship is a very significant one in the contemporary problem of insecurity. The point of issue tends *usually* to be economic. The mass of people today fear unemployment. This fear has its social effects in war hysteria, increased military expenditures, red-scares, and loss of faith in democratic processes. But this insecurity is compounded of fears other than economic. Feeling secure

[18] Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage,* American Council on Education, 1940, p. 251.

involves a sense of acceptance, confidence in one's own worth, status with one's group, respectability, a recognition of achievement, comradeship in a common task. Labor unions have endeavored (in some cases with extraordinary success, as in the textile unions) to augument the economic interests of their members through cultural activities; informal and creative drama, orchestras, fine arts and handicrafts, a union magazine, social events to develop poise, self-confidence, *savoir-faire*. In fact, the economic element emerges only on rare occasions. Through these cultural activities it has been possible in local unions to implement national interracial policy, so that interracial membership is not only enforced but enjoyed. Yet the unions are themselves but a segment of the community; in their very isolation is bred a contempt for the bourgeois mind, a reaction arising out of a knowledge that socially they are not yet "accepted."

Now it is in the social class structure of the community that the deeper issue of modern insecurity lies. The crucial need in American communities is to keep class stratification from becoming solidified. A number of recent extensive field studies of social stratification confirm this. One study by Warner and Lunt of "Yankee City" in New England, sponsored by Harvard University, is somewhat typical in its results.[19] Practically every family in this community of 17,000 was included in the study. Through personal interview, observation, and cross reference the investigators distinguished six social classes in "Yankee City" and were able to place every individual specifically in one such class. It was found that within each class, intimate social relations (such as entertainment in homes, membership in social cliques, heterosexual relations) were approved, but these same relationships were denied outside the class. The social aloofness between the two lower classes was most marked, as was also that between the two middle classes. The two lower classes with sixty per cent of the population had ninety per cent of the unemployment and the smallest percentage of the fully employed. As factor after factor is studied, the gulfs between social classes widen. Not that people do not cross these gulfs. But social adjustment becomes far more difficult for them as class differences increase. On every count the lower sixty per cent are down in the cellar: job opportunity, income, regularity of employment, educational opportunity, ownership of property, political appointments, access to community facilities and utilities, treatment by police and the courts, health conditions, etc., etc. To them what do such ideals as "free enterprise," "individual freedom," "personal worth," "equality of opportunity" mean? For those who pass store windows packed with goods which they cannot buy these ideals have little relevance. In mass meetings addressed by

[19] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *Social Life of a Modern Community*, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. 81-91.

members of their own class these are *not* the ideals held before them. But such ideals pervade the schools, fill the halls of commencement oratory, decorate the walls of the chamber of commerce, and resound in pulpits.

Now the social psychologist and mental hygienist appraise this situation in this way: the parents mold the child's character; in turn, the parents' character and their methods of child training are part and parcel of the social structure of their class culture. The character structure of the child and the parents (*i.e.*, "the total character organization") is acquired by the specific ways in which people relate themselves to other people.[20] The class stratification therefore becomes of vital importance because it functions precisely at that point; *i.e.*, it determines the ways people relate themselves to each other. For the lower classes who have not "arrived," a conflict exists between the democratic ideals of personal achievement and individual worth and the frustrations and obstacles to individual advancement imposed by the class structure. This disharmony generates a deep, persistent need for some kind of integrity and equilibrium within. The overt expressions of this conflict are class snobbishness; claims of mythical qualities and virtues, even among the disinherited classes; resentment expressed in continual demands for increased wages; reckless disregard for continuity of production; "feather-bedding," etc. But these negative responses do not restore harmony. Quoting from one authority: "emptiness and planlessness of the individual life, lack of achievement and therefore lack of faith in oneself, if prolonged, result in emotional and mental disturbances which incapacitate man even from the achievement of his material aims."[21] Blocked in his development, "he reverts to primitive systems," to blind adherence to dominating leaders. The only way in which a real harmony can be restored to these individuals and social neuroses avoided, say Dr. Fromm, is by creating for him "frames of orientation and devotion," "devotion to an aim, an idea or a power transcending man such as God, in order to give him a sense of completeness."[22]

This dynamic interpretation of contemporary social conflict stands in marked contrast to the social determinism found among some churchmen. The latter are inclined to regard the social situation as the impartial operation of the law of competition; the lower classes are where they are because of their incapacity; or because "the poor ye have with you always"; or because the end of the world will come soon. An excursion into fact-finding at this point may improve spiritual insight. Consider a few examples of these "disinherited classes." Some twenty-five years ago, George

[20] Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself*, Farrar and Rinehart, 1947, pp. 58 ff.
[21] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, p. 249.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

Counts[23] established on the basis of field studies the existence of a social and economic selective factor in high schools, *i.e.,* that continuance in high school to graduation was affected more by the social and economic status of the family than by the native capacity of the student. More recently, President Conant, of Harvard, has pointed out America's waste of talent through denying education to many American youth, more capable than some who were favored with college opportunity.[24] Studies of Negro ability indicate that negro-white differences, when they occur, are due to environmental rather than racial factors.[25] An interesting report on the illiterates in the United States Armed Services reveal that eighty-four per cent of the 324,126 inducted into the Army successfully completed an *eight-weeks* course of training, equivalent to *fourth-grade* achievement; and incidentally, eighty-five per cent of the Negroes successfully completed the course, compared with eighty-three per cent of the whites. The Navy studied the background of its illiterates, with the conclusion that illiteracy was the result of family and community environment, not of mental deficiency. On the basis of a nonverbal test, the Navy found but "slight difference" between the illiterate recruits, who successfully passed the training course, and the average regular recruits in the entire Navy.[26]

Consider another segment of the defeated people in local communities: those in juvenile crime. The more aggressive, independent, self-reliant youngsters get into crime. Crowded living conditions for families, bad housing, lack of supervised play, poor schools, unemployment, illicit trades—all these breed young delinquents. These delinquents are then picked up by the police. "In 1946," a federal official of the Bureau of Prisons writes, "between 50,000 and 100,000 children between 7 and 15 were thrown into jails" for minor offenses, usually such as school truancy, or because they were trespassing, or abandoned by parents, etc. Here they are indiscriminatingly thrown with hardened criminals.[27] The Federal Bureau of Prisons has set certain minimum standards for jails; yet the Bureau reported in 1937 that sixty-five per cent of all United States jails had met less than fifty per cent of these minimum federal requirements. In 1945, this percentage rose to eighty per cent; and in 1946, eighty-two per cent of the jails were under a fifty per cent rating by federal standards. Now who determines the standards of the local jail? Who approves a policy which permits police to wink at delinquencies of children in middle-

[23] George S. Counts, *Selective Character of American Secondary Education,* University of Chicago, 1922, p. 22.

[24] James B. Conant, *Supplemental Educational Monographs,* No. 19, University of Chicago.

[25] Gene Weltfish and Ruth Benedict, *Races of Mankind,* Public Affairs Pamphlet, 1944.

[26] Cyril O. Houle *et al., The Armed Services and Adult Education,* American Council of Education, 1947, pp. 172-191.

[27] *Latest Ratings of City and County Jails and Work-Houses, inspected July 1, 1930 to June 30, 1947,* Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Washington.

and upper-class residential areas ("Take the kids home in a car"), but to throw them indiscriminatingly into jails if found in poorer sections? Who makes these policies? The local community, citizens, judges, public officials, church people.

Perhaps the most serious barrier between the upper middle and satisfied classes and the working classes is a psychological one, created by the lack of intimate social contact and persisting for the same reason. The organized working classes and the unions have developed an ethical system quite contrary to middle-class (bourgeois) individualistic ethics. The core of this ethical system is "solidarity," the discipline of the union, the party; the key word is *comrade*. The electrical union, I am told by one of its members, requires that among every four men hired for one job, one must be over fifty years of age. This guarantees security in later years, and assures an income the same as that of younger, stronger men, whose output might be double. The bricklayers eliminate individual competition likewise by setting the maximum number of bricks to be laid in a day at a standard older men can attain. When it comes to technological improvements, machine efficiency, increased production, unions place first the security of their jobs. From their standpoint, industrial advance (*i.e.*, increased profits) can wait. Union rules are maintained by threat of fines or excommunication.

This ethical outlook arises out of the class solidarity, which results from the frustration of disinherited classes to overcome class barriers; it characterizes the working-class movement around the world. Individual achievement, worth of individual personality, personal freedom and equality, so much a part of the contemporary Christian ethic, have been replaced by collective ideals of group solidarity, comradeship, and security. This is the psychological barrier. Churches are the most obvious institution for dealing with these divisive forces in the community. Their membership is generally representative of all classes in the community.[28] They have the ideal of a common fellowship of all peoples, whatever the nation, class, or race; they provide social status, self-respect. Most of all through worship they vastly extend the individual's orientation to a wider system of values than those of his immediate environment. But the disturbing fact is that churches are organized to extend the class structure rather than to overcome it. Denominations have become extensions of class stratification, as studies of local church memberships reveal.[29] And churches operate, denominationwise rather than communitywise. This social fact, more than any other, is the basic reason why the vertical, multidenomina-

[28] See *Information Service*, May 15, 1948, Federal Council of Churches, Study No. 10.

[29] *Preliminary Paper*, prepared for the Conference on Church and Community, International Council on Religious Education, Chicago, 1947, by Robert Havighurst.

tional approach to the community is not working. The community is the core of our contemporary social problem of unity. Here is where it must be solved. Can the Protestant churches act at the point of crucial operation? This brings us next to the question of the nature of the Protestant churches.

The Nature of Protestantism

Is Protestantism adapted to the kind of community approach which the contemporary religious situation requires? Or are we, as Professor Tillich suggests we may be, at the "end of the Protestant Era?" [30]

Two recognized, indispensable features of Protestanism have been its sectarian character (*i.e.,* its principle of protest and historical relativism) and its lay character (*i.e.,* its denial of a superior ecclesiastical authority). These two factors have interacted upon each other since the Reformation. The sect, perennially arising out of protest, sought to perpetuate itself, sometimes by isolation and withdrawal from society, sometimes by evolving cultic and ecclesiastical prerogatives and claims. These latter at times encroached upon the lay character of Protestantism and emasculated its inherent power, as, for example, in the state churches of Europe, the emergence of the episcopate and of liturgical churches, the domination of laity by clergy even in Presbyterianism where a formal equality exists. The more the lay power became eclipsed by ecclesiasticism, the more emphasis shifted from conduct to cultus, and the sectarian principle became not a principle of ethical protest against the existing order but a principle of cultic exclusion, of setting the sacred apart from the secular order.

It can scarcely be denied that Protestantism had a great deal to do with the secularizing tendency of the modern period. This tendency, instead of being appraised in terms of its relation to the Protestant lay principle, has been singled out as the demon and source of evil in our modern life. Both among our contemporary theologians and among religious educators, there is a strong stream of reiterated protest against so-called "secular forces," and an urgent plea for "religious forces" to take command. Instead of assuming a positive moral leadership in the face of our contemporary confusion and cultural disorientation, these leaders have turned to a "theology of crisis" and liturgical reconstruction, where moral speculation about the extent of human guilt and self-delusion may safely be carried on without social responsibility for concurrent events. Their analysis of the nature of the crisis runs somewhat as follows: On one side stand the secular forces, demonic in their nature, which threaten to overwhelm and destroy civilization. On the other side stand the churches, the forces of goodness and light. This dualism of the demonic powers and

[30] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era,* University of Chicago Press, 1948, chap. xv.

the powers of God, resembling the Persian dualism of light and darkness which underlies the Pauline eschatology, is fortified by a mediæval theology in modern dress, with its sharpened distinction between the area of the sacred and the area of the secular. Neoörthodox dualism, with its somewhat sophisticated "mythical" interpretation of traditional theology, has its counterpart among the fundamentalists, whose doctrine of dispensationalism sets up a deep chasm between the present (evil) world and the future (good).

On the basis of this analysis, which I believe is essentially escapist, two lines of interpretation have become current, each seeking to establish a clear distinction between "Christian" and "secular." On the one hand, an attempt is made to set apart "Christian" schools and colleges, "Christian" social work, "Christian" life vocations, etc. Recently a group of distinguished Protestant leaders, lamenting the secularism in public schools, declared in favor of the diversion of public funds to parochial education. This obviously implies a Protestant parochial school system. Others in this group, fearful of secularized amusements, urge that the church compete in the commercial entertainment field. The logic of this development would be an ecclesiastical system of control: Protestant schools and colleges, Protestant social work, Protestant athletics, Protestant amusements, Protestant guilds and clubs. And one is inclined to ask, Why not Protestant science, Protestant mathematics, a Protestant index on reading matter, a Protestant political party?

The second line of interpretation is toward a liturgical revival. They seek the restoration of "THE CHURCH" as the historic embodiment of the Christian message in creeds, doctrine, and symbols. In this manner the Christian becomes distinguished from the secularist by adherence to an ancient ritual, a system of doctrine, and a common creed. Theological formulation is made basic and prior to action, on the assumption that only from right belief can right conduct follow. Cultic uniformity or minimal creedal agreement become the basis for interdenominational coöperation; thus primary concern is centred upon creedal, theological questions and forms of worship rather than upon conduct.

Both lines of interpretation, each seeking a more disciplined Christian fellowship, have good in them. But unfortunately, based upon an arbitrary dualism of sacred/secular, and requiring a growing ecclesiasticism, they destroy the inherent, native power of Protestantism, and seek an *"ersatz* Catholicism," as Nichols[21] calls it. For it is of the essence of Protestantism that the sacred is in the secular and the secular in the sacred. For to be truly religious is, in the words of Professor Tillich, "being unconditionally concerned, whether that concern expresses itself in secular

[21] James Nichols, *Primer for Protestants,* Association Press, p. 148.

or religious forms."[32] The secular and the religious are one world, God's world; this one world is the world of the daily vocation, where, as Calvin said, God's glory shines through the deed.

Protestantism has inherent potentialities for the penetration of the organs and structure of society: such as the family, the social class, the clique, the occupation, the political party, the organization, the community. This is achieved by means of its lay character, its sectarian principle of ethical protest, its intolerance of ecclesiastical arrogance and presumption, its integral view of the world. These constitute the powerful elements for social transformation in Protestantism, not correct theological formulation or ecclesiastical power. Protestantism has been a unique development in the history of religions. The daily vocation in the local community is the actual scene for the fulfillment of the religious life. James Nichols calls this "the means of the greatest penetration of Christianity into culture which the history of the faith has seen."[33] Mr. Hsu, one of Crozer's Chinese students, has said that although Protestants constitute but one fifth of Chinese Christians, their influence upon the whole of Chinese culture, its social, political, civic, and educational institutions, has been incomparably more profound and permeating than that of others.

In America our imperative need is in some manner to release the leaven of the gospel into the intricate patterns of human relations in local community living. Protestantism seems uniquely, providentially, fitted to do this, if its vital energies are not consumed in self-analysis and an unrelieved concern about the futility of all human effort. This now brings us to a more specific determination as to what constitutes the church's task today.

The Function of the Church in the Community

How, then, may the function of the church in the community be defined? The scientific study of religion in the last half-century altered the course of thinking about religion, which characterized the middle of the last century and, even more recently, the '20's when Walter Lippmann, Harry Elmer Barnes, Joseph Wood Krutch were the idols of flaming youth. The Russian experiment has been impressive. Here on a scale without precedent, religion was to be extirpated root and branch. It survived, in a much chastened, much rejuvenated, form it is true; but its indispensability, its necessity in Soviet culture, has been officially recognized. But it is not necessary to rest the case for religion on this or other historical situations. Extensive field studies in the character of culture have led to a generally accepted conclusion that religion is an integral part

[32] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, p. xv.
[33] *Op cit.*, p. 138.

of every culture, is indispensable indeed to it. Sorokin puts it in this typical fashion: "The decay of one religion is followed by the ascent of another,"[34] and another somewhat more precisely writes: "Religion is the substance of culture, and culture the form of religion."[35]

The scientific analysis of religion seems to suggest an ambivalent nature, an integrating, unifying tendency on the one hand, and a restless urge to extend its borders on the other. These tendencies might be called the centripetal and the centrifugal forces in religion. The integrating tendency centres around the object of worship, expressed through such elements as the symbols, creeds, hymns, sacraments, vestments, etc., which as a whole constitute the "cultus." Since worship is primarily a symbolic, a representative act, it appeals to and relies upon the imaginative, emotional, human motivations. In a sacrament, for example, an object in the natural world—water, food, wine, a holy place, flowers—is brought into the scene of worship, a new setting, where the eye perceives a spiritual quality, a new meaning in the object. The difference between the Protestant view of a sacrament and that of an ecclesiastical religion is that the latter believes the natural object is suddenly and miraculously transformed into something other than it is. It is thus set aside as a *sacred* object. The Protestant view is that the spiritual character of the object is inherent, it is always there, it remains there; but only through a second insight, a new sense, does the mind grasp the spiritual character of the object. This means all life is sacramental, all has a spiritual significance.

I recall in paraphrase the remarks of a distinguished anthropologist in a personal conversation about this character of religion: "Few people understand the nature of the human forces involved in worship. In the cultus, the most subtle and the most profound powers in human life are plumbed. There are subconscious needs, deep motivations and aspirations, which are touched through the symbolic act of worship." I asked then if elaborate ritual was the more effective. The scientist replied by citing the Quakers and pointing out the danger of a refined, laborious ritual becoming a routine, exacting blind loyalty rather than awakening the inner subconscious powers. "These inner forces may be more truly released by reflecting upon contemporary experience so that its deeper spiritual significance is perceived. If this is done, religion can become the most potent integrating factor in modern community life."

The function of the Protestant church in the community may therefore be described in terms of these two aspects of religion. On the one hand, the local church needs to be self-consistent, strong and secure within itself. Corporate unity and integrity seem to require, primarily, a cultus

[34] P. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 691.
[35] P. Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

which effectively explores the inner imaginative and creative human capacities. In some respects modern drama, poetry, and painting reflect spiritual insight which the churches miss. Perhaps the anthropologist quoted above was right in putting a finger on the need for contemporaneity in our modes of worship. Amos Wilder, in his *Spiritual Aspects of the New Poetry,* points out the genuine religious insight in the writings of Robinson Jeffers, Vachel Lindsay, T. S. Elliot, Robert Frost, Witter Bynner, and others. In the play "And He Did Hide Himself" by an Italian writer of the Underground, in the final scene by the bier of the young radical, a martyr to the cause of the working class, the familiar words spoken there have an effect upon the audience more profound than is usually perceived in the church: "This is my body, broken for you; this is my blood, given for you." Old words, but in a new meaning, a meaning having relevance, compelling relevance for life in our time. It is this type of liturgical revival that we need.

On the other hand, the local church needs to reach out beyond its own structure, to exploit the centrifugal forces in religion. These forces emerge because human nature is dynamic; inherently man grows, explores, expands. St. Francis of Assisi expressed it: "'The world is our cloister." Applying this to the community, it is to say, the church needs *to comprehend the whole community.* This is not the state church concept—every citizen a member of the church; nor the ecclesiastical concept—spiritual authority over the community; nor the evangelistic goal—every citizen a converted member; nor Calvin's concept at Geneva, of disciplinary control over morals and belief. Rather, it is for the church to keep continually before it (a) in worship, (b) in planning, (c) in operation, the life of the whole community. However, the vertical denominational structure tends to canalize these centrifugal forces outside the community. It is now relatively easy, with modern technology, for a local church to aid Chinese flood sufferers, lepers in Moluccas, DP's in Europe, a medical station in the Cameroun. Such outreach costs American churches approximately $6 per member per year—the price of two football tickets. It is far more difficult to plan jointly with other local churches, having different forms of worship and social positions, how to create a larger parish, eliminate restrictive covenants, overcome illiteracy, provide equal opportunity for the people underprivileged, extend health facilities, bind together more closely the church and the public school.

So much for the general functions of the church. Three specific functions may be deduced from the nature of Protestantism itself. These can be mentioned only briefly. First, the church regards all agencies, groups, organizations, institutions of the community as potential spiritual forces. It therefore works through them or with them, rather than creating a rival

set of agencies or institutions. The church's method is that of persuasion, criticism, and conciliation, not that of control, direct or indirect. Often religious people regard politics as "dirty," labor unions as "highhanded," economic matters as "outside the church's competence," law enforcement as "too negative." This view usually reflects more a class character than it does Christian insight.

The second specific function of the church in the community is that it is to operate through the daily vocations of its members. This is an almost forgotten function today. To many, the church is always to be represented in the community by the pastor. He must sit on committees; attend functions; be an authority on housing, race relations, care for the aged, control of venereal disease, juvenile delinquency, and the real estate tax rate. The actual experts in these fields and others are those members of the church having special talents, skills, abilities, and occupational experience. What they need—which most Christian laymen today lack—is some understanding of the bearing which the gospel has upon the human relationships which operate every hour and day within their respective vocations and interest groups. The function of the church, therefore, under the skillful leadership of the pastor is the preparation and training of the laity for this task. The pastor would need to know his community thoroughly but not need to disperse his energies; instead he would concentrate them on the congregation. He would use the strategy of small groups, cells, individual action rather than seek approval for every move by the entire congregation; he would constantly call on the expert to aid him in this training. He would see the church, not as a specialist in community affairs, tinkering with this, repairing that; patching here, restoring there; rushing from one emergency to another—a session on public health today, a conference on the control of atomic energy tomorrow. He would see the church approach the community, integrally, as a whole, and become one of the means for preserving the unity and cohesion of community life.

The third specific function of the church is that to which reference has just been made: it is to preserve the wholeness, the integrity of the community. More than any other institution, the church must "see life steadily and see it whole." The church looks at people rather than at problems; it deals with people as whole beings, not as fragments, not as "souls" divorced from the material secular bodies. This means that the church works primarily through the two institutions in which people are seen as wholes rather than parts: the family and the community itself. In the family and the community the fragments of individual living are most completely pieced together. In the school, the club life, the professional society, the union, the occupation, the lodge, the individual lives only part

of his life. There may be no real coherent unity among these various groups to which he belongs. But if our analysis of the family and the community environment is approximately true, then the most comprehensive units of living are the family and the community. This approach strikes directly at some of the sources of cultural disintegration: atomistic living, fear and insecurity, the hardening of class lines. It is the fact that the church is primarily concerned with people, not with things, that frees it for the task uniquely.

What in conclusion may be said to be the implications of this interpretation for the significance of the community in the present religious situation? First, a fundamental shift in strategy by the churches from a vertical to horizontal operation, *i.e.,* communitywise rather than denominationwise. Cultic differences should be accepted for what they are in true Protestant tradition—historical relativities, human preferences, not barriers to corporate fellowship in matters of conduct.

Second, a philosophy of community is seriously needed—a philosophy which correlates the work of social scientists with the teachings and insights of the Christian religion. Such would provide a common meeting ground and would also become the basis for a new strategy in Christian work. Inevitably if this were accomplished, the ethical scope of Protestantism would be broadened to include the proletariat, and a truer balance between cultic (*i.e.,* centripetal) interests and ethical (*i.e.,* centrifugal) interests would result.

Third, the church as an imperial, territorial force has become overextended. While organic unions, ecumenical coöperation, a World Council are essentially goals, they have been developed at the expense of not mastering the problems of the home base. It is not that these things are not noble achievements; it is that they have no roots, they give a false sense of strength by their external size and structure.

Fourth, the real danger confronting the church is not that it will be destroyed, that it is too weak to perform its function, that it will lack prestige and public respect. The danger is that it will become largely a ceremonial affair, "where people go and sit on comfortable benches, waiting patiently until time to go home to their Sunday dinner."[36] The danger is that religion may become a holy hide-out, a place of retreat into silent pools and eddies of isolation, ignored by the masses and irrelevant.

Fifth, the hope, the real hope we may have, rests in faith upon the essential relevance of the Christian religion. Protestantism is peculiarly equipped, by God's grace, with those things which today requires. Who knows but that she may have a rendezvous with Destiny.

[36] Elton Trueblood, *Alternative to Futility,* Harper, 1948, p. 31.

SOURCES AND RESULTS OF AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF EVIL

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In his famous polemic against Marcion, Tertullian says, "Like many men of our time, and especially the heretics, he is bewildered by the question of evil." In a profound sense, this statement applies to Augustine and his attempt to reach an understanding of the problem of evil. That he solved this problem to his own satisfaction cannot be denied, but that he left confusion in the wake of his solution has become quite apparent as the church grapples with the tensions of the twentieth century. The purpose of this article is to examine Augustine's theory of evil, relating it to its source of origin, and seek to determine whether or not Augustine had sufficient power to break with the prevailing dualism of the Græco-Roman world and to establish the church's concept of evil on a firm foundation of Christian monism.

I

St. Augustine was one of those many-sided creative personalities who occasionally flash across a narrow area of human history, but who remain profound and disturbing influences long after they have disappeared from their particular historical areas. And since Christianity is linked inevitably to man's mind, as well as his heart, Christianity is, in a great measure, the sum total of the thinking of the creative personalities who have appeared within its organization. It is for this reason, for example, that the church can speak of Pauline theology, of Calvinism, and of Augustinianism. So it is, that one cannot conceive of Christianity without drawing into the compass of one's mind the creative personalities who dug the intellectual channels through which Christian thought was made to flow. Augustine was one of these creative personalities, and he labored so well, and dug his intellectual channel so deep, that Christian thought has not yet risen above the channel he created. The consequence of this has been that Augustine became an intellectual dictator, dominating the thinking of the church for the last fifteen hundred years. It is this very fact, the fact that he has dominated the church's thinking for so long a period, that makes Augustine a disturbing influence. If our social, political, economic, moral, and religious environment and attitudes had remained constant, in a state of *status quo,* as it were, since the time of Augustine, his influence could hardly be disturbing. But since, as Heraclitus long ago observed, "All things flow," and since man does live in an ever-changing environment, it becomes a disturbing factor to

have as an authority one who long ago passed beyond the changes of this changing world.

It should be clear, at this date, that Augustine did not reveal Christianity to mankind, nor was he its founder, and therefore his hold on the church's mind is not absolute. Augustine was a thinker, not a prophet; he was an ecclesiastic of the church, not its founder. Being a thinker, it was inevitable that his Christianity would be conceived as a philosophy, but in addition to this, because he was a thinker, it became necessary for him to fix the results of his thinking, *i.e.,* his Christianity, into an organization and institution which would have its appropriate place in the social environment. As a thinker, he was driven to be an ecclesiastic, and the church of the Middle Ages, and, indeed, the Roman Church of today, continue to be a vociferous and fulminating testimony to the thoroughness of Augustine's ecclesiastical piety. However, even more disturbing is the fact that Augustine continues to hold sway over those who profess to be in protest against the ecclesiastical order he erected. Protestant theologians, it appears, divide Augustine into two persons—a theologian and an ecclesiastic; they then reject him as an ecclesiastic, but accept him as a theologian, apparently never being aware of the inherent irresolvability of this contradiction. Our Roman brethren, not having to deal with an irresolvable contradiction, continue to give undivided expression to religious despotism, while euphoniously calling it "the true faith." The Protestants, on the other hand, knowing that religious despotism is not Christian, seek to rise above such a point of view, but they seek to do so on the theological foundation of Augustine. The consequence of this is that, while Protestantism avoids despotism, in its ecclesiastical organization, it does not avoid theological despotism. It should be quite clear that Augustine cannot be divided into two persons, *i.e.,* a theologian and an ecclesiastic. His work as an ecclesiastic is simply the logical and necessary outcome of his work as a theologian; it is all part of the same process, and not two separate functions. Thus, to build on Augustine, one must erect a structure, the keystone of which must be theological despotism. This despotism is clearly revealed in the doctrine of sin, which the church has inherited from Augustine.

II

Before discussing Augustine's theories of the origin of evil and sin, there must be some understanding of the man and his life, for although he became a Christian, he traveled a devious path before he reached that goal. He was born at Tagaste, a small community in North Africa, in A.D. 354. His father was a pagan, while his mother was a Christian. While he was still a child, his mother taught him what she considered

to be the Christian faith. However, in all probability, her conception of the Christian faith was quite superstitious, since Augustine later rejected Christianity, because he considered it decidedly inferior to the prevailing rationalism of the times. On entering his adolescence, Augustine gradually was awakened to the fact that he had a great yearning for knowledge and learning, but with this thirst for knowledge there came also a strong passionate nature, and very early not only was he tormented by the sins of the flesh, but they also actively occupied him. He was sixteen years old, and a student at Carthage, when he took a mistress, with whom he lived for fourteen years, and by whom he had a son. As a consequence, resulting from this liaison, very early there developed within Augustine a great conflict between his passion for knowledge and his bodily passion. Thus we see that at the very outset of his intellectual life, Augustine was confronted by the problem of evil through a tormenting personal experience. The intense personal nature of this conflict laid the foundation for Augustine's subjective point of view, which, in turn, has been one of the reasons for his popularity and authority in the church. By having a subjective point of view, the attractive element of personal warmth appears, and when couched in terms of mystical piety, as in his *Confessions,* each person coming into contact with it finds that it is like reading an account from his own life; one sees oneself reflected, and so it is easy to place the stamp of authority upon it. It is this subjective element in Augustine which always calls forth a personal response that has helped to make him appear authoritative to later generations.

As an outgrowth of this conflict between intellectual and sensual passion within him, Augustine finally decided, at the age of nineteen, and after reading Cicero's *Hortensius,* that he would henceforth seek truth and hold worldly pleasure in contempt. Unfortunately, the maturity of this conversion to truth can be seriously questioned, for he did not sever his liaison with his mistress, and we also know that his concept of purity was unrelated in a vital way to his desire for truth, as he continued to pray, "Grant me chastity, but not yet."[1] Desiring truth, and yet unwilling to give up an immoral relationship, shows considerable immaturity, but at least his prayer did reveal the incipience of that apprehension which opened to him the prospect that his ideals, and his conduct, would have to be harmonized. At any rate, it is important to note that Augustine's amorphous inner life first began to take shape around the problem of evil. But, since he was too young in years to be a philosopher of any subtility or depth, it was natural for him to seek to resolve his problem of evil by turning to the most attractive solution of this problem, namely, unsophisticated dualism, or that type of dualism

[1] *Confessions* VIII, 7.

which baldly claims that there exists an evil being who is coeternal with a good being. Accepting this principle of two beings—one good and one evil, who radically oppose each other—it was natural for Augustine to attach himself to the Manichæan sect. This religious group, at that time, was very strong, and very popular, as it claimed to be a higher and more rational form of Christianity.

The Manichæan sect was a syncretistic dualistic system, and although it contained elements from Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism, it combined these elements in a unique manner, and with an originality that prevented it from being a mere conglomerate religion. According to Mani (A.D. 215-276) the founder, there were two powers in the universe who were in a state of perpetual war; the power of light and the power of darkness. The darkness attacked the light, and in order to repel the attack, the god of light made primeval man. However, in the ensuing battle, Satan won over primeval man, and by his victory he imprisoned in his darkness elements of light. This the god of light could not tolerate; so he fashioned the world for the express purpose of helping these captured portions of light to escape. Now, Satan, in order to keep in his possession the elements of light, created Adam and Eve, in whom he placed the light captured from primeval man. Adam was created out of lust by Satan, and thus Satan had one in his possession whom he could control, and yet who at the same time had elements of light. However, the god of light decided to frustrate the realm of darkness by sending Jesus to warn Adam and Eve not to fall prey to the senses, and to inform them also of the fact that they held elements of light which Satan was seeking to keep and to control by his power over them. Accordingly, to the Manichæans, the purpose of Jesus was to bring salvation by having man hold to the correct knowledge of man's nature, to understand the nature of man's slavery to Satan, and finally to create the desire to return to the realm of light. It was the religious duty of all Manichæans, therefore, to strive to liberate the elements of light within themselves from the realm of darkness. This liberation could only be attained by vigorous ascetic practices, which rejected everything belonging to the realm of darkness. This asceticism was so strict that not everyone could adhere faithfully to its rigorous demands, with the consequence that it became necessary to divide their followers into two classes: "the elect," who fulfilled the demands of the religion; and "the hearers," who accepted the teachings, but did not practice the full austerities.[2]

The chief aim of the Manichæans was thus to draw out the good

[2] For more detail on Mani and the sect he founded see Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Vol. 3, pp. 316-336; also the article by A. A. Bevan in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 8, pp. 394-402; F. C. Burkitt's *Religion of the Manichees*.

which is imprisoned in matter; they did not seek to obliterate evil from the world; rather, they sought to free the divine element in man so that this divine element could return to its heavenly source. Manichæanism thus presented a fairly simple solution to the problem of good and evil, which would be readily welcomed by a young man caught in the turmoil of passion and a desire for truth which Augustine found in himself at the age of nineteen. By following Manichæanism, Augustine did not have to face the moral issue his life created, because he could rationalize around it and devote his energy to a metaphysical separation of good and evil. By separating good and evil metaphysically, the effort was intellectual rather than moral, and the movement was thus directed toward the extracting of the good and the releasing of the divine, rather than the repression and submission of evil to the good. From the point of view of psychology this would be an exceedingly attractive conception for a young man not yet morally mature, and so it was quite natural for Augustine to identify himself with the Manichæans in the capacity of a "hearer." But as he emerged from his youthful adolescence into manhood, his restless mind finally broke through the surface of the complicated cosmology of the Manichæans, and he discovered that it was neither profound nor satisfying, insofar that it did not help him to reconcile his thirst for knowledge and truth and his slavery to the passions of his body. So it happened that his mind, restless and groping, contending with his great inner conflict, and unable to find that intellectual rest it needed, turned Augustine into a period of intellectual skepticism and the formal abandonment of the Manichæan sect.

Augustine's intellectual skepticism lasted for a period of three years. Just how deep his skepticism penetrated into that area of philosophical questioning where life itself becomes meaningless, we have no sure way of knowing, but since his mind was of the type that had to have certitude and rest, even though restless, it can be assumed that his skepticism did not go so deep into the abyss of despair as to destroy completely all hope of finding certitude. Thus, because his skepticism did not actually plumb the depths, he was not moved to turn to a religious solution of his mental state. On the contrary, the power that rescued Augustine and enabled him to climb out of the distress of skepticism was philosophical speculation. It was philosophical seeking, rather than religious seeking, which finally led him to the ladder which enabled him to climb to the level of certainty, and to find mental rest. Specifically, it was the philosophy of Plotinus, the Neoplatonist, rather than the religion of Christ, that rescued Augustine. Under the soothing influence of the philosophical balm created by Plotinus, Augustine finally was able to come to an agreeable solution of his inner conflict and problem of how to be a seeker of truth, and not

be under the sway of passions which take one away from truth. It was the Neoplatonic concept of evil which gave his mind that resting place from which it could view life in repose and contentment. At last, Augustine was able to understand evil to his own satisfaction: evil is negation; it is that point furthest removed from God; therefore it is nonbeing. Evil is not positive, it is negative; evil is evil, only when it is not. Thus, by means of Neoplatonic jugglery, Augustine was able to palliate evil, and thereby it lost its terror for him; for why should one be disturbed by that which can be shown to have no real being? Having been enlightened philosophically, Augustine could now return to the church of his youth, and was baptized a Christian by the eloquent Ambrose of Milan. Ten years later, in 396, Augustine became bishop of Hippo, in North Africa; and here, in this out-of-the-way diocese, he became the mastermind of the church for the centuries following him.

III

Very briefly, this was the manner by which Augustine became a convert to Christianity. It can be readily seen that his conversion from one step to another in his journey to Christianity moved always through his intellect. It was always the intellectual problem which confronted him, rather than the moral aspect of the problem. He lacked the depth of a St. Paul when confronted with good and evil. Paul is the prophet who experiences evil tragically in his soul; Paul stands unreconciled to God because he has not walked correctly the path God has laid down. Augustine is the philosopher who sees evil as a necessary part of man's nature. Paul sees a moral problem in evil; Augustine sees a metaphysical problem.

Now, turning to Augustine's specific solution of the problem of the origin of evil and sin, we must begin with his conception of God. In his teaching on the relation of God to the world and evil, Augustine is fundamentally a Neoplatonic philosopher, rather than a profound Christian. To the Christian, God is the Creator, whose motivation is love, and by this love we are brought into oneness with him. He is our Father, and we are his children. However, to Augustine this concept and experience of God as a loving Father is foreign, because he approaches the problem philosophically. To Augustine, God is the highest good, who is in himself completely self-sufficient.[3] To him, then, only God has real existence, and he is unchangeable, and he is furthest removed from nonexistence.[4] God is thus the absolute being who is above all the flux of life. This is very important to Augustine, for he sees everything existing in a state of change; which, in turn, is most distasteful to him, since as

[3] This claim of Augustine that God is self-sufficient presents an interesting contradiction, for while self-sufficiency is good in God, in man it is sin.

[4] This is discussed in the treatise, *Concerning the Trinity* v, 2.

long as there is change, there cannot be real being. But, in God, real being is found, because God is the one unchangeable, permanent "true and eternal substance." He is the one resting point in a world of flux. Since God is the one resting point, it follows then that God is the one to be sought and to depend upon. It is in this Neoplatonic manner that Augustine arrives at the conclusion that God is man's highest good.

It would appear from this, then, that all man must do, in order to have joy and peace, is to depend upon God. But, since this does not happen, Augustine must find a reason. The reason man does not have joy and peace by depending upon God is that man has an inherent tendency within his nature which causes him ineluctably to go away from God. According to Augustine, when God made the world, he did not use any of his substance in fashioning the world, but he created it out of nothing. By insisting that creation was out of nothing Augustine establishes a principle which is diametrically opposed to the absolute good, or God. It is the principle of "nothing," for he says, "This I do know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing can."[5] It follows, then, that when natures become defective, they become so because of the principle of nothing out of which they have been created. Accordingly, there is introduced the idea that this "nothing" has movement within itself, which, in turn, causes things, or natures, to slip away from God. He says specifically: "Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from him, this is because it is made out of nothing."[6] From this we see that, to Augustine, evil is loss of being, or negation. Thus, all the evil which abounds is caused by this movement, inherent within all created things, to return to the condition of nothing from which they came.

Establishing evil on this Neoplatonic basis, Augustine then applies this to man, and here he arrives at an interesting conclusion. Man, being created out of nothing, has the movement within him which causes him to slip into nothingness. Because of this inherent movement away from being, man can only choose the lesser good. The fact that man is a nature created out of nothing perverts his will. So man's will always makes the lesser good his choice, and this is man's sin, and is something impossible to avoid. In order to overcome this, man needs a power not his own. This power he receives from God in the form of grace. Thus, it is grace, and grace alone, that saves man. This grace does not remove man's inherent movement toward nothingness. This always remains; but the grace of God, operating on man through the church and sacraments, overpowers this movement in man.

[5] *City of God* XII, 8. [6] *City of God* XIV, 13.

With this neat and rather elaborate system Augustine did not need to explain evil by the "fall" of Adam. Adam's "fall" and its consequences were merely methods used by Augustine in order to give biblical authority to his theory. As a matter of fact, observing how he worked out his theory by using Adam's "fall," we are able to see that he was loyal to his Neoplatonic teachers and, at the same time, carried over into his theory a Manichæan idea. The introduction of a Manichæan idea has caused some confusion, but it does not change the basic foundation.

Augustine tells us that originally man was so constituted that he "was able not to sin, was able not to die, was able not to forsake the good."[7] However, since Adam was created out of nothing, Adam had within him the movement to return to nothingness. This causes Adam to choose the lesser good, which means that Adam chose self rather than God. Pride became Adam's sin which he could not avoid. We are told that "Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted" and, therefore, "'This falling away is spontaneous."[8] Accordingly, Adam was forced to choose evil because of an inherent and necessary defect in his nature, which resulted from being created out of nothing. Thus, Adam "fell" out of necessity, and in falling the freedom of being "'able not to sin" was lost, and lost so completely that thereafter he was able only to sin and to be sinful. This condition was passed on to all men, since all men existed in Adam by means of seminal identity.[9]

At this point Augustine introduces a new note into his theory, taken from Manichæanism, for when Adam fell, because of sin, his fall was due to lust, which was an uncontrollable impulse coming from his nature. Had lust arisen from the will, it could have been controlled; but since the will cannot control this lust, it comes from Adam's nature, and keeps propagating itself, and is inherited in the very act of propagation. Furthermore, this lust is a substantive thing; it is a "disease" which is the direct and immediate result of a faulty condition of the human seed. Because of this fact, children are born out of lust, and they inherit it.[10] Sin, then, is in nature, and infects everything. This corrupt nature is thus the source of evil.

[7] *On Rebuke and Grace* 33. Since Adam fell, that meant that originally Adam was perfect. "For he [Adam] began to have sin from the point at which he fell; and if he began, certainly he was without sin before he had begun"—*ibid.*, 26; see also *City of God* XIV, 26.

[8] *City of God* XIV, 13.

[9] *City of God* XIII, 14. Out of an abnormal type of piety Augustine will not admit the fact that the Mother of Christ also had sin. He seems to be unaware of the fact that, if he allows the Mother of Christ to be sinless, then other human natures could also be in a similar state. He says specifically, "We must except the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom I wish to raise no question when it touches the subject of sins"—*On Nature and Grace* 42. Psychologically, this is interesting, as it is possible that the roots of this abnormal piety is imbedded in Augustine's own low treatment of women, coupled with the influence of his mother, who seems to have been what modern psychiatrists call the "Mom" type of woman.

[10] See *On Marriage and Concupiscence* II, 20, 30, and 33; also *City of God* XIV (*passim*).

IV

This, in brief, is Augustine's conception of the origin of evil, and any critical examination of it reveals that this doctrine of man's total and complete depravity is based on a dualistic view of man and of the world which is essentially foreign to Christianity. It has been noted that before Augustine became a Christian he was a Manichæan, and then a Neoplatonist. Even though he abandoned both of these formally, it is doubtful whether he ever did so actually. The fact that he postulates the creation out of nothing, even though this "nothing" constitutes a real substantive thing which is evil, is a carry-over from Manichæanism of the idea of two separate and distinct principles in the world at war with each other. In fact, what Augustine really does is to combine in an original manner the Neoplatonic concept of evil as nonbeing with the Manichæan concept of lust. For only by combining these two concepts can Augustine maintain that sin is rooted in nature and propagates itself in all humanity. If our depravity were merely a matter of a corrupt will, then our sin would be voluntary and would involve moral responsibility. However, Augustine makes it quite clear that the source of evil, from which all individual sins spring, is in nature. The reason man cannot become good is not because of a moral lapse, but because there is a defect in the very substance of man's nature. Since this substance is corrupt, man can only become good by an act of God. Man has no real responsibility, either moral or spiritual, for the condition of evil in which he finds himself, and this is always a sign of a dualistic conception. Dualism always claims that the ultimate victory will be won by the good, regardless of man, who stands between the forces of good and evil. And this very principle of dualism has appeared in Augustine in the guise of his doctrine of predestination. For, although all men "sinned in Adam," and all men are thereby subject to eternal damnation, some men will be saved because of God's predestination. Logically, in accordance with this principle of dualism, Augustine devises a method whereby the good achieves a victory without being dependent upon man.

V

It should be a theological axiom that whenever there is put forth the idea that God and man are sharply and profoundly separated, there is then begun an intellectual movement toward dualism. This is clearly brought out in Augustine's theory of evil. By creating an essential difference between God and man, *i.e.,* God not able to sin, man able only to sin, the break between God and man is complete and distinct. Such a complete distinction must result in dualistic solutions. Furthermore, to claim that it is impossible for individuals to do that which is good leads to a completely unchristian life, causing people to rely on ritual and the authority of priests in order to gain forgiveness.

This indifference to Christian living is clearly discernible in Augustine's own life, and reveals the non-Christian nature of his doctrine. For the space of fourteen years Augustine lived with a woman, and had a son by her, all without the benefit of clergy. One would think that after his conversion to Christianity he would either have married his mistress, or at least have made some kind of restitution to her. Unfortunately this did not happen. What actually happened was that he dismissed her, taking their son himself, and arranging to marry a wealthy woman, who could better advance his interests. However, since this wealthy woman could not be married immediately, Augustine acquired another mistress, purely as a temporary convenience. This woman, likewise, was put aside when he was able to marry the woman of his choice. This low treatment of women would seem to be the result of his conviction that man is depraved by nature. Still another consequence of this doctrine appears in Augustine's advocation of the use of force against heretics. By advancing such a grim view, he laid the foundations for the immoral inquisition of the Middle Ages. Actually, this point of view grows out of the idea that man is, by nature, evil. Since man is evil, it follows that man should not have freedom of speech, since he can only spread evil by his free speech. Therefore, if a man insists on spreading evil, and from the point of view of the church is a heretic, he should be disposed of forcibly, if necessary.

This appalling callousness to moral problems of a practical nature, coming from the man who laid down a doctrine of sin and evil which is considered part and parcel of original Christianity, has been one of the ironic jokes history has played on the Christian church. It is especially ironic when viewed in relation to Origen. Origen was perhaps the noblest in character of all the church fathers, being so profoundly sensitive to evil and its consequences that he made himself a eunuch for the kingdom's sake, and lived as Christ exhorted, namely, never have two coats, or two pairs of shoes, or silver, or gold; yet this man had been exiled by the church during his lifetime, and after death he was repudiated and anathematized by the church.

VI

By briefly relating Augustine's theory of evil to its source, we can see that he never broke with the prevailing dualism of his day and age. The confusion to the Protestant church of this sophisticated dualism has been tremendous, for it has led the church to seek to build its theological structure on a dualistic anthropology and cosmology, which in turn has contributed to the general decline in morals and culture so characteristic of the twentieth century. When man is looked upon as being essentially sinful, the evils in the world and the wars which have hounded man are all considered part of the essential nature of life, and, therefore,

impossible to escape. Man is doomed, and the church considers her task to be that of giving man an escape from his doom. Where Christ exhorted man to be "perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect"[11] and thus sought to lead man to a life dedicated to love and mercy and gentleness,[12] the church, under the influence of Augustine, sees man as being sinful. The church thus claims that wars and suffering are inevitable, and so exhorts man to accept Jesus. By so doing, man even though sinful, will be saved, and will thus escape the doom of the world and the worldly. The steady secularization of our life should point the theologians of the church to their failure to meet the problems of life by this kind of thinking, and should move the theologians to accept the judgment of Harnack on Augustine's doctrine of original sin: "Above all, however, the doctrine of original sin leads to Manichæan dualism, which Augustine never surmounted, and is accordingly an impious and foolish dogma. For, turn as he will, Augustine affirms an *evil nature,* and therewith *a diabolic creator of the world.*"[13]

A new anthropology must be created by the church, which will give man new meaning and purpose. The problem before the church is, not what to do about communism, or socialism, or industrial capitalism, but the problem is to concern itself with man and to explain man to man on the basis of Christian monism. Then a new cultural pattern will appear, and all the burning problems of the day will be solved on the basis of a new approach to these problems. Also, the church should set about creating a new cosmology. Under the dualistic scheme of Augustine the heavenly city is at war with the earthly city, with the final end being a catastrophe for the earthly city. Before this event man is powerless; the only thing he can do is to be personally saved by "accepting" Jesus. This, in turn, gives birth to egotistic Christianity, and prevents Christianity from becoming truly universal and ecumenical. As a matter of fact, this dualistic conception of the end of the world is one of the psychological factors keeping alive the various and sundry denominations. One of the factors bringing to birth the denominations after the Reformation has been this egotistic concern to be on the "right side" when the end of the world came. So it is that Protestant Christianity, laboring under the theological domination of Augustine, has never truly been universal. As long as the church continues to postulate a dualistic end-of-the-world idea, *i.e.,* dualistic cosmology, the Christianity she represents will not flower and provide the force necessary for new cultural patterns, and secularism will continue to mold and guide the lives of the people to their spiritual extinction.

[11] Matt. 5: 48.
[12] Luke 6: 36; John 15: 12; Gal. 6: 2; Col. 3: 12; Eph. 4: 2.
[13] Harnack, *op. cit.,* Vol. 5, pp. 217 f.

PACIFISM — THE WAY TO PEACE?

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According to many people, including many Christian leaders, the greatest moral issue confronting the world today is the issue of war or peace. The avoidance of a third world war is both of primary and paramount importance not only if Western civilization is to endure but if mankind itself is to survive. Nothing short of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy can save man and his civilization from certain destruction. This point of view is urged with considerable forensic skill, always with passion and sometimes with the strident note of hysteria, by America's foremost pacifist, A. J. Muste, in a recent book entitled *Not by Might.*[1] Many know him already as the author of an earlier, definitive work on pacifism published shortly after the beginning of the last war and entitled *Non-Violence in an Aggressive World.* A former Presbyterian minister who resigned from his parish during the first world war when he felt that he could no longer compromise his opposition to the war, he has long been active in the labor movement and served as minister of the Labor Temple in New York City. He is now national secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

The problem of war has always troubled the conscience of the Christian, if not, indeed, of everyman, and the threat of a holocaust that may wipe out every vestige of human civilization makes the problem more acute than ever. Two world wars in one generation, culminating in the invention and use of the most destructive weapon yet to come from the hands of man, are, indeed, a frightful and frightening reality. Nevertheless I think it is important for us to realize that the moral issues remain precisely the same as they were before the invention and use of the atom bomb. A great deal of nonsense is talked today about the atomic age as though we were upon the threshold of an age that required a complete reorientation of our intellectual and spiritual life. The unleashing of atomic energy undoubtedly does herald the dawn of a new technological era, but our intellectual, moral, and spiritual problems remain precisely the same as they have always been. Certainly for the Christian the primary and paramount issue has not changed at all: salvation or perdition. When the paramount issue confronting the world today is framed, as the pacifist would frame it, in terms of war or peace, it surely obscures, if it does not obliterate, the spiritual issues upon which human destinies truly turn. Pacifism, it seems to me, tempts us to concentrate upon physical survival

[1] A. J. Muste, *Not by Might: Christianity the Way to Human Decency,* New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 227, $2.50.

to the neglect of spiritual survival. And the Scripture declares that he who is concerned first and foremost about how to preserve his body will surely lose his soul.

For the purpose of examining the nature and relevance of the pacifist argument let us consider some of the arguments advanced by Mr. Muste in his most recent defense of the pacifist position.

Eschewing no argument which might conceivably win converts to his cause, Mr. Muste proceeds in the opening pages of his book to try to win us over to pacifism by scaring us out of our wits. Through the testimony of the atomic physicist, Professor J. R. Oppenheimer, he tells us how in a single raid on a congested urban centre one atom bomb might very well kill forty million people in a matter of minutes or hours. That this is no exaggeration we have all been made acutely aware by the testimony of countless scientists. That many of them are frightened, and with good reason, of the terrible weapon they have invented we know. It would be difficult to exaggerate the horror of atomic warfare. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether fear is our best counselor in this day of crisis. An equally horrible picture could be painted of the world dominated by the Russian secret police; that some men, though not indeed all, might survive in such a world as slaves would be small comfort to those enlisted in the forced labor battalions or to those subjected to the tortures of the tyrant's concentration camps. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say which of these horror pictures is the more horrible. The problem obviously is not to be solved by the depiction of horrible alternatives. "Which of you by being anxious can add one cubit unto the measure of his life?" (Matt. 6:27). Certainly as Christians the question is not: What do we fear most? but rather, What do we love most?

Fear is not our best counselor, though as human beings we are surely tempted at times to yield to that instinct and now especially. But the atom bomb will have done the most destructive work of which it is capable if it serves to paralyze our conscience by making us fearful of the consequences which may follow from obeying its dictates. The bomb may kill our bodies, but if we allow fear of its use to kill our conscience, it will have succeeded in killing our souls. The world has already done the worst of which it is capable (atom bomb or no atom bomb), for Christ crucified is the worst the world can do. In these days of crisis it might be well to remember the comforting words of Christ, "Be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world." This is not to say that we should ignore with complacency the problems that beset us in the world today. On the contrary, we must and should seek to solve them in the spirit of love and justice, but we are more likely to find solutions if we keep in mind the comforting words of Christ than if we yield in panic to the temptation

to think first and foremost of survival and safety. We must not mistake for a supreme good that which is a lesser good though the good we prize be democracy, civilization, or the physical survival of the human race. It is well to remember that Christ died on the cross not that the world might be made safe for democracy, not that Western civilization might endure, not, indeed, that mankind might survive in this world, but rather that following his example we should not shrink even before the cross. Only if our love of God is greater than our fear of death can we hope for the salvation of our souls. Love, not fear, must be our guide, and the voice of fear must be recognized for what it is, the voice of the prince of this world.

Mr. Muste recognizes that "fear is not a very exalted motive," and although he contends that "fear may have its uses," he does not, of course, base his case for pacifism alone upon the fearful aspects of an atomic war (although he never ceases throughout his book to remind us of the horrors that are in store for us). In an introductory chapter he argues that the recent war against Nazism and Japanese imperialism was fought in vain and that it served only to demonstrate the illusory character of all war. He points out with justice how, since the end of hostilities, the victors have betrayed many of the aims for which the war was fought, but by a curious logic attributes this betrayal to the war itself and to those "who died in it . . . in vain" rather than to those who survived the war and are clearly responsible for postwar policies. If "millions in Europe are undernourished or actually starving with no living options except Stalinism or some new ultrareactionary regime," the responsibility for this surely lies with us the living. No one ever claimed that the military defeat of Nazi tyranny could do more than give us an opportunity to liberate the oppressed victims of injustice. If we have failed to act with compassion and justice, as too frequently we have, the responsibility is ours, the failure is ours. It is not that our soldiers died in vain but rather that we, the living, have proved ourselves unworthy of their sacrifice. It would appear to be sounder logic and better Christianity to concentrate now upon what might be done by us the living to redeem our past mistakes than to exhaust our energies in the denunciation of war in general and in seeking to prove that the errors of the postwar period were inevitable consequences of fighting the war in the first place.

In some contexts Mr. Muste is anxious to make the point that nothing is inevitable and that we are free to choose our course of action. If this is true, as I believe it is, then the fighting of the recent war did not inevitably engender of itself the policies which we followed during and since the war, but those policies were of our own deliberate choosing. We could in each instance have chosen to act otherwise than we did; we

could have utilized the opportunity which military victory gave us in order to act with compassion and justice; and what is more important, *we can so act now if we choose.* If millions are starving today in Europe, this is not because we fought the forces of Nazi aggression but because we have deliberately chosen to follow a policy which entails starvation for millions. Somewhat belatedly (but it is never too late) we have conceived and begun to put into operation a program for European relief and recovery. We could have begun much earlier. It was not the fighting of the war which prevented us from doing so nor was it the fighting of the war that led Congress in its latest session to curtail the funds available for such recovery and relief. It was a decision of individual congressmen not an inevitable consequence of the fighting. By attributing the economic misery of Europe to the "war" we obscure the responsibility of individuals and attribute to impersonal "forces" consequences which in reality stem from the will of men.

If the spectre of Stalinist terror haunts Europe today, this is not because we fought to liberate the victims of Nazi tyranny but because we have deliberately chosen to follow a policy which has encouraged the aggression of the Soviet Union. No one ever contended that the military defeat of Hitler and his forces would result in the overthrow of Russian tyranny. Mr. Muste clearly recognizes that we are able to pursue any number of policies *vis à vis* the Soviet Union. He examines these and rejects some in favor of others which he urges upon us for adoption. Now if this choice of policies is possible, as Mr. Muste believes, then clearly the fighting of the recent war did not and does not inevitably demand that we follow one policy rather than another.

If we unleashed the horror of atomic warfare upon the world, this was not the inevitable consequence of fighting Nazism, as Mr. Muste would seem to imply, but an act of deliberate choice. We could have chosen to engage also in gas and bacteriological warfare since both were technically possible, but fortunately we did not. This, of course, in no way justifies our use of the atom bomb, and Mr. Muste, I think, is right in calling upon us to repent of its use and to renounce it as a weapon of war. But I think he is wrong in implying that war of itself inevitably demands the use of the most brutal weapons available. (Were that so, there would be no reason to call us to repentance.) Certainly the temptation in war to use such weapons is great, but the evil lies not in technology but in the passions of men. The indiscriminate bombing of cities and the slaughter of millions of innocent women and children was not an inevitable necessity, not even a military necessity, but an act of revenge. We chose to retaliate in kind. We were not forced to do so.

Mr. Muste talks a great deal about the "logic" of war, implying

that war of itself necessitates the removal of "all restraint upon atrocity," but logical faculties are by definition attributes of men, not of techniques. If "all restraint upon atrocity" is removed, this will be because individual men choose to remove all restraint, not because war of itself demands the removal of all restraint. If we show less respect for the rules of warfare than men of former generations and ages, this is not, I believe, because we are able to violate such rules with greater technological audacity but because our conscience in such matters is weaker than theirs. Our decision to defend our lives and institutions against Nazi and Japanese aggression did not of itself demand that we invent and use the atomic bomb, nor does the existence of the atom bomb of itself demand that we use it in the future. Because we have used the atomic bomb, Mr. Muste believes that we have "left ourselves no moral ground on which to protest against whatever atrocities may be perpetrated against us" in the future. Now this is curious logic. If there were and are moral grounds for condemning our use of the atomic bomb, as Mr. Muste and I and countless thousands believe, then there are the same moral grounds for condemning its use in the future whether by us or by others.

"How can we possibly persuade anyone else or ourselves," Mr. Muste asks, "that if we have atomic bombs at all we shall not use them if we deem it expedient?" Now Mr. Muste does not really believe that men are motivated solely by considerations of expediency; otherwise he would not have written a book trying to convert people to pacifism. Though we might very well destroy the bombs which we have in our possession, we cannot now destroy the knowledge that produced them and can produce them in the future. The use which will be made of this knowledge depends not upon the existence of the knowledge itself but upon the decisions of men. Now if we cannot possibly persuade ourselves to act in any other way than that dictated by expediency, then the situation is even more hopeless than Mr. Muste imagines. If human actions are dictated solely by considerations of expediency, what possible comfort could we derive from a decision, were it taken, to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, as Mr. Muste urges? Why does Mr. Muste assume that men can act in the one instance only as expediency dictates but in the other from purer and nobler motives? Mr. Muste's thought reveals a curious compound of cynicism and idealism. He is alternatively cynical and idealistic depending upon the requirements of his argument.

"There is a vast difference," Mr. Muste contends, "between the way of non-violence and cowardly or apathetic surrender. . . . Non-violent resisters are people who, though they will not kill, have schooled themselves to die rather than collaborate with dictators and quislings, rather than coöperate with evil and tyranny. . . . The non-violent have

their own ways of opposing evil. People who will not dig coal, run trains, operate factories at the command of foreign generals on behalf of an evil regime, and who at the same time show good will toward the agents of that regime, will not kill them, insist on fraternizing with them and urging them to give up their dirty work while all the time refusing to collaborate—such people can constitute a problem for tyrants." Here, it seems to me, Mr. Muste makes significant admissions, namely: 1. that despite the fact that every regime is imperfect and tainted by evil, some regimes are so evil that it would be immoral to coöperate with them; and 2. that when coöperation is morally impossible, individuals are justified in taking measures that will paralyze the economic life of the country. Now it seems to me that the pacifist who argues in this way is making a highly sophistic moral distinction between killing a man with a bullet and killing him by starvation. There are any number of ways in which the death of other persons may be brought about, and, as a matter of fact, there are situations in which sudden death by a bullet might be more humane than slow death by starvation. Persons who "will not dig coal, run trains, operate factories," and refuse by similar means to coöperate with an evil regime may be just as responsible for the death of other individuals (many of them innocent) as the soldier who fires a gun. And, as a matter of fact, doing nothing at all may be as morally reprehensible as doing something specific. The man who ignores the fact, for example, that millions are starving in Europe today and never thinks of sharing his food with them is surely as responsible for the death of individuals as though he killed them outright. He might plead that he had "done nothing" either to aggravate or to relieve their suffering, but a decision to "do nothing" is, nevertheless, a decision and in this instance equally as fatal in its consequences as the decision to pull the trigger of a revolver. The most passive attitudes can lead to violent results, and it is certainly no moral defense to refuse to examine the train of events that flow from passive indifference or resistance. Once one admits that passive resistance of the kind suggested by Mr. Muste is morally justified in some especially evil situations, then the question as to whether violence in the form of shooting is justified resolves itself into a technical, political argument rather than a moral one.

In this connection most pacifists cite the example of India as a way in which independence was achieved with a minimum of violence. They credit the achievement to Mahatma Gandhi's leadership and to his policy of passive resistance. They suggest that this is a political policy that promises to be universally valid and successful. But they overlook, it seems to me, an important factor in the success of Gandhi's policy, namely, the reluctance of the British to resort to a counterpolicy that would

result in great human suffering. This, of course, is not to say that the British never have resorted or never do resort to policies involving great human suffering but only that they have shown greater respect for human life than either the Nazis or the Russians under Stalinist tyranny. There is considerable room for honest doubt whether Gandhi's policy would have been as *politically* successful had his opponent been the Nazis, the Japanese, or the Russians.

Violence either is never justified in any situation or it is sometimes justified. Now in order to be logically consistent it seems to me that the true pacifist must argue that violence is never justified in any situation. Yet few pacifists will go so far. Certainly not Mr. Muste. A refusal to "dig coal, run trains and operate factories" has violent consequences. If a nation, moreover, is unjustified in maintaining an army, it is equally unjustified in maintaining courts of law and a police force. The pacifist must squarely face the fact that his position, if followed consistently, leads to the repudiation of all authority, to the destruction of law and order—to anarchy. "The test to which the exercise of police power is, according to our thesis, to be subjected," Mr. Muste declares, "is whether it is moral in purpose and effect." This implies several conditions, among which is the qualification that "the application of power, force, must be kept to a minimum." Now why force should be tolerated at all in the domestic scene is something I cannot logically reconcile with Mr. Muste's contention that force in the international situation is never justified. No Christian contends that force should be used in the international situation except when it is "moral in purpose and effect," and he would agree that "the application of power" should be kept to a minimum. Mr. Muste refuses for reasons best known to himself to carry his argument to its logical conclusion, but if he did, it would lead to anarchy. This is not to say that the ultimate sanction of authority and government is force, but it is to recognize that force, as well as consent, is a necessary ingredient of all earthly government and authority. This necessity for the use of force, as the greatest Christian thinkers of all ages have recognized, is the result of man's fall from innocence. Government, law, force are necessary because man is no longer an innocent creature of God but a sinful rebel, and so long as he remains rebellious there will be need of restraining him by force. Pascal once correctly pointed out that "Justice without power is impotent and power without justice tyrannical." The task of politics, he thought, was to make that which was just strong and that which was strong just.

Mr. Muste contends that "Present-day civilization stands in far more danger of totalitarianism than of anarchy. There is too little revolt against authority" rather than too much. Here, it seems to me, he falls into a

common error of equating totalitarianism with authoritarianism. Despite its ostensible appearance of order the totalitarian state is the political manifestation of political, social, economic, intellectual, and spiritual *anarchy*. The total character of the dictatorship is necessitated by the *lack* of any common authority. Compulsion replaces consent in every sphere of life because there is no common agreement obliging consent in any sphere. "The totalitarian state," Emil Brunner has declared, "is the inevitable result of the slow disintegration of the idea of justice in the Western world." The totalitarian dictatorship is the embodiment not of authority but of naked power—it repudiates reason, justice, God, and comes into power only as a consequence of the prior repudiation of authority by the mass of the people. It is an effort to fill the void left by the repudiation of authority by a will that is unguided by reason, unrestrained by considerations of justice, and unmindful of the commandments of God. It is not government in the true sense of the word but a perverted attempt to employ the techniques of government when government fails. The statement of Mr. Muste is even more astounding in the light of his argument of a few pages previously when he insisted, quite rightly I think, that "all authority derives from the nature of the moral universe, *i.e.* from God." It is impossible to reconcile the statement that "there is too little revolt against authority" with the statement that "all authority derives ... from God." It is the latter statement which is the correct one, and present-day civilization would appear to be in need of more authority rather than less. Outward appearances are often deceiving, and we must not mistake the outward appearance of order which characterizes the totalitarian dictatorship for true order, for, in reality, it is chaos. To mistake totalitarianism for authoritarianism is to make a grave mistake in the identification of the enemy who confronts us and to underestimate the nature of the crisis through which we are passing. That crisis is not essentially a political one but a spiritual one; we must choose not between forms of government, not between rival economic systems, but between ultimate allegiances, *i.e.*, between God and Satan.

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr has probably presented the soundest theological answer to the pacifist position. The pacifist, he says, refuses to come to grips with the fact of human depravity. Mr. Muste says:

> Until a person has achieved integration and rebirth, unless indeed he experiences it in each moment of existence, in each contact with others, he is constantly enacting the role of the Pharisee. I see myself as standing here and the other person is over there, quite separated, not the "other" whom I am to love as myself, to forgive as I have been forgiven. And I justify myself. I experience thus a glow of satisfaction. That is to say, in my imagination I put myself up here and the other person down there. But it is clear, is it not, that this is already a kind of warfare: I am pushing him down, committing an assault upon his spirit and slander-

ing it. This sort of thing goes on all the time in the most respectable circles, in the Ladies' Aid societies, and the official board of churches, and in the peace and pacifist societies. . . .

Now Mr. Muste, if I understand him correctly, sees here an important aspect of human depravity—man in his pride constantly makes war upon man, and this warfare engendered by pride even takes place among those who profess to be followers of Christ, *i.e.,* among members of "the Ladies' Aid societies and the official board of churches." It even occurs among members of "the peace and pacifist societies." Until this warfare ceases, is it not illusory to believe that world-wide peace can be brought about by the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?

Mr. Muste dismisses Professor Niebuhr's doctrine of human depravity as "a one-sided and unscriptural view of human nature," but it should be noted that in doing so he dismisses a doctrine advanced not only by Professor Niebuhr but by the great Protestant reformers and by the fathers of the church. In dismissing the doctrine as "unscriptural" he ranges himself against the greatest teachers and expounders of Christian doctrine. That is, of course, his privilege, but the weight of Christian authority lies on the other side.

Mr. Muste admits that Professor Niebuhr's strongest argument against pacifism is his statement that pacifists unjustifiably isolate war from the ethical position as a whole and "demand with reference to this one moral issue an absolute obedience to the perfectionist ethic." When Mr. Muste declares, however, that it is Professor Niebuhr's view "that Jesus' teaching envisages a wholly transcendent and future Kingdom of God and that his perfectionist ethic has no immediate relevance to the practical problems of national and international life," I think he misunderstands Niebuhr's position. If I understand Professor Niebuhr correctly, he *insists* upon the relevance of Christ's teaching to national and international problems but he recognizes that because of his sinful nature man will always fall short on this earth of perfection. Mr. Muste's position seems to be: perfection or nothing. He seems to say that we must choose between idealism and cynicism. The Christian doctrine of man, it appears to me, presents no such alternatives. It neither overrates men's motives nor underrates their potentialities. It avoids the pitfalls both of fatuous optimism and of hopeless despair. We *pray* that God's will be done on earth but we do not demand it, for we are in no position to demand it. Through our prayers we may invoke God's mercy, but never will our works, however good, give us reason for demanding the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. When the kingdom of God is established on earth, it will be by God's grace and not by our merit—it will be, moreover, the day of Last Judgment, a day of judgment before which each

one of us may well tremble. This is not to be construed as an argument against good works, against striving toward perfection with God's help, but rather as a humble recognition of the fact that no matter how good our works or how sincere our striving we shall never earn salvation by our own merits. Our comfort lies in the fact that Christ has already done perfectly what we can only do imperfectly and by his sacrifice atoned for our weakness.

The great danger in pacifism, it seems to me, is that it greatly oversimplifies the problem of attaining peace and tempts us to spiritual arrogance. The pacifist talks as though the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy were the principal requirement for salvation and the conscientious objector, the true saint. This is surely an oversimplification of man's spiritual situation. There is no short cut to peace and to salvation as pacifism tempts us to believe.

The error of pacifism arises from regarding as a higher good that which, in reality, is a lesser good and from seeking that which cannot be sought directly. Peace in the sense of the absence of hostilities is a good, but it is not the highest good that men can and should seek. Christ did not say, Seek ye first peace, but rather: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," and peace shall be added unto you. Some goods in the hierarchy of goods leading to God have priority over others, and it is only by seeking the higher goods that we may attain the lesser. We can love our neighbor as a brother only if we first love God as our Father. The proper ordering of those things which are good is essential to the proper ordering of our lives and essential to our salvation. It is a human weakness to mistake for a supreme good that which in reality is a lesser good, but it is a weakness that imperils our souls. It is a truism of experience, although paradoxical, that we never obtain the most important things in life by aiming at them directly. The happiest man is not the one who does nothing in life but strive to be happy. Happiness is the by-product of activity that has love, not happiness, as its object. Similarly, peace is the by-product of justice. We shall attain peaceful relations among nations not by trying at all cost to avoid war but only by establishing just relations among nations. A peaceful world is a just world, and if we would work for peace, we must work for justice. He who would sacrifice justice for the absence of hostilities will obtain neither peace nor justice. The pacifist attacks the symptom rather than the disease. The fighting and violence will disappear only when that which gives rise to the fighting and violence is overcome, *i.e.*, sin. It is not war that must be outlawed but the causes of war. If we would have peace in the world, we must seek to overcome the injustice that leads to violence and to war. "And I tell you," Christ declared, "that

if your justice does not give fuller measure than the justice of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. 5:20). There can be a peaceful world only when there is a just world, and there can be a just world only when mankind is united in love of God. Peace will never be attained by the decision to renounce war as an instrument of national policy; it will be attained only when, through the love of God and by his grace, we allow Christ to rule in us as well as over us. "Whence come wars and whence come fightings among you? come they not hence, even of your pleasures that war in your members? (Jas. 4:1).

When we pray to God, "Thy kingdom come . . ." as one writer has expressed it very well,

> We pray that God's external kingdom may be extended throughout the world, but also that our own submission to its claims may one day become unconditional, that the barriers of self-will may be broken down so that Christ may reign not only over us but in us. . . . So long as sin or any of its results remain, Christ's victory is incomplete; all his enemies are not yet beneath his feet. Not until his own triumph over sin and death is reproduced in his followers, the members of his mystical Body, will Satan's kingdom at length be utterly vanquished. Only our own resurrection, our personal conquest of death, will cancel finally the dire results of Adam's sin, and so bring into being the kingdom of God in its full splendor.[2]

In the words of Scripture: "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; then they that are Christ's, at his coming. Then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have abolished all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be abolished is death. . . . And when all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all" (I Cor. 15:22-26, 28).

[2] A. Graham, *The Christ of Catholicism: a Meditative Study* (Longmans, 1947), pp. 308-309.

REFORMED CHURCH MUSIC

The Basic Implications of Calvin's Philosophy of Church Music

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In our own day Calvin's precepts on church music are more honored in the breach than in the observance. At a time when there is considerable revival of interest in Calvin's theological insights, an embarrassed silence reigns supreme when Calvin's injunctions on the conduct of church music are in question. There is reason for this embarrassed silence. Not yet have the smouldering embers of bitter feud between sections of the Calvinist churches died out, and any discussion of Calvin's philosophy of church music is in the very nature of the case gasoline poured on the embers. With a fanatical loyalty to the faith once delivered to the saints, fractional Presbyterian bodies in Scotland and in the United States hold with an almost touching devotion to those revealed insights on the proper conduct of church music which Calvin taught his disciples in Geneva.

It is significant that in our day when Calvin's authority is invoked for the introduction of certain high church practices into the Presbyterian churches[1] no responsible scholar has been able to discover a shred of evidence in Calvin's writings for current practices in the conduct of church music. Modern departures from Calvinist music theory are basic. These departures from Calvin's straight and narrow path have led modern Presbyterians into an acceptance of instrumental music, and particularly organ music, as a permitted feature of divine worship; into an acceptance of "hymns of human composure" as a permitted feature of divine worship in place of the inspired Psalms; into an acceptance of singing in parts as a permitted feature of worship song. Calvin permitted no organ music in the churches of Geneva. He sanctioned only inspired Psalms as material suitable for congregational singing. And he vigorously opposed any attempt to introduce part singing into the congregational singing of the Psalms.

Let us examine these charges in detail. In Calvin's sermon on I Samuel, chapter 18, he says: "It would be a too ridiculous and inept imitation of papistry to decorate the churches and to believe oneself to be offering God a more noble service in using organs. . . . All that is needed is a simple and pure singing of the divine praises, coming from heart and mouth, and in the vulgar tongue. . . . Instrumental music was tolerated

[1] William D. Maxwell, *The Liturgical Portions of the Genevan Service Book,* Edinburgh, 1931, p. 13 and pp. 201-205. On p. 13 the statement is found that Calvin desired weekly communion, that he wished to carry reserved sacrament to the sick, that he desired a declaration of absolution after the confession of sins, that he wanted to retain the open confessional, and also the rite of confirmation.

in the time of the Law because the people were then in infancy."[2] In his commentary on Psalm 92 Calvin pursues the same vein:

> In the fourth verse, he [the Psalmist] more immediately addresses the Levites, who were appointed to the office of singers, and calls upon them to employ their instruments of music—not as if this were in itself necessary, only it was useful as an elementary aid to the people of God in these ancient times . . . . now that Christ has appeared, and the Church has reached full age, it were only to bury the light of the Gospel, should we introduce the shadows of a departed dispensation. From this, it appears that the Papists, in employing instrumental music, cannot be said so much to imitate the practice of God's ancient people, as to ape it in a senseless and absurd manner, exhibiting a silly delight in that worship of the Old Testament which was figurative, and terminated with the Gospel.[3]

The strangest aspect of Calvin's denunciation of instrumental music which he calls a senseless and absurd aping of figurative Old Testament worship is the absolute restriction which was placed on the Calvinist churches: Psalms from the Bible, and Psalms only, were to constitute the congregational matter for singing. How wonderful to confine his disciples to these very Psalms whose literal injunctions on the use of instruments Calvin would never admit as binding! But more of the Calvinist Psalm-monomania at another time. In his commentary on Psalm 149 Calvin says: "The musical instruments . . . were peculiar to this infancy of the Church, nor should we foolishly imitate a practice which was intended only for God's ancient people."[4] On Psalm 71 Calvin subjoins the following comment: "Musical instruments . . . are banished out of the churches by the plain command of the Holy Spirit, when Paul, in I Cor. xiv. 13, lays it down as an invariable rule, that we must praise God, and pray to him only in a known tongue."[5] At the risk of monotony we add still another passage of like tenor (one among scores), this time from Calvin's remarks on Psalm 81:

> The Levites, under the law, were justified in making use of instrumental worship in the worship of God; it having been his will to train his people, while they were as yet tender and like children, by such rudiments, until the coming of Christ. But now when the clear light of the gospel has dissipated the shadows of the law, and taught us that God is to be served in a simpler form, it would be to act a foolish and mistaken part to imitate that which the prophet enjoined only upon those of his own time. From this, it is apparent that the Papists have shown themselves to be very apes in transferring this to themselves.[6]

So seriously did the Scottish churches regard Calvin's interpretation of Scripture that authorizations for organs in the various branches of the

[2] John Calvin, *Sermons on I Samuel, ch. 18* (Sermon 66).
[3] John Calvin, *Commentary on the Book of Psalms,* Edinburgh, 1847, Vol. III, pp. 494 f.
[4] *Ibid.,* Vol. V (Edinburgh, 1849), p. 312.
[5] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 98.
[6] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 312.

Presbyterian Church were delayed until 1866 for the Established Church, 1872 for the United Presbyterian Church, and 1883 for the Free Church. And, of course, to this very day the ultra-Calvinist Reformed Presbyterian Church of America forbids the use of organs and the singing of hymns. Calvin's dithyramb against organs and instrumental music has been endlessly repeated in Presbyterian circles. The last organ in a Geneva church (a survival from a Roman monastery) was melted down in order to obtain the tin from the pipes. Under date of August 17, 1562 (two years before the death of Calvin, when his authority was complete in Geneva) the minutes of the town council carry the following notice: "It has been thereupon ordained that it shall be melted, that the Hospital shall take what metal it needs, and the rest shall be kept in pigs."[7]

The tradition concerning the destruction of organs at the ruthless hands of the Cromwellian soldiery is by no means our first hint of the antagonism which Calvinist parties in every country vented against organs. In 1567 in a tract called *The Praise of Music* occurs the notice: "Not so few as one hundred organs were taken down and the pipes sold to make pewter dishes."[8] As early as 1550 Edward VI had issued an injunction under date of October 26 which indicated an intention of removing organs. In Scotland, according to Peterkin's *Records,* sentiment against organs had so crystallized by 1644 that the General Assembly of that year felt moved to congratulate the Westminster Assembly because "the organs at Pauls and Peters [Westminster Abbey] have been taken down."[9] Some years earlier in Scotland the "glorious organs of the Chapel Royal were masterfully broken down nor no service used there, but the whole chaplains, choristers and musicians discharged and costly organs altogether destroyed and unuseful."[10] In 1640 in "the University of old Aberdeen there stood the remainder of an old organ. . . . This was broken down and complained upon as a thing very intolerable in the church of a college."[11] By 1727 the only church organ in all Scotland was one which stood in the Episcopal church at Aberdeen.[12] When a project for the introduction of a church organ was placed before Glasgow Presbytery in 1807 it was promptly declared unlawful.

In 1711 the leaven implanted by John Cotton, who vigorously de-

[7] Percy A. Scholes, *The Puritans and Music,* Oxford, 1934, p. 339. Dr. Scholes seeks to exculpate Calvin and the Puritans generally from the oft-repeated charge of animosity to music. He translates the minutes of the Geneva Council in order to prove that the organ pipes were not melted until after considerable attempt over a period of years had been made to sell this organ with an object of turning over the proceeds to the town poor.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 231.

[9] William McMillan, *The Worship of the Scottish Reformed Church, 1550-1638,* Edinburgh, 1931, p. 99.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 100.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 100.

[12] Scholes, *op. cit.,* p. 245. Dr. Scholes takes his authority for this statement from Dalyell, *Musical Memoirs of Scotland,* 1849.

nounced organs ("Singing with Instruments was typical, and so a ceremonial worship and therefore is ceased"),[13] and by his successor Cotton Mather ("And because the holy God rejects all He does not command in His worship, He now therefore in effect says to us, I will not hear the melody of thy Organs"),[14] had still so potent a hold on the New England mind that the first organ brought there, though willed by its owner to a Congregational church, was haughtily refused. Eventually this famous first organ in New England (owned by Thomas Brattle) found its way into the King's Chapel, which at that time was still an Anglican house of worship. The controversy concerning the introduction of organs elicited an intolerable number of pamphlets both in Scotland and New England.[15]

In our own time the Directory of Worship for the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charily skirts the corners of this dangerous topic, and leaves totally unmentioned the whole subject of choirs and organs in Chapter IV where it might logically occur.[16] In the 1947 edition of the Manual of Presbyterian Law a quotation from the minutes of the General Assembly of 1884 is included, showing a typical handling of a difficult situation. As with so many other vexing problems the conduct of church music is thrown back into the arms of each session as its own hot potato. "The Assembly leaves to each Session the delicate and important matter of arranging and conducting the music as to them shall seem most for edification, recommending great caution, prudence, and forbearance in regard to it."[17]

Throughout the stream of Calvinist church life there has run a contempt for man's own creative instinct. Luther, in his oft-quoted letter to Ludwig Senfl, one of the foremost musicians of the early sixteenth century, and a Roman Catholic throughout his life, praises music in the most extravagant terms. He places music next to theology as the highest science known to man. Is it any wonder that the greatest religious composers of modern times, Johann Sebastian Bach and Handel, were both sturdy Lutherans? England before the breath of Calvinism swept the land was a "nest of singing birds." But after Calvin's theology went abroad in the land a man such as Merbecke (at one time condemned to death by Henry VIII for his ultra-Protestant views) turned from music to the production of biblical concordances (1550), and in a dedication to Edward VI laments that he was "altogether brought up in your highnes College at Wynd-

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 246. Quotation from John Cotton, *Singing of the Psalms a Gospel Ordinance,* London, 1647.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 248. Quotation from Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana,* 1703.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 245. Scholes takes his list of pamphlets from Dalyell, *Musical Memoirs of Scotland,* 1849.

[16] *Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,* Philadelphia, 1944, p. 441.

[17] *Manual for Church Officers and Members,* 15th ed., 1947, p. 108.

sore, in the study of Musicke and plaiying on Organs, wherein I consumed vainly the greatest part of my life."[18] When as accomplished a composer as Merbecke (one of the Tudor greats) calls his music a vain thing, little wonder should attach itself to the fact that no Calvinist climate has ever permitted a creative composer to breathe easily. It is significant, in passing, that until Calvinism won its way into the Low Countries the Netherlandish composers were among the greatest in Europe. Obrecht and Okeghem were names to conjure with in European music during the fifteenth century. After the invasion of Calvinism Holland becomes mute as far as the production of musical composers is concerned.

The composer with whom Calvin had most intimate dealings was Louis Bourgeois. "Historians who wish to give a true philosophical account of Calvin's influence at Geneva ought probably to refer a great part of it to the enthusiasm attendant on the singing of Bourgeois's melodies."[19] Although Bourgeois consumed himself after flight to Geneva on account of his Protestant convictions in such laborious tasks as the instruction of children, he was allowed to languish in poverty during much of his ten-year sojourn in Geneva. A touching account remains showing his petition for coal and certain other bare necessities of living. He was arrested in 1551 and placed in prison for having changed "without permission" the melodies of certain of the psalms, which he had himself written some years earlier! Is there small wonder that this greatest of Calvinist composers found the atmosphere so uncongenial in Geneva that he left that same year for Paris, never to return? Douen, in his classic work on the Marot Psalter, gathers scores of highly ingenious and inspired arrangements for several voices of the Psalms from the Genevan Psalter, but none of these elaborations ever found its way into the approved worship of the church. Innovation or elaboration was hardly desired by those authorities who could clap Bourgeois himself into jail for altering a psalm melody.[20]

The crux of the issue really lies here: Calvinism denies "the power of the Holy Ghost to inspire men afresh in the Praise of God." Clement Marot and Theodore Beza were the two principal authors of the Genevan Psalter. "There was nothing novel in the mere translating of Psalms into meter. . . . But the adoption of such translations as the sole vehicle of congregational sung praise began with John Calvin."[21] The whole long, tiresome dispute over what translations were the most literal, and therefore the most acceptable to God, occupies pages of church history. "Wor-

[18] *Tudor Church Music,* edited by Edmund Fellowes, Oxford, 1929, Vol. x, p. 159.

[19] Winfred Douglas, *Church Music in History and Practice,* New York, 1937, p. 217. Douglas takes this statement from Robert Bridges, *The Yattenden Hymnal.*

[20] *La Grande Encyclopédie,* Paris, n. d., Vol. VII, p. 758.

[21] Douglas, *op. cit.,* p. 219.

ship of the Holy Scripture kept the Old Version [Sternhold and Hopkins] in use long after its absurdities were evident to the unprejudiced."[22] In New England the *Bay Psalm Book* appeared in 1640, but the poetry is not considered superior to Sternhold and Hopkins. Rous' version adopted in 1650 by the Scottish General Assembly was disowned by its author on account of the further meat-ax technique used by the Scots in accomodating Rous to the "Hebrew original."[23] "As late as the eighteen-eighties there was an organized anti-hymn party in the Presbyterian Church in the United States. . . . It issued a monthly journal with eleven editions, these representing pure psalm-singing churches in the United States, the British Isles, and Holland."[24]

Distaste for organs, distaste for hymns, and distaste for part singing were typical marks of Calvinist church music. In the Genevan Service Book of 1556 we find the following rubric for the conduct of the Sunday morning service: "This done [the reciting of a general confession], the people sing a Psalme all together, in a playne tune."[25] William Maxwell comments on this rubric as follows: "The reference to 'playne tune' does not mean only that simple music is to be used, but also that there is to be *no harmony singing*. In the Psalter at the end of the volume [the Geneva Service Book of 1556], the melody line only is given for the various tunes; while Huycke translating and explaining Calvin directs that the Psalm be sung in 'playnesong.'"[26] Without piling Ossa on Pelion we can feel certain that as far as Calvin was concerned music for his church was ideally conceived as Spartan in simplicity, and like St. Augustine[27] he knew the emotional power of music sufficiently well to fear it. Douen, a Protestant pastor, a Frenchman, and a scholar whose lifetime was spent in tracing the history of Psalters, says that Calvin, "the pope of Geneva . . . the enemy of all mere pleasure and distraction," was even an enemy "of music." Whether Calvin personally liked or disliked music is beside the point. He certainly conceded its power, but as he pointed out in a passage on Job music could be blameworthy, and most commonly men turn the flute and tabor and similar things to "bad ends."[28]

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[23] William D. Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship*, Oxford, 1936, p. 132.

[24] Scholes, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

[25] Maxwell, *The Liturgical Portions of the Genevan Service Book*, p. 88.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

[27] Augustine, *Confessions* x, 33.

[28] John Calvin, *Sermons on Job, ch. 21* (Sermons 79 and 80). The importance of Calvin's disparagement of the arts and of the art of music in particular arises not so much from the actual tenor of Calvin's remarks on the dangers of music, but rather from the seriousness with which Calvin's remarks were taken not only by a man such as John Merbecke, whose case we cited, but because of the numerous other composers of absolutely first-rate ability whose genius turned into a trickle and then completely dried up as their addiction to Reformed teaching grew. In *Tudor Church Music*, which we have cited, but in the first volume of this series (1923), the lamentable case of John Taverner is narrated in similar exposition of the subject which we have been treating (pp. l and li).

Nowadays when Presbyterian churches accommodate themselves to the cultural tastes of the upper middle classes, serious thinking needs to be accomplished in the elaboration of a theory of music for this day. Since there is no Presbyterian composer nor Reformed composer of any stripe or hue with the exception of the coterie who worked on the Marot Psalter in the sixteenth century, Presbyterian churches turn to doctrinal expressions in music which are alien and positively hostile to the *geist* of the Reformed Church. Leading Presbyterian churches advertise with great gusto performances of the Verdi *Requiem,* Mozart *Masses,* the Fauré *Requiem,* the Palestrina *Stabat Mater,* and so on. Since these musical masterpieces are performed in church, the basic implication for the auditor is authorization by the church which of all churches is most alien in its tradition to this kind of thing. 'Cardinal Sadolet is now enjoying the sweetest vindication of all of Calvin's opponents. He has seen Calvin's progeny discard the fundamental principles of Calvinist musical reform. Perhaps Calvin was wrong. Perhaps music is one of the needful matters. If it is, why does not the conscience of the grandchildren of Calvin move them to foster creative enterprise amongst themselves, rather than feasting now on the honey of the beast whom Samson slew?

EPISTOLARY FORM IN PAUL

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DEISSMANN[1] noted, years ago, the characteristics of the conventional letter form of the ancient world, and how well they are represented in the Pauline epistles. It should be remarked further that Paul seems to have elaborated an epistolary outline even more definite, to which his letters were more or less consciously conformed. And it may be inquired, still further, whether such an outline can throw any light on the integrity of the letters in their present form.

I

First, let us look at an actual letter more or less contemporary with Paul, of which the Egyptian papyri give us many examples. The familiar Apion letter[2] may be used as an illustration, since it combines many of the conventional features in one document. We may list them as follows: 1. *Salutation,* in the usual form, "A. to B., greeting"; 2. *Invocation,* "Before all things I pray that thou art well"; 3. *Thanksgiving,* "I thank the Lord Serapis. . . ." These are all introductory features, as Deissmann remarks, more or less stereotyped in nature. Then follow: 4. the main *messages* of the letter, succeeded by 5. *greetings* to other members of the family and to neighbors, 6. a *final message* on something almost overlooked, and 7. the *valedictory,* "I pray you fare well." Subscribed is 8. the *return address,* perhaps in military form, for it names the soldier's unit; and 9. *greetings from friends* are added as a postscript on the margin.

II

Most of the above features appear in the Pauline letters frequently enough to show how naturally he fell into the conventions of the day. But we should like to go further and inquire how far the apostle had individualized the forms. We may begin with the Thessalonian epistles, where the entire outline is very definitely (and mechanically) marked.

1. They begin with the *salutation* (I Thes. 1:1; II Thes. 1:1-2) in the conventional form, though here as elsewhere Paul shows a tendency to enlarge upon one or more of its three elements. Thus, the second element, "to the church of the Thessalonians," is expanded with the phrase, "in God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." The third element takes on the typical Pauline form, "Grace to you and peace from God our

[1] A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East,* 4th ed., pp. 180-182, esp. notes 4, 5, 18, and p. 184, n. 3.

[2] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

Father and the Lord Jesus Christ,"—in which the Greek "greeting" (χαίρειν—Jas. 1:1) is Christianized into "grace" (χάρις), and the tender old Semitic salutation, "peace be unto you," is joined to it, with the final addition of an invocation of the Father and the Son.[3] This form is invariable in the acknowledged letters of Paul, and in Ephesians, except that it is shortened in Col. 1:2, and in I Thessalonians. Gal 1:4-5 adds to it—perhaps in lieu of a thanksgiving. No other epistle in the New Testament reproduces it exactly: the Pastorals all omit "to you" (ὑμῖν), and I-II Timothy add "mercy" (ἔλεος) with II John. This precise form of the salutation may therefore be taken as typical of Paul; though the omission of articles in the Greek suggests that it was already an ecclesiastical formula.

2. The salutation is followed immediately by the *thanksgiving* (I Thes. 1:2; II Thes. 1:3), "We give thanks to God always for you all." This is the rule in other Pauline letters; but it is omitted entirely in Galatians (for good reasons!), and in I Timothy and Titus, though it is incorporated in II Timothy (1:3). In addition, it is replaced with a *doxology* in II Corinthians and Ephesians (II Cor. 1:3; Eph. 1:3), but it is reflected later in each of these cases (II Cor. 1:11; Eph. 1:16).

3. The *invocation,* "constantly mentioning you in our prayers" (1 Thes. 1:2), is nearly always joined closely to this thanksgiving, though in II Thessalonians (1:11) it follows later, and in I Corinthians (1:4) it happens to be omitted completely.

These three features belonged evidently to the introductory portion of a conventional letter, though Paul's epistolary habits have given them an individualized form. At the same time, Paul frequently connects the thanksgiving and invocation so closely with what follows that they form also a transition and introduction to the chief topic of the epistle, and they must be regarded in both lights in any analysis.

4. Following the introductory section, it seems to be Paul's custom to turn at once to the *principal message,* the topic which forms the primary reason for writing the letter at all (I Thes. 2–3; II Thes. 2:1-17). It was not his habit to beat about the bush, and when any subject so stirred his attention as to lead him to letter writing, it was pretty sure to be the first expressed. Something of the circumstances and purpose of the epistles can often be deduced from this fact. In the Thessalonian epistles the conclusion of this primary section is clearly marked with a formal benediction (I Thes. 3:11-13; II Thes. 2:16-17), a formality not often repeated

[3] J. H. Ropes (*ICC, James,* pp. 127 f.) has questioned this and suggested that the combination "grace and peace" is a reflection of the Aaronic benediction; but his objections seem inconclusive, in the face of Paul's fidelity in other respects to hellenistic epistolary form. The conscious combination of Greek and Semitic elements in the salutation, either by Paul or in existing ecclesiastical formula, would correspond admirably to the mixed constituency of Paul's churches.

in later letters.[4] But it should be noted that such sections often do end with an elevated passage of exhortation or rhapsody[5] of greater or less extent but generally with emotional appeal. This can be a helpful sign in following the course of the apostle's thought, for he seems to have sought frequently to round out a given body of teaching with an appeal to some emotion to drive the message home. The principal message and occasion of the letters of Paul are of various sorts; but it may be noted that doctrinal teaching is more likely to be found here than in other parts of the epistles.[6]

5. The principal message treated, Paul seizes the occasion to include *secondary messages* suggested by his pastoral relation to his readers (I Thes. 4-5; II Thes. 3:1-16). These too are marked off in the Thessalonian letters by formal benedictions (I Thes. 5:23-24; II Thes. 3:16). Due to the circumstances and constitution of the early churches, these secondary messages are largely of a practical and ethical character.

6. In the *conclusion* of the epistles there is much greater variety. This is the occasion for gathering up all the little matters that have been previously overlooked. In general these deal with *personal affairs*—the apostle's plans for travel, recommendation of his messengers, etc., and an occasional practical postscript. In I Thessalonians we note a request for prayers (I Thes. 5:25), and strict orders regarding the public reading of the epistle (I Thes. 5:27).

7. More conventional elements of conclusion are the *greetings* (I Thes. 5:26), both to and from friends,[7] and 8. the *signature* (II Thes. 3:17), where the apostle writes a portion of the letter in his own hand.[8]

9. Finally the letter closes with a *benediction* (I Thes. 5:28; II Thes. 3:18) in place of the secular "fare thee well" (ἔρρωσθε). The typical Pauline form of this benediction runs, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you (all)"; but Rom. 15:33 substitutes "The God of peace be with you all," Galatians and Philippians have ". . . with your spirit," and Colossians and the Pastorals have only the curt "Grace be with you." The elaborate benedictions of II Cor. 13:14 and Eph. 6:23-24 are more liturgical.

Thus we discover in the Thessalonian letters a clearly defined outline, as follows:

I. Introductory
  1. Salutation
  2. Thanksgiving and Invocation

[4] But *cf.* Rom. 11:33-36; Eph. 3:20-21.
[5] *Cf.* Rom. 5:1-5; 8:31-39; Gal. 5:1-6.
[6] *Cf.* II Thes., Rom., Gal., Col., Eph.; *cf.* Phil. 2:1-11.
[7] *Cf.* I Cor. 16:19-20.
[8] *Cf.* I Cor. 16:21; Gal. 6:11; Col. 4:18; *cf.* Philm. 19.

II. Principal Message (often doctrinal)
(here closed with a benediction)
III. Secondary messages (mainly ethical)
(also closed with a benediction)
IV. Conclusion
1. Personal messages and postscripts
2. Greetings
3. Signature
4. Closing benediction.

It is hardly to be assumed that Paul ever set up such an outline before him, and went to work to fill it in, but rather that the conventions of the age and the natural movement of his own mind led him to shape many of his epistles in this fashion spontaneously. It remains to examine how this worked out in the remaining epistles.

III

First, let us turn to Romans and consider whether the above outline fits that most formal of Paul's epistles. 1. Romans opens with the usual salutation (1:1-7), much expanded, but still retaining the Pauline formulæ, and goes on with the thanksgiving and invocation (1:8-15) introducing the writer. 2. Then comes the statement of the principal topic (1:16-17), the discussion of which continues without interruption through chapter 11. The discussion falls into a typical sermonic outline, with title and text (1:16-17), introduction (1:18–3:20), statement of theme (3:21-26), and standard three points (3:27–4:25; 6–7; 9:1–11:32) each with its climax (5:1-21; 8:1-39; 11:33-36). But all this is organic to the principal message and purpose of the epistle—and it is doctrinal. 3. The secondary messages (12:1–15:13) are as usual ethical and practical, and form almost a compend of Paul's moral teaching, dealing first with personal obligations (12:1-21), then with social (13:1-10), and finally with a particular problem (14:1–15:12). This section is concluded with a benediction (15:13). 4. Then we come to a passage of personal affairs (15:14-29), closing with a request for prayers and a benediction (15:30-33). That completes the conventional pattern of the epistle. Romans 16 is left standing, either as an appended note, or at best as a postscript. It is too brief and casual to conform to the outline established above.

Galatians fits the same pattern. 1. Its introduction has the necessary salutation (1:1-5), but the omission of the thanksgiving is significant. 2. The main message (1:6–5:12) is double-barreled, but ends in an elevated appeal (5:1-12). 3. The secondary messages make practical application of the main theme (5:13–6:10); and 4. the conclusion (6:11-18) contains the signature and reiteration, with blessing and benediction.

Colossians also fits the established outline. Its introduction (1:1-13) includes an additional prayer, leading up to the main message (1:14–2:23). This in turn leads on naturally to the practical messages (3:1–4:6), and the conclusion (4:7-18) includes various matters of business, greetings, signature, and benediction.

Thus at least five of the Pauline letters are seen to conform to a pretty definite plan of construction. This is not so clear with the remaining letters, and we may well look for the reasons. There is at least a presumption that they too should have been constructed similarly.

IV

With I Corinthians the case is fairly clear. 1. It begins with the conventional salutation (1:1-3) and thanksgiving (1:4-9), though there may be a hint of irony in the omission of the invocation, as if the Corinthians had nothing more to pray for! 2. Next Paul lunges directly into the question of the factions, the main topic on his mind (1:10–4:22). 3. Secondary topics, also ethical and practical, follow in order (5:1–6:20). Here the letter seems ready for the conclusion, for Paul has said what was in his mind. But instead a new feature enters (3b), *epistolary responses.* Paul has received a letter from the Corinthian church, and now he must reply to a series of questions they have addressed to him (7:1–16:4). This intrusion into the typical outline greatly extends the epistle. 4. Finally, however, he comes to the concluding section, marked by discussion of plans for himself and his colleagues (16:5-12), a few last words (16:13-18), greetings (16:19-20), signature and benediction (16:21-24). Thus in I Corinthians the established outline has been expanded at one point because of the letter Paul had received.

In II Corinthians there is again apparent deviation. 1. After the usual salutation (1:1-2) the thanksgiving is replaced with a doxology (1:3-7), though there is an echo of the formal thanksgiving and invocation in the confused phrases of verse 12. 2. The main theme, Paul's ministry in its real and ideal aspects, follows (1:8–7:16—bracketing 6:14–7:1). 3. A practical subject follows (8:1–9:14), concluded with a brief doxology (9:15). This suggests that the conclusion should follow immediately; but, instead of that, we have the notorious break into diatribe at 10:1. However, the application of the typical outline to this epistle seems to strengthen the case for thinking it composite. If this be so, then the "painful" chapters represent the end of another letter. The main topic (§2), which seems referred to in 2:3-5, is now wanting, and probably deserved suppression. 3. But 10:1 looks like the opening word of a fresh topic, and may well have stood at the beginning of the secondary messages (10:1–13:10), followed 4. by a curt conclusion (13:11-14), with the benediction now in an expanded and more liturgical form.

For Philippians similar conclusions may be drawn. Here we have 1. introduction (1:1-11); 2. principal topic, here personal (1:12-26); 3. ethical messages (1:27–2:18); and 4. travel plans (2:19-30), usually part of the conclusion. The addition of a benediction would complete the epistle, and this argues once more for composition. Indeed, if χαίρετε in 3:1a be read "farewell" instead of its literal sense "rejoice,"[9] the letter seems more than half concluded. In what follows, the introduction (§1) and perhaps the beginning of the following section are wanting; but the heat of Paul's denunciation suggests that this section (3:1b–4:1) must have been his main message (§2), and it is capped with a brief exhortation (4:1). 3. The practical messages are brief (4:2-8), and followed with a benediction 4. similar to that of Rom. 15:33 (4:9b; *cf.* 4:7). The remaining paragraph (4:10-23) might be the autograph portion, or the conclusion of still another letter. Analysis thus tends to confirm the theory that Philippians is composite.

Philemon is a brief personal note, too short to discuss more than one subject, hence secondary messages (§3) are omitted. 1. It has the usual introduction (1-7), 2. the primary message (8-21), and 4. comes at once to the conclusion, with travel plans, greetings, and benediction (22-25). Its deviation from the established outline is, like that of I Corinthians, quite natural under the circumstances.

Ephesians follows this outline, if anything, too perfectly. 1. It has the customary salutation (1:1-2), but substitutes a doxology (1:3-14) for the thanksgiving, which appears instead with the invocation at the beginning of the next section (1:16). 2. The main message (1:15–3:21) is doctrinal, and concluded with a doxology (3:20-21). 3. The secondary message (4:1–6:18) is ethical and hortatory. 4. The conclusion (6:19-24) includes a request for prayer, introduction of Tychicus, and a double benediction differing from the usual Pauline formula.

The Pastorals, and the remaining New Testament epistles, do not accommodate themselves to analysis on the above plan.

VI

In conclusion, it appears that the majority of the Pauline epistles show clearly that they were constructed upon a common outline, one of the most distinctive features of which is the clear separation of the main topic from subsidiary interests. None of the remaining epistles of the New Testament, not even the Pastorals, show this division; and most of them differ in other details of form as well, even though the formal elements of the Pauline letters can be shown to have belonged to the conventional epistolary style of the day. Thus the form of the epistle can throw some light upon questions of its integrity and authenticity.

[9] *Cf.* J. B. Lightfoot, *Philippians* (London, 1883), pp. 125, 126.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

WERE CHRISTIAN opinion to be polled as to the one basic and fundamental Christian principle, the verdict would almost certainly be Love. Our favorite quotations all assert it, either directly: "God so loved the world . . ." and "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love . . ." or by implication: "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them" and "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

But despite the general assent that this is after all the *sine qua non* of Christianity, and apart from the convenient commentary as to what love really is, which Paul thoughtfully provides in the one chapter of the Bible which almost everyone almost knows by heart, there is still, I am convinced, a deal of muddy thinking as to what this love really is. And the fact that there is so much uncertainty at this point may be the real reason that there so often seems to be so little of the virtue shown.

Everyone knows the story of the supposed word of the precocious child: "I love Aunt Martha, but I don't like her." My impression is that under that ageless smart saying, which has, as such stories always do, emerged chameleonlike in many forms, lies a deal of common sense and sound theology. Through the years one very dear to me, whose own life, to those who know her best, has been a glowing example of love at its sweetest, has often expressed difficulty at another familiar word in the Christian tradition: "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen." Her difficulty has not been with the first half of the verse—there is no one, I am sure, whom she hates—but with the second half, which she is wont to quote in its more familiar form as a question. "That," she has frequently said in substance, "is just the difficulty. It is because I *have* seen him that I find it so hard to love him."

The little girl and her elderly sister have both alike put their finger on a weakness in our theological vocabulary which ought to be obvious. The word *love,* especially when it is used as a noun, can be, just because it is forced to cover so much territory, often most ambiguous. It is a commonplace that in other languages, as, for example, Greek, there are several words to express these very different emotions. Not so in everyday English. Properly or improperly as the case may be, when the word *love* is used, it suggests to most the sentiment of a husband for his wife, a father for an adored child, a lover for his sweetheart. And they are likely to be contemptuous, as it seems to me they should be, when they hear Richard Lovelace declaim to his Lucasta: "I could not love thee, dear, so much, lov'd I not honour more." They may not be able consciously or rationally to give utterance to their suspicions, but they know perfectly well that there is something incongruous involved, that two very different things are being talked about. *Love* in the sense to which I am referring is an all-out quality. There are no qualifications, no exceptions. To everyone else the one adored may seem selfish, vicious, even detestable, in a

word, the very opposite of one beloved; to the one who truly loves him, all this is secondary. He may not be blind to the weaknesses, may even see them most acutely and painfully; but something—perhaps it is illogical, irrational; nonetheless it is indestructible—keeps the channel open. And God pity us when that tenacity finally lets go.

But this is only part of the picture. Precisely because of this there is so much muddy thinking and loose expression. Of necessity there are very few persons from whom I, as an individual, have such an unreasoning but complete devotion. But that does not mean that toward the rest of the world I should or do feel the opposite compulsion. Of course I love my wife as I love no other woman, and am keenly suspicious of the man who remarks: "A Christian should love all mankind alike; I love every woman as deeply as I do my wife and my own flesh and blood. I love every country as deeply as I do America." If he really means it, I am very suspicious of him. He doesn't get invited to my home as a week-end guest. But while I love my wife, my children, my mother, my country, in a way which, I frankly admit, I do not—cannot—love other people, other lands, I am far from espousing the sentiment of the old jingle:

> "Dear God, bless me and my wife,
> My son John and his wife;
> Us four, no more."

For there, you see, an utterly different element comes into the picture. I may not have the slightest personal and intimate fondness for this man, that woman—and, so far as I can see, there is no earthly reason why I should—but that does not mean that I do not wish him well—and I do not mean in the idle or casual sense which a James so properly excoriates. It often happens that men and women who know best the consuming love for their own, of which I have been writing, devote themselves, with seemingly no slightest regard for their own convenience and best interests, to trying to make possible for others with whom they come into contact, intimate and casual alike, the same joys and happiness so dear to themselves. And for the life of me, I can see no contradiction here; no grounds for the charge of narrow provincialism, nationalism, antiecumenity, or any of the other self-righteous epithets so easily and carelessly tossed about nowadays.

Is not this what these several texts to which I have referred really mean? We used to sing of the "old-time religion" that it made us "love everybody." Yes, if by *love* we mean, have the desire (always backed up by very practical and genuine deeds) that he receive the same treatment from life that we want for ourselves; no, if it means, have necessarily a passionate attachment for him or even want him as an intimate friend. I "love" lots of people, as I inferred in a former paragraph, whom I would never dream of inviting into my home. If that be heresy, make the most of it!

The little girl was right: of course she ought to love Aunt Martha; but there are lots of Aunt Marthas of whom there is no slightest reason for her to be fond or even to like, despite the fact that she should honestly try to keep the channels as open for them as for herself to find the fullest and completest happiness in this interesting quest we call life.

From Off the Campus and On

One of an editor's regrets is that so many of his readers are but names in a card catalogue. If, as is happily true of Crozer Quarterly, a good many subscribers are former students and thus far more than mere names, he can count himself fortunate. Many of you write in from time to time, and your letters are always welcome. Naturally, we enjoy expressions of appreciation and approval. Despite the fancied peace and tranquillity of the ivory tower existence which is popularly supposed to be the lot of theological professors, we are quite human and enjoy what most normal men do. But frank criticism is always wholesome. You have been most restrained in serving that up—at least in letters which have fallen under the editor's eye. Don't think we are asking for trouble. Far from it. Continue to write your plaudits. We love them. But if you do have any grievances, tell us direct. Don't bother your friends, who aren't—or shouldn't be—interested in them; tell us, for we are. And, who knows, it might do some good. Be assured that in the coming year we shall continue to try to provide a fairly balanced diet, with something wholesome for everyone, and perhaps once in a while an exotic dish or two, not always to be found on theological bills of fare, to tickle an occasional palate. If there is such an item you have been looking for, tell us; it may be that we can find it. And so once again: Happy New Year.

It is with mixed feelings that we publish the leading article—unalloyed satisfaction in being able to share with our readers a masterly survey and analysis of a situation which few seem competent to handle; sadness that it had to be posthumous. Dr. Cassady was taken ill, shortly after having presented this paper as the matriculation address at Crozer; and after a trying sickness and apparent recovery suddenly passed away on October 24. Colleagues, students, friends—all share in a common loss and sorrow. Dr. Cassady was in his second year at Crozer as professor of applied Christianity and director of field work. During the war, he had been associate director of men's work for the Presbyterian Board of Education. For a decade (1931-1942) he had been chairman of the department of religion at the University of Rochester. He was a graduate of Juniata College and Princeton Theological Seminary, and held a Ph.D. from Columbia University.

Mr. Smith, who probes into Augustine and the latter's notions of evil, has been minister of St. John's Lutheran Church, Sayre, Pennsylvania, since 1945. After graduation from Mt. Airy Lutheran Seminary, he did graduate work both there and at the University of Pennsylvania, from which latter institution he received an A.M. in philosophy. For nine years he was a missionary in the West on the staff of the (Lutheran) Church Extension Board. He is at work upon a volume on freedom and evil, of which the present article is a by-product.

Dr. Hallowell (A.B., Harvard; A.M., Duke; Ph.D., Princeton) is associate professor of political science at Duke, where, following several years on the faculty of U.C.L.A., he has taught since 1942. In addition to

articles in professional journals he is the author of *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*. He is also associate editor of the *Journal of Politics*.

Dr. Stevenson is a member of the faculty of the Westminster Choir College, where he teaches liturgy and worship. He holds an A.B. from the University of Texas (where he was subsequently an assistant professor of music), an S.T.B. from Harvard, a master's degree from Yale, and a Ph.D. (in music) from the University of Rochester. He is a Methodist minister and served as an Army chaplain during the recent war.

Dr. Perry, since 1924 professor of New Testament at Bangor Theological Seminary, was presented to our readers in the July, 1948, issue. It is a pleasure to welcome him again, this time with a companion article. He holds degrees from Marietta, Harvard, Hartford, and Chicago. His doctoral thesis (Chicago, 1920), *Sources of Luke's Passion Narrative,* aroused keen interest in the then only dawning realm of form criticism. Prior to his many years at Bangor he was a parish minister in Connecticut and (subsequently) a member of the faculties of Hartford and Smith.

Despite astronomical printing costs books are still appearing in a veritable cascade from the several presses. Each issue of CROZER QUARTERLY goes to bed, with its review sections bulging and with several reviews held over "for a more convenient season." There would not thus seem to be any reason to fear aridity in this particular part of your journal. Again we must limit to a bare line of introduction our thanks to the staff of reviewers who make this section possible. But even if our mouth cannot be "open unto you, O faithful friends, our heart is enlarged." Dr. Aubrey, president of Crozer, has accepted the invitation of the University of Pennsylvania to become head of its new department of religious thought. Mr. Ayres is the director of the Gulf Research & Development Co. Dr. Bertocci is a professor of philosophy at Boston University and secretary of the American Theological Society. Dr. Brightman has been for many years professor of philosophy in the same faculty. Dr. Cadbury is professor of New Testament at Harvard. Professor Clark holds a similar chair at Duke. Mr. Cohen is rabbi of Beth Sholom Congregation, Philadelphia. Professors Davis and Enslin have respectively the chairs of theology and New Testament at Crozer. Dr. Ferm is professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster. Mr. Gehr is minister of the Church of the Restoration (Universalist), Philadelphia. Dr. Holcomb is professor of the philosophy of religion at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Howson is head of the department of biblical literature at Vassar. Professor Keighton has the chair of homiletics and worship at Crozer. Miss Lam is a member of the Education and Cultural Relations Division attached to the Office of Military Government for Germany. Dr. Mackie is president of the Presbyterian Ministers Fund. Drs. Matthews and Neisser were both for many years members of the faculty of Crozer; the former as professor of Old Testament, the latter director of the Extension Course. Father Pittenger is a tutor in dogmatic theology at General Theological Seminary. Professor Pritchard has the chair of Old Testament at Crozer. Mr. Scammon is an instructor at Andover Newton. Dr. Shryock is rector of Grace Church and the Incarnation, Philadelphia. Dr. Widgery is professor of philosophy at Duke. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet from America, by D. R. Davies, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xv, 102, $2.

The importance of the subject of this book justifies a longer review than its size suggests. In that it advocates some views of Reinhold Niebuhr it presents a challenge for their critical consideration. Early in the preface (p. vii) the author says that "anyone with average intelligence" can grasp the meaning of Niebuhr's writings. Yet, later (p. viii) he admits that he has "come across scores" of men "who failed to grasp" Niebuhr's position. He quotes one "quite intelligent person" as commenting: "Niebuhr no sooner makes a statement than he seems to affirm the opposite" (p. viii). Dr. Davies' exposition leaves much still unintelligible to me.

The author describes Niebuhr's turning in politics and economics "to the left" during his thirteen years as a pastor in Detroit. This was largely due to his acquaintance with the conditions of work and living of so many employed in the Ford automobile industry as little other than "dehumanized" "depersonalized" parts of a vast mechanism. He contrasted that with the Christian emphasis on spiritual personality. He discredited the hopes that mankind may achieve an earthly utopia by merely human agency—and, indeed, he has no hope of any such utopia. With this, he is *supposed* to have turned from what is called "liberal" Christianity "to the right" of traditional theological orthodoxy. The doctrine of "justification by faith" is *supposed then* to have become central for him, as referring to the way man is to be saved, that is, presumably, attain to a satisfaction in contrast with the successes and failures of his merely human achievement. I have said *"supposed then,"* because it may be that by his upbringing this was actually the doctrine most closely associated with his own religious experience from his youth, that it was a central conviction leading him to enter the ministry, and, perhaps, ultimately the real basis of his abandoning studies at Yale as irrelevant. Dr. Davies says that the doctrine of justification by faith is the "hinge" of Niebuhr's thought. As the significance of this doctrine would appear the more important the greater the seriousness of man's condition, Niebuhr came to concentrate attention on sin, "more particularly, original sin" (p. 43). "Niebuhr more than any contemporary Christian theologian," writes Dr. Davies, "has rehabilitated the Christian dogma of original sin" (p. 39). Looking around, with that attitude of mind, his gaze has become focussed on evils. Thus, our author declares that Niebuhr's "understanding of original sin" has delivered him from undue illusion about the process of social development. Then, to counteract the views of history and human life thus developed, he has adopted statements of "complete realization" as being "beyond time and history altogether." As Dr. Davies puts it: "The fulfilment of the historic process is beyond history" (p. 51).

This book confirms the impressions I have otherwise of Reinhold Niebuhr. If he is to be described as a prophet, it is essentially as a preacher of tremendous energy and vitality, filled with moral enthusiasm, and of the utmost sincerity. Like so many such prophets he seems not to entertain any idea whatever that some of his attitudes and statements may be wrong, even grievously wrong. Sharing in the widespread respect for him as a moral force, especially in his efforts to apply Christianity "to every social situation," I am convinced that he should be opposed

with regard to some fundamentals. I find his use of certain terms—essential for him—quite unintelligible and highly mysterious and as such a futile distraction of attention, *e.g.*, original sin, justification by faith, beyond time. Dr. Davies defends Niebuhr by insisting that his "way of thinking" is dialectical. Niebuhr's dialectics undoubtedly enable him to escape from many forms of criticism but not from two objections I have to make which refer to the dialectic itself. As most of those who use the method of dialectic, he presents concepts as though in opposition, one or both of which give through exaggeration a distorted idea of the actual facts. This objection may be made with reference to a comment made by Dr. Davies. He suggests that the failure to understand Niebuhr "is due in the final analysis" to "an insufficient appreciation of the tragic element in moral experience" and "of the abysmal element in religion" (p. ix). This, I contend, is where Niebuhr exaggerates one concept in his dialectic—that of the corruption of man. Why does he do it? It seems to me because he wants to bring in and emphasize the importance of justification by faith, something "transcendental" "beyond time." My second objection is that what is presented thus as though the dialectical synthesis, the reconciliation, is not intelligibly such. He *seems to me* most frequently to present a distorted concept of history as though it has been and is merely secular in contrast with the "transcendent." Yet history has rarely, if ever, been merely secular. Religion has been and is an experience of historical life *in which* the relation to the divine is actual. If Niebuhr means that men cannot realize merely by the secular and with no conscious relation to God what they need for their complete satisfaction, why does he not simply say so? His Christian myopia and his hanging on to certain Christian dogmas prevent him from a true view of history. He is just as much in error in his exaggerated stress on the "illusion" of human power as those against whom he declaims for too great confidence in that power. His conviction of justification by faith may be said to have led him to a libel and slander of mankind. His dialectic way of thinking has not saved him from looking at things out of balance. It may be that all solutions of social problems so far in human history have been "partial, incomplete, and dynamically imperfect." But if they are solutions, though only partial, they are some triumph over difficulties, for which we should be thankful. Yet, notwithstanding that according to Dr. Davies Niebuhr takes the doctrine of the resurrection of the body as symbolic "that nothing gained in historic development will be wasted and lost" (p. 56), he focusses attention exaggeratedly on the aspects by which the partial solutions fall short of an "absolute ideal." Niebuhr's distorted view of history is in part due to his lopsided moralism and religionism. Dr. Davies describes his position to be that "if the meaning of history is to be sought within the historic process, then it is just meaningless" (p. 65). The fundamental question here is how the term "meaning" is to be understood. For Niebuhr it appears to be something "beyond time"—and therefore as such is not to be found in history. But just what is this meaning "beyond time"? In one of his critical articles, Niebuhr wrote: "What appals us particularly is the spiritual poverty which forces so many people in our era to talk this nonsense in order to save themselves from despair" (p. 78). Niebuhr also emphasizes despair, and what appals me is that he should (to use his own expression) talk the "nonsense" about "beyond time" to save us from it. To say that history is meaningless unless it has the meaning he wants to ascribe to it is utterly dogmatic. It may reasonably be maintained that history for a normal person has meaning (in a valid sense differing from his) in physical, intellectual, and æsthetic values and in social human relationships as time goes along, even quite apart from any possible future life or any religious relation to a transcend-

ent divine. But it may be said that these are "of the world" and Niebuhr, according to Dr. Davies, thinks the church "must wage war against the world for the entire duration of history" (p. 94). However, perhaps to guard against a charge of implied Manichæan dualism, it is added: "until it is swallowed up in the eternal order." But if the order really is eternal, is not the world already swallowed up in it; has it not always been swallowed up in it? Then, does the "until" make any difference? If none, can the statement have any significance for us? If any, is it not just with reference, as the term "until" itself implies, to the historical in the future? Then of this eternal, the time-transcendent reality, God, in and through whom there is to be the fulfillment of history, Niebuhr says: "The majesty of God is most perfectly revealed in the movement when Christ is crucified" (p. 77). That may just be the language of the preacher—but how utterly horrible!

Personally I am not perturbed by Niebuhr's attitudes and theology, except for Niebuhr himself and those scared theologians who follow him bolting for refuge to traditional dogmas. I believe that those "within" the churches mostly think his ideas of human corruption apply to those "outside"; and those outside do not bother with such ideas or definitely reject them. Mankind is far more free than otherwise from belief in such doctrines. Men are in some ways corrupt, some more than others, though perhaps none more than those who corruptly exaggerate the corruption. Yet if men had not been more healthy than diseased physically, more rational than irrational, more moral than immoral, they must have disappeared from the earth long ago. What we need is a prophet who will preach the utmost faith in both God and man. Some applying dialectic may claim that that is what Niebuhr is. But is he?

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Christian Apologetics, by Alan Richardson, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 256, $3.

Canon Richardson has written a vigorous but muddled book which deserves a close reading if only because it attempts to deal honestly with problems to which Christian writers must sooner or later give a clear and detailed answer. His subject is the method by which theological claims may be justified, and the relation between theological method and the methodology of the sciences. The book is not addressed primarily to the faithful; it is proposed as a reasoned defense of the faith, designed to meet the objections of humanists, believers in any non-Christian philosophy or religion, egoists, and zealous cynics. (It is soon apparent that "liberals" are regarded as a fifth group in need of persuasion.) In view of Richardson's purpose, the case he presents is perhaps best judged from the side of the nonbelievers to whom it is addressed.

At the risk of doing the author an injustice by referring to widely separated passages without giving the intervening arguments, it should be noted that what is most likely to baffle the non-Christian reader is Richardson's habit of taking back what he has ostensibly conceded. When Christian apologetics is offered as a "reasoned defense" of the proposition that there is an authoritative revelation, this seems fair enough and one prepares to listen. But when it turns out that the revelation can be seen only by a faithful believer, and that the Bible is the authoritative vehicle of revelation because God commends it to the believer's heart, then one wonders if Richardson does not mean by "reasoned defense" what is ordinarily meant by "begging the question." The same is true of the author's announced conviction that theological knowledge must "justify itself at the bar of rational inquiry," for this equable conviction fades into the theme that "there is no human science which can

pass judgment upon" the Bible, which is (primarily) its own interpreter and the basis of theological knowledge. To the nonbeliever this sounds like theological fiat, not justification at the bar of rational inquiry. Again, when it is promised that Christian apologetics will make scientific method its starting point, the phrase "scientific method" connotes a general, well-recognized pattern of hypothesis-induction-verification as a means of arriving at warranted belief. Richardson, however, does not start with such a pattern in mind. He starts with the general principle that there is no knowledge of truth apart from revelation, and no undistorted truth without special revelation, which is a miracle given to the eyes of faith by God. It finally appears that rationality and truth and science all rest on the miracle of Christ's resurrection. If the non-Christian be bewildered by this unremarked shift in starting points, he deserves more than Christian charity.

And so it goes with all of the crucial concepts like *induction, evidence, observable, science,* and *rational.* Each of them suffers a theological sea change into something rich and strange and beautifully tailored for the purpose at hand. In addition, the author at important points adds to the semantic confusion by tossing in darkly mysterious phrases of continental derivation, such as "theological existence." There is, on the face of it, no more reason to say that a Christian thinker exists theologically than to say that a doctor exists medically or a milkman milkily. So saying gives no information about the Christian, the doctor, or the milkman, even though theologians seem to hint that a new "dimension of being" has been uncovered. Faced with new terms which have no readily understandable meaning, and with common terms which shift their meanings according to the author's needs, the nonbeliever will find a hazy, dreamlike quality pervading what purports to be rigorous argument.

The first step in Richardson's argument is to establish the fact that theology not merely ought to be, but is and has been, an empirical science, and to this end he advances four considerations. He holds that since by theology we mean the study of Christian existence, therefore "the science of theology is rendered necessary by the existence of the Church, just as the existence of physical objects makes necessary the science of physics." But one could as well argue that the existence of bumps on the head renders necessary the science of phrenology, while the presence of stars and human hands make necessary the respective sciences of astrology and palmistry. No discipline becomes "scientific" merely because it selects a certain range of facts as subject matter; it becomes a science in virtue of the testable procedures by which it orders and explains the range of facts. So far as the argument under consideration goes, nothing is said on the only relevant point.

Richardson next finds theology to be a science because theology makes use of its own categories, and again he fails to see that the same thing could be said for a vast number of ingenious explanatory systems which the wit of man has devised or could devise. Independent categories allow us to distinguish the various types of explanations and to follow out their consequences, but mere autonomy of basic concepts is scarcely sufficient to justify a proposed explanation as reliable. The other reasons offered by Richardson for regarding theology as a science group themselves under the assertions that theology uses "scientific method" and is imbued with "the scientific spirit." As indicated earlier in this review, Richardson's understanding of these terms is so unusual as to make improbable any ground of common understanding with his nonbelieving audience.

With theology established as an empirical science, the author presses on to show that this particular empirical science is unique in that it rests on revelation. Though not so nimbly as Niebuhr, he finds that revelation must be the key category because

the meaning of history is to be found outside history. This conclusion is reached via the observation that all facts are interpreted facts and that no science is merely a collection of hard little facts unrelated to the interests and interpretations of human investigators. This is obviously true, but it is difficult to see why the truth that data do not come bearing labels, plus the failure of an earlier century's ideal of "complete objectivity," warrants any theistic conclusions about revelation or bestows more than a dubious metaphorical significance upon phrases like "beyond history." There may *be* some connection between the premise and the conclusion, but Richardson does not supply it.

Possibly the required supplementary material is meant to be found in the contention that all purely naturalistic explanations of Christian experience merely "explain away" what is vital in that experience. Certainly the many ill-conceived attempts to "reduce" religion to some illusion or fear or frustration give point to the author's protest, but the nonbelieving reader will be quick to see the weakness of the argument. He will point out that *every* sect, no matter how puerile or dangerous or palpably false its beliefs, will claim that explanations by outsiders miss what is vital in its faith. But the fact that alien explanations miss what is dear to the believer is in itself no evidence that what the believer holds dear is either true or worth holding. Evidence of a different kind is needed for that, and thus Richardson's supplementary argument fails to supplement, being itself in need of nourishment. Similar considerations apply to the demand that there must be special revelation because Christianity makes a unique claim. If every unique claim made in the course of history were evidence of a special revelation, we should be treated to a spectacle no more pleasing to the Christian than to the "rationalist." For each revelation would be, by definition, true, while the fact that many of the revelations were conflicting would make it impossible, by ordinary standards, for all of them to be true. Though Richardson occasionally toys with that notion of "paradox" which holds that a contradiction becomes a profundity when advertised as "dialectical," his targets among the nonbelievers rarely share this odd conviction.

Passing on to another stage of the argument, we find that the occurrence of miracles is the basis of belief in revelation, which is in turn the basis of theology as an empirical science. The chapter on miracles is filled with interesting material gathered to support one fundamental contention: miracles are grounds for belief in revelation because revelations are themselves miraculous, and therefore miracles attest to revelation. (This is not a parody; see pp. 165-168.) In short, Richardson seems to hold that all attempts at naturalistic explanation are futile for the reason that if revelation were not revealed it would not be revelation, and revelation, itself miraculous, is evidenced by miracles. Whether the circle in this argument is "vicious" or "productive" is for the reader to decide, remembering the while that Richardson is avowedly presenting a reasonable case to nonbelievers. In the reviewer's opinion, this presentation all too frequently resembles an elaborate *petitio principii* founded upon the correct, but logically trivial, belief that if Christian standards of judgment be used, then Christian claims are (to be judged) true. See p. 116. It is improbable that anyone ever meant to deny this.

The foregoing criticisms are unfair in the sense that they have been given without reference to the heart of Richardson's argument: faith precedes reason, faith justifies reason; science rests on a faith which is not formally different from the faith of religion. It is plain, even to nonbelievers, that there are many senses in which faith precedes reason. To name only one, fallible human beings in a precarious world usually have to commit themselves to actions and to ends before all, or enough,

evidence is in. What is not plain is how any specifically theistic conclusions can be wrung from this universal predicament. As for "reason" being "justified by faith," one wonders whether Luther's dictum about the salvation of the soul is applicable to the point at issue between Richardson and his unconverted readers. Luther may well be absolutely correct concerning the relation of an immortal soul to God, but surely in the realm of human *knowledge* the last word must rest with those communicable and testable procedures of analyzing, verifying, weighing against other facts, etc., usually associated with the intellectual life of man. Life could not go on without deep convictions, but the multitude of conflicting convictions which split our world should make it evident that having a conviction is not of itself sufficient to make that conviction true or right. "Justification" comes later, if at all, and from other sources. The author's error is the fundamental one of holding that "faith is its own evidence," an error which has been criticized by Christian theologicians almost as often as by nonbelievers.

When it is said that faith is formally the same in science and religion, it is sometimes meant that the great scientific discoveries usually follow from "intuitions," or " inspirations," or "hunches," or "flashes of genius," which are held on faith. Let it be granted that "insight" follows no mechanical formula, but let it be noted that in science these "acts of faith" are held tentatively until substantiated by more pedestrian methods, are constantly modified even after adoption, and are discarded if the slow process of verification so indicates their fate. This is patently a very different matter from the unswerving total commitment involved in religious faith. Without disparagement to either side, the two kinds of "faith" are not formally the same but are different in their meaning, their psychology, and their practice.

A more important indication of the formal similarity of faith in science and religion stressed by the author is found in the assertion that science as well as religion has its unquestioned assumptions, for example, the uniformity of nature. It is true that practicing scientists assume the validity of induction and that this seems to have some connection with Richardson's contention, but it is something of a puzzle to discover just what the connection is. At times Richardson appears to feel that since one cannot prove everything, one must start with *some* assumptions, and therefore one starting point is as good as another. More often he repudiates this kind of skepticism, seeing that it would make nonsense of Christian belief as well as of everything else. A better rendering of Richardson's intention would perhaps be along the following lines: Since everyone has to have some assumptions in order to get started, the Christian has as much right to his fundamental framework as the scientist has to a different one, and scientists who throw bricks ought not to forget that their own glass house has a foundation of faith. The exhortation to humility is well taken, but the central point is not, for no question of a man's "right" to make this or that assumption is involved. The only pertinent question is whether it is reasonable and fruitful to proceed from a certain assumption, and no unbeliever should be moved by an *ad hominem* argument on this score. This criticism does not imply that Christians are wrong and unbelievers right; the criticism merely states that the author has provided no grounds upon which an unbeliever could, or should, change his mind.

The question from which we have digressed is whether science—meaning here by the term a nontheistic philosophy based on science—necessarily rests on an "unquestioned faith," and whether this faith is formally identical with religious faith. To most charges of this kind it could be replied that scientific method is self-corrective in that it criticizes each premise in time, though not all at once. With respect to

beliefs like that in the validity of induction the case is different, since the belief is itself presupposed in every instance of criticism. Nevertheless, analysis of the inductive principle is possible, and the vast amount of intensive analysis devoted to the principle and the grounds on which it rests has been carried on in a critical spirit in no way similar to the treatment of a basic religious faith by a body of believers. Moreover, enough light has been shed on the subject to reveal the very ambiguous nature of the phrase "problem of induction," and thus to undermine the effectiveness of any blanket appeal to the subject made in order to illustrate a point or to support a not obviously related claim. Finally, there is a familiar pragmatic difference between the status of "faith" in induction and faith in, say, the incarnation of a personal deity in Jesus Christ. No active human being can live an hour without showing by his actions that he accepts the principle of induction, but a great many millions of human beings manage to get along throughout their lives without any theistic religious faith whatsoever. Hence, as nonbelievers are fond of pointing out, one "faith" is a matter in which they have no choice, while the other "faith" is a matter which they choose to reject; the former has a sort of pragmatic justification, while the latter has, in their eyes, no justification at all. Even if one's final assessment of such pragmatic justification is that it is worthless, the observations just offered still buttress the only point relevant here, namely, that scientific faith and religious faith are not the same, formally or otherwise. If so, all of Richardson's sweeping deductions from their alleged identity carry no weight. As before, this criticism does not entail the conclusion that the Christian faith is poorly founded; it merely seeks to show that Richardson's defense of the faith is founded on a mistaken judgment.

The upshot of it all is that Richardson fails either to give a persuasive "reasoned defense" of Christianity which will touch a scientific age, or to justify (a certain type of) theological method in its relations to scientific methodology. It is not a conclusion happily reached, but it could prove to be an instructive one: Richardson ably represents the type of theological thinking now prevalent, and if his understanding of theological method is not sufficient to the demands placed on it by our day, then we would be wise to work toward a new understanding of and a new method of theology.

It would be unfortunate if the critical nature of this review caused any reader to fail to buy and study the book, for it is a lively work, full of brilliant historical summaries and of insights which demand attention and support. Best of all, when Richardson is wrong, he is wrong in an informative and instructive manner.

HARMON R. HOLCOMB

Education for Life, by John O. Gross, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 219, $2.25.

A serious purpose inspired this book: it was written to present "a form of education which can produce a life-giving culture," in contrast with the one described in *Education for Death,* by Gregor Ziemer. The first chapter opens with the statement, "The United States of America is a Christian nation." The author does not overlook the anti-Christian influences which were so evident in our country from 1670 to 1776, the wave of skepticism and religious indifference which swept through even the early Christian colleges, and the unfavorable results of mass migrations as new frontiers were opened in the West. He agrees with Pitirim A. Sorokin in maintaining that such demoralizing and desocializing conditions afforded "a favorable

ground for the swift transformation of social institutions." The early Christian church in America sensed and seized this opportunity, and joined in the westward movement. It "fought barbarism," built morale, and outlawed the rough vices of the pioneers. An excellent account is given of the relation of this religious awakening to the growth of the democratic ideal, and the consequent development of public education. It is shown also how moral and intellectual virtues were taught through textbooks such as the *New England Primer* and the McGuffey readers, the sales of which ran into many millions; and by gospel hymns, sung in the public schools. In contrast, it is affirmed that while today the nation's culture is being developed by its educational forces, "they do not incorporate religion in their programs."

In discussing "Education for Democracy" the author shows that the essential ideas of democracy are "embedded in the great Hebrew-Christian tradition of man and his worth," and calls attention to the fact that an idealistic form of government does not automatically generate concepts of right and wrong." Education has come to be looked upon as "the one guarantee for social conservation and regeneration." The mighty public educational system of America has been loaded with the task of youth development, but religion has been slowly but surely pushed out, regardless of the fact that "the ability of this nation to make democracy succeed depends upon its utilizing its resources of religion." Secularism is described as the "greatest threat" to our democracy at this time; and the necessity of producing "dependable Christian leaders" is presented as the prime essential for saving it from destruction. "Democracy must have the undergirding of religion."

As a basis for his discussion of the relation of education to culture the writer considers two views of education, and emphasizes the one which conveys the idea of giving nourishment. Christian ideals must be intensely cultivated in early childhood. The school provides only one of the many educational influences which bear upon the child. Propaganda, in its proper sense, provides a method of impressing definite moral and religious principles. How peoples behave is determined by their culture, which is conditioned by their ideals. The effect of ideologies upon culture is illustrated by the experience of some European nations, where adults have imposed destructive ideas upon youth. American freedom gives opportunity for influencing ideologies by propaganda of various sorts. According to the author, "The ease with which public opinion is swayed is the current threat to our traditional Christian culture." He quotes *Fortune* magazine as saying that "leadership has passed from the hands of the church to the hands of the active and practical laity." It is his conviction that an atmosphere favorable to the Christian church must be created. "Society possesses the power to make man over in its own image"; therefore Jesus' method of leavening the world should be followed.

In the chapter on "Education for Death" the educational methods used by Hitler to secure totalitarian control of the German people are recounted. These were based upon an already existing German philosophy, which exalted war and glorified the idea of a "master race." An inclusive educational program was undertaken to make Nazis, the success of which a devastated world knows all too well. The latter part of the chapter is devoted to warnings against allowing "the cultural base" of our nation to be shifted so as to undermine the "Christian way of life." Evident tendencies in this direction in American life today are represented as being: the promotion of the idea of "world domination supported by force," the increasing willingness to turn the support and control of education over to the government, and the approval by many of universal conscription, with its attendant moral evils.

The present critical situation of the world demands the production of competent

and devoted leadership. Formerly the church trained such leaders through its own educational institutions. Interest in the church college seems to be waning, probably because of secularism and the increase of state schools. The author feels strongly that the "effort . . . to provide a leadership saturated with Christian idealism must be revitalized." Positive convictions favorable to Christian culture must be cultivated; therefore "the church related college is needed to continue its spiritual mission in our century." Attention is called to the warning of Dean Lynn Harold Hough against a culture that is "unilluminated by the great truths of literature, the great truths of history, or the great truths of revelation." Scientific research has greatly increased human powers of mutual destruction, so that the question is raised as to who shall assume "the responsibility for devising means to insure that the new discoveries shall be used for the benefit of mankind instead of as a means of destruction." This is declared to be a universal responsibility. Attention is called to the shift of interest on the part of students after World War I from individuals to causes, and to the present change in the direction of concern for individual problems rather than social issues. Society at large, however, is hardly ready to respond to this new interest in religious reality, especially because of the pressure to restore material losses. "Widespread awakening of the spirit of true Christianity is needed to sustain the church's educational institutions" in their task of furnishing the leadership required for this perilous time. Youth must be enlisted "in a movement to Christianize all of life" lest some less worthy cause should claim them.

The final chapter of the book poses the question: "Where shall the church begin its task of bringing to the world a spiritual outlook?" In opposition to the idea that religion should be made a part of the school curriculum, the author holds that the religious leaders themselves are responsible for "correcting the nation's religious illiteracy." After a discussion of "released time" and other methods used by the church in attempting to meet this responsibility, he concludes that the Sunday school is still the instrument upon which the church must depend for its educational needs. A number of suggestions are made to aid the church in giving its program educational significance, among them the enlistment and training of adults. Since evangelism and religious education must be unified if the church is to reach its objective, Dr. Gross gives considerable attention to the function of emotion as related to education. He urges also the "need for a militant church" on the ground that Christianity promoted the freedom and "encouraged the search for ways to better mankind" which ultimately resulted in the production of the atom bomb. The church has the opportunity of making these forces constructive by "establishing a Christian way of life." He declares that "basically the responsibility of the loyal follower of Christ is to make his private personal religious convictions public opinion." The volume closes with the earnest hope that the church will not fail its Lord "in one of the gravest periods in history."

This book is worthy of wide reading. While many of its ideas may be familiar, they are presented in such a way as to make a deep impression. Quotations are unusually frequent, but they are from leading writers on related subjects and are used effectively. The writer does not try to delude himself or others, but presents the facts as he sees them and offers his solution to the critical problems of the present day. If he should be accused of "wishful thinking," his critics need to remember that his wish is noble, and his thinking worthy of most careful consideration.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander, by John W. McCarthy, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. 111. $2.50.

This is an ideal doctor's publication—ideal because it is so simply and understandably written and because it conveys in an admirable manner the thought of one of the major philosophers of our time.

McCarthy points out that two other interpretations of Alexander's thought have recently been written (one an unpublished Cornell Ph.D. thesis) which, although valuable, have failed to do justice to his ideas because of a distaste on the part of those interpreters for a naturalistic philosophy. He goes on to say that he himself was looking for some comprehensive philosophy which would present a grand system of thought, believable and modern, with all the facets of experience properly considered, and has found his answer in the writings of this British philosopher.

I could wish (as a reviewer) that those contemporary writers who tend to equate naturalism with materialism would read such a book as this to overcome such a gross misunderstanding. *Naturalism is not necessarily materialism.* It could be associated with any major *qualitative* view of reality (such as idealism, materialism, neutralism, dynamism). Alexander's naturalism thus is dynamism touched with idealism. Naturalism is a view which holds that the world is one weave (monistic, in this sense) without recourse for explanation to some supernatural order of existence.

The naturalism here expounded is both simple and complex. It is simple in its use of the analogical method (taking useful analogies and applying them up and down the scale of the levels of reality); it is complex in that *time* (or *space-time*), the matrix out of which the universe is produced and grows, gets expressed in many different forms and qualities as the cosmic urge (or *nisus*) asserts itself.

Time (or events) lies at the basis of this metaphysical scheme. Out of it issues the driving force which animates the whole, producing at each level characteristic "finites" with appropriate qualities: first, matter with its primary and secondary qualities (English new realism), then organisms and life, then the body-mind of man, then the whole body which is God or Deity. What lies ahead, not even God can know. Values are appropriate for each level: the simple ones at lower levels (much as Laird would say) mattering to the others at that level; then, through instincts and impulses up to those higher levels which are called "tertiary" (*tertium quid*) such as beauty, goodness, and truth. These latter are objective but they exist only at the level where there is the mind-body relationship in all its fullness. Values of the tertiary order have no existence without appreciators; yet appreciators cannot create values *in vacuo*. Alexander's realism is consistent throughout. Realism means that the objective world has its existence independent of thought and experience (yet, thought and experience, at the higher level, are indispensable to these higher values). There is no truth, for example, without people (or spirits). There is no good without mind. There is no beauty without appreciation. But all these values rest upon an objective relationship, a compresence of subject and object. The mind-body analogy is used profitably throughout the whole scheme.

God, for Alexander, is the process whereby the next higher stage is reached. God is not space-time because it does not have the quality of the object of religious worship. The classical arguments for God have no worth. One believes in God because one needs a God at man's level of existence. There is an impulse in man that makes for this belief. Man's impulses are many and they create their objects, and nature seems to answer back to these impulses. The quality of Deity is variable in terms of the growth of the universe under time (thus, God is caught in the mesh

of a changing world). God is to be viewed both as plurality and unity: plurality in terms of gods for each level; unity in terms of the whole process. His real Deity, however, is reserved for the level to which mind has reached.

Old problems of theology (such as evil, suffering, predestination, pantheism, theism, etc.) are insoluble, so Alexander claims, because of an impossible (anthropomorphic) theism. But this metaphysics offers, it is claimed, soluble meanings. God does not have foreknowledge; God is immanent (pantheism) in respect to his body but transcendent (theism) in respect to his deity—*i.e.,* at that level where tertiary qualities emerge, or, better still, at the next higher stage of qualities (unknown) which are bound to emerge.

Religion is more than ethics for Alexander. Religion may well use morality but is not dependent upon it. Rather, a man is religious because of his unreflective emotional needs. What food is to hunger, so God is to the impulse for greater life-satisfactions. God is more than human, exists without a rival. God is a type of perfection superior to human goodness, truth, and beauty. Evil exists in the body of God. Goodness will triumph at every stage (wherever the quality of goodness is appropriate) because it possesses the best qualifications for survival.

Mind, thus, for Alexander, is a form of time. God is involved in the upward sweep of time, and viewed as the upward sweep God is creator; but so far as the higher qualities go, God is created by that sweep. Thus is made intelligible McCarthy's remark that Alexander, like Spinoza, "is a God-intoxicated man." Few words of speculation are offered on the question of immortality. The world itself is eternal, but we cannot say that mind will continue to exist without body. There is no fully accredited evidence for personal continuance beyond the life of mind with its body or that it may shift its place to some other body and still retain memory. In our present ignorance we should be content, he claims, to hand over our work to other hands and rest our immortality in the species.

The author concludes that there still are many unintelligible jumps in this system of metaphysics, many major points asserted without too much empirical evidence and even, perhaps, too generous use of analogies beyond their limited spheres. Nevertheless it is a system which contains its full measure of philosophical plausibility and certainly a fresh and stimulating way at looking at the world not only in its totality but in terms of the emergence of qualities and levels of existence and in the way many specific metaphysical questions are helpfully answered.

My own judgment is that the teachers mentioned by the author in his preface with grateful appreciation may themselves well be proud of the outcome of this study by a promising student and writer. The teachers mentioned are Horace Friess, Herbert Schneider, John Randall, Irwin Edman, of Columbia's philosophy department; and Helen Parkhurst and William Montague, of Barnard across the way.

VERGILIUS FERM

Man and Metaphysics, by George P. Adams, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. vii, 162, $2.50.

The second series of Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University was delivered by George P. Adams, under the title of "Man and Metaphysics." Professor Adams, of the University of California, is one of America's most mature, but least vocal, philosophers. Although he writes sparingly, he is gifted with rare literary grace. He never falls into clichés, never elaborates the obvious, always presents new facets of thought. While Adams belongs in the main stream of idealistic thought, he is

subservient to no tradition. Some, indeed, may feel that he overlooks lessons which the history of thought might have taught him. He is somewhat ambiguously idealistic. Further, in these lectures, and not here alone, he inclines more toward an awareness of problems than toward definite attempts at solutions. The volume is devoted to reflections on the problems arising from the relations of nature and mind, a field of thought which also greatly concerned Woodbridge himself.

These lectures, then, are brief, tentative, and preliminary. They leave us, as Adams himself says, "like all metaphysical reflection, . . . at the threshold of fresh and further inquiries." This is all to the good; thought is indeed an infinite task, as Kant hinted, and stopping places are deceptive. Yet it is possible to tarry too long at a threshold, and it must be admitted that this book is predominantly a threshold. The writer looks at the house of metaphysics, but does not enter it. For all that, *Man and Metaphysics* presents a vigorous challenge to thought. It throws down the gauntlet on two fronts by questioning several of the current preconceptions both of naturalism and of idealism. Incidentally, Adams does not share the naturalistic error that idealism is a negligible corpse.

A naturalist who reads this book should never again feel quite so sure of his first principles as he was before. Naturalism takes the application of "scientific method" to the space-time order as the wellspring of all knowledge and wisdom. Adams asks the naturalist to confront a basic question about nature and mind: "Which set of facts appears most provocative of wonder and to provide the best clue to an understanding of the total situation?" He hints broadly that the facts of mind furnish the most provocative clues, and are also least amenable to scientific method. Man, he grants, has mastered physical nature by means of science, but experience reveals "man's tragic failure to order his own life." This failure, he implies, is to some extent an indictment of naturalism and its exclusive reliance on scientific method. Adams also asks the naturalist to admit "the great divide" between matter and energy on the one side and mind and consciousness on the other. His case would have been stronger and his resultant idealism more coherent had he qualified his statement by speaking of matter and energy *as conceived by naturalists.* Matter and energy as reinterpreted by personalistic idealists is separated by no great divide from mind, but is itself one of the manifestations of cosmic mind. This, however, Adams regards as dubious. He is on firmer ground when he makes fundamental the contention that naturalism runs counter to "man's metaphysical sense," that is, his sense of the claims made on him by "that which transcends the phenomenal and empirical order of nature's events." Although Adams does not discuss religion, every reader of this journal will recognize that the metaphysical sense refers to the realm of moral and religious values.

An idealistic reader will also be given some uneasy moments. To the argument that mind or personality is the ultimate category, Adams replies that "there is more than one way of existing." That is, he recoils from the usual qualitative idealistic monism in the interest of a qualitative pluralism. Against familiar arguments urged by Hegel, Bradley, Royce, and Bowne in different ways, he insists that "experience" is not a "single inclusive area, holding within itself all diversities." This is a crucial point for most forms of idealism. To many idealists it seems to be a straightforward empirical fact that all diversities do actually occur in experience, and that experience in the form of personal consciousness is the only mode in which all possible diversities can be included and unified. Unfortunately, Adams does not elaborate his reasons for rejecting this view of experience. Perhaps he enjoys a persistent intuition of duality or plurality which deters him from acknowledging unity in the world; and

there is no arguing about tastes or intuitions. More clearly in the mood of reasoning, Adams appeals to Hume's question whether a conclusion can be transferred from the parts to the whole. Hume's point, obviously, bears with equal force against naturalism and idealism; against scientific method and synoptic coherence. But Adams uses it, as Hume himself did, more especially against idealism. Adams finds panpsychism too easy a way out. He finds the idealistic identification of mind with energy to be reductionist; that is, he cannot see how the unique properties of energy can be conserved in mind. Thus he lays down a barrage against current idealism and personalism.

On the other hand, when Adams becomes constructive, even to a slight extent, his native idealism reasserts itself. We cannot explain the facts that we find, he asserts, without seeing that mind pervades nature and falls within its domain. To omit consideration of mind, this implies, is to omit the most salient fact about nature. Further, meaning and value derive solely from mind; hence there is purpose in nature. Nature as conceived by the sciences, without meanings and values, makes mind a miracle. Indeed, science itself would be a miracle in such a nature, he hints, for science is really normative. At the end, he grants that man's metaphysical sense indicates that experience and nature should be included in a single world, transcending the dualistic and pluralistic tensions that Adams feels so strongly. But he will have no idealism purchased cheaply at the cost of ignoring the real contrasts that we find. Here he is on firm ground.

These selected ideas fall far short of doing justice to the richness of this book. On the other hand, it must be admitted that many important points are neglected or treated casually. Adams gives inadequate hints as to what he understands by value and meaning. He speaks much of mind, but does not discuss personality. He barely mentions God as a suitable subject for investigation—but he halts at the threshold of investigation. Nevertheless, he offers clues that are helpful to one who wishes to pursue these themes. Incidentally, he offers sharp and merited criticism of Whitehead's peculiar view of consciousness, charging Whitehead with playing fast and loose. Adams gives the reader a sense of the wealth and depth of reality—its paradoxes and its ranges of meaning.

A reader who wants his questions answered or his neoörthodoxy supported would do well to avoid this book. But one who wants windows opened, even when it is stormy outside, will profit greatly by it. He will be aware that high thinking and good writing still exist in our country.

The printer has unfortunately placed a Greek *xi* for *zeta* in the word *zoē* on p. 9.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Faith of Reason, by Charles Frankel, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. x, 165, $3.

This book, the Woodbridge prize essay in 1947, is a critical exposition of the notion of rational investigation and evaluation as it developed among such thinkers as Descartes, Pascal, Condillac, d'Alembert, d'Holbach, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and Condorcet. This illuminating essay in the history of ideas is written from the point of view of a thinker who is convinced that the *method* of science, as expounded by Dewey (that is, free from any metaphysical presuppositions and clinging to no "set of unassailable metaphysical truths") is the condition of human progress.

It must not be thought, however, that this naturalistic perspective is superimposed upon the data, the historical-philosophical analyses of the *philosophes.*

Rather does Dr. Frankel find this conception of reason, and the attendant idea of progress, growing alongside of, and in conflict with, another firmly rooted intellectual conviction. The Cartesian belief that the life of human reason is ultimately the expression of the harmonious structure of nature and the cosmos, the faith that scientific reason, itself a part of a larger metaphysical context, envisions ends which are fixed and unchanging—this total outlook so permeated the thinking of the *philosophes* that only haltingly, and with little awareness of the contradiction involved, did they move away from it.

For, as Dr. Frankel sees it, the attempt to establish the validity of reason as an instrument of progress "by basing it on absolute grounds external to the method of science itself," or to define progress "in terms of the movement toward fixed moral goals which were also established absolutely" (p. 3), always put the source of authority and inspiration outside of the temporal realm and thus severed the inner connection which must exist between ends and means. Thus, as in the thought of Condorcet, "there was no necessary relation between the intellectual recognition of natural rights and the obligation to take practical action. And there was, consequently, no indissoluble tie between the progress of knowledge, conceived in this manner, and the pursuit of happiness (p. 140). So also d'Alembert, Condillac, and Voltaire tended to disengage reason from the historical process. Thus, "a metaphysical psychology and theory of natural rights described what would have happened had not history, change, and the contingent intervened" (p. 155).

It was Blaise Pascal who began to look to the *method* of science itself for the interpretation of reason and progress. He, Rousseau, and Diderot were especially aware of the fact "that the method of science was unique among intellectual authorities in that it was a cumulative and self-corrective process" (p. 156). They saw that scientific method does not need the justification of a higher morality, predetermined goals, or any other metaphysical guarantee. Indeed, as Frankel sees it, "it is our moralities which require the kind of integrated growth which is exemplified where the method of science is employed" (p. 157). The closing sentence of this book reads:

> It was the *philosophes* who laid the foundations for the conviction that the moral significance of science lies in the opportunity its methods present to develop responsible and informed uses of social power, and they are largely responsible for the liberal faith that freedom of thought, equality, and coöperative inquiry are ingredients of any progressive morality (p. 158).

The reader who has followed the delineation of the conflict of these two faiths in reason, who has marked the repeated warnings that scientific method must not be compromised by unprovisional principles, who has considered the objection that metaphysical reasoning of the Cartesian sort is faced by the time-eternity dilemma, may be somewhat surprised at Dr. Frankel's unargued conviction that "integrated growth" will be exemplified wherever the method of science is employed. He might ask why equality and coöperative inquiry are *necessary* concomitants of the *method* of science, strictly speaking. That scientific conclusions are always open to further criticism is clear, but why this means integrated growth either in intellectual or in moral terms is far from clear, apart from certain attendant convictions about the nature of man and the universe he lives in. Further, granted that the method of science does not "need" external guarantees, granted that the question: "How do we know the method of science is reliable?" does not need Descartes' kind of external justification, is not a philosopher *still* confronted by the question: How shall we account for the fact that scientific method and its attendant value-emphases are reliable?

PETER A. BERTOCCI

Prospecting for a United Church, by Angus Dun, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xi, 115, $1.50.

The Episcopal bishop of Washington, Dr. Angus Dun, gives us in this small volume the addresses with which he inaugurated the Hoover Lectures on Church Unity, given at the Disciples' Divinity House in Chicago last year. Like Dr. Dun's other writings, these lectures are marked by clarity of thought, felicity of expression, and an irenical spirit. They are admirable as the inaugural lectures in such a series as that which they opened.

After some preparatory chapters, in which the bishop sketches what the average church member thinks about church and its meaning, what have been the causes and results (to date) of the will to unity, and what ought to be said about the way in which religious life, like all life, is expressed in a strange body-spirit complex, Dr. Dun turns to "an essay in understanding." He endeavours to sketch the three main types of Christian church expression, using the key words, "Catholic," "classical Protestant," and "fellowship of the Spirit," as his central ideas. In each instance, he seeks to penetrate to the essential notion or conviction or belief which is behind the various external manifestations of Catholicism (as in Rome, Eastern Orthodoxy, and what he terms "a vigorous movement which has come to be called 'Anglo-Catholicism' "), classical Protestantism (Lutheranism, Calvinism, and much Anglicanism, in the bishop's view), and the free bodies (Methodism, the Baptist communion, and the Quakers and similar groups).

On the whole, in this reviewer's opinion, he succeeds in accomplishing that which he has set out to do, although doubtless each of us will feel that something has been left out—the reviewer, as an Episcopalian of High-Church views, feels, for example, that there are certain inadequacies, if not errors, in the sketch of the "Catholic" idea, although admittedly there is much to be said for the emphasis which Dr. Dun places on the "official" and "legal" as almost constituent of Catholicism. Probably the "classical Protestant" will not feel this quite so strongly, since Dr. Dun seems to have a certain tenderness for this position. Yet it would be both unfair and ungracious to stress this criticism, since at every point the lecturer endeavoured to be as sympathetic, as understanding, and as accurate as possible.

In concluding sections, Dr. Dun writes nobly of the way in which any genuine unity of Christendom must secure the preservation of the values which are found in each of the traditions. The givenness of the church as the Body of Christ, with its given faith and sacraments and a ministry which is from God; the centrality of the Word of God, both incarnate and redemptive, and also as contained within or speaking through the Holy Scriptures; and the inner life, with insistence on genuine conversion, genuine experience, genuine appropriation of the benefits of Christ: all three of these must have part and place in the reunited church of Christ. Each of these elements checks the others when they pretend to exclusive rights; each of them strengthens and supports the others when they are seen in right perspective.

How the united Church is to be secured Dr. Dun does not tell us. Of course not, because (as he says) only God can reunite his people; and our task, as he points out, is "to prepare the way of the Lord and to do all within our human power to make his paths straight." We can heartily commend this book, therefore, since it tells us prophetically what the goal must be, but does not seek to dictate how the Holy Spirit is to guide the scattered Christian bodies of the world towards the achievement of that goal.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

The Plight of Freedom, by Paul Scherer, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xiv, 227, $2.50.

This book consists of lectures originally given at Vanderbilt University during the second world war, and later repeated at the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Austin, Texas. The general theological standpoint is that of the "new orthodoxy" which has been made famous by the author and his colleagues at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, notably by Professors Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. Of course no two neoörthodox theologians agree with each other on every point, and it would be unjust to attribute all of Scherer's positions in detail to any of his colleagues. The general thesis of this book is that the problems of war and peace can be solved only by complete devotion to Jesus Christ as interpreted by the neoörthodox theologians. The book is interesting and eloquent, and it ought to be helpful to ministers who agree with its theology.

Entirely apart from the question of the merits of evangelical neoörthodoxy, there are a few comments that seem pertinent. First, the author entitles the book *The Plight of Freedom.* This "plight" consists in the problem how to maintain freedom for individuals that will neither be anarchical license nor a complete negation of freedom in totalitarianism. The only book in which this problem is thought through and a satisfactory solution found, of which I am aware, is Bronislaw Malinowski's *Freedom and Civilization.* This solution, although it seems to me entirely adequate, is difficult. I have found that it takes five weeks for an ordinary undergraduate class in political philosophy fully to understand it in all of its most important implications. It would probably have been impossible for Scherer to have made this solution intelligible to his audiences in the time at his disposal. As it is, Scherer has raised a problem for which he is unable to offer any satisfactory political solution. All that he can recommend is complete submission to the will of Christ, which the neoörthodox theologians apparently believe that they know how to interpret and apply.

Professor Scherer is a *laudator temporis acti.* He bitterly complains that most Protestants no longer go to church services so regularly as was customary in the last century. He ignores the increased sense of social responsibility which in the twentieth century has inspired Christian effort to a greater extent than ever had been true before. He sees only the faults in twentieth-century Protestantism, and he is blind to its virtues.

So far as I can see, Professor Scherer's solution for all international problems is for every one the world over to become a neoörthodox Protestant and to serve Jesus in the neoörthodox manner. Just how we could ever come to any kind of agreement with the Russians on this basis is inconceivable. On the contrary, we shall have to find some common denominator between dialectical materialism and our western conceptions of democracy on which we can agree for working purposes, and this will certainly have to be secular and not religious in character. We should remember that in order to make the American federal constitution generally acceptable, the founding fathers had to leave the name of God out of the constitution, and to place the union upon a purely secular basis.

It is a generally accepted maxim in educational psychology that better results can be gained by praising people for their merits than by scolding them for their faults. Professor Scherer would have done well to have followed this maxim throughout this book. When at Austin, after the conclusion of peace, it would have been better pedagogy if he had praised his audience for their patriotic contributions toward winning the war, and explained to them that to some extent a moral slump has

almost always come with the peace at the conclusion of a war, but that this slump need only be temporary; and he should have called favorable attention to whatever indications he could find of unselfish coöperation already beginning to appear in peace time.

Probably I have overemphasized faults in a book that in many, perhaps most, respects is excellent. The volume is beautifully written, deeply religious in spirit, and full of illustrations and citations that ought to be helpful to ministers in preparing their sermons.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The House of Nasi: Doña Gracia, by Cecil Roth, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xiii, 208, $3.

Originally, Dr. Cecil Roth had been asked to write the biography of an extraordinarily romantic figure in Jewish history, Joseph Nasi, duke of Naxos, a small island off the coast of Greece. When he made research into his subject and the age in which he lived, he became interested in the duke's aunt, Doña Gracia. These two Spanish Jewish notables were members of a wealthy and influential mercantile and banking family of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in Europe—the House of Mendes. Through this interest, the author has come to write the first full-length biography in the English language of a remarkable Jewess, hitherto little known. Dr. Roth, an English Jew and an authority in Jewish history in Italy and Spain, is an outstanding historian. He is an engaging writer, master of a swift moving, even dramatic style. His characterizations are excellent. His development of his theme is well organized and clear.

The times in which Doña Gracia lived were filled with persecutions of the Jews by the Roman Catholic Church. In 1492, Spain expelled the Jews. Though some became converts to Christianity, most sought to flee to less hostile lands. Many assumed the outer garments of conversion but inwardly remained loyal to their ancestral faith. These latter were called *marranos* (a term of contempt), and later were referred to as the New Christians. Because the sincerity of their conversion was suspected, the church instituted continuous investigations of these New Christians, and through conviction at the hands of the dreaded Inquisition, thousands of Jewish men and women went to death through burning and, incidentally, the church officials confiscated the Jews' property.

Doña Gracia was such a *marrano.* She had married the elder of two brothers, Francisco Mendes; her sister had married the younger, Diogo. Eight years after her marriage, Doña Gracia was widowed, and into her hands fell the responsibility of conducting one of the outstanding international businesses of that age. Her brother-in-law, too, died an early death, leaving still heavier burdens for Doña Gracia to carry. But, with enlarging experience, she grew in wisdom and influence. The immediate task of Doña Gracia was to save her family and its fortune from the hands of the Inquisitors who, working through the secular arm, the state, endeavored to seize her family's wealth. She and her family fled to Portugal from Spain, then to Antwerp, and finally to Constantinople, where she organized and financed an "underground railroad" to help other *marranos* to escape to freedom.

In Constantinople Doña Gracia and her nephew, Joseph Nasi, found a haven of peace. She devoted her energies to developing the Jewish community there. She became a patroness of the arts, of learning, and of religion, and she stimulated Hebrew printing, a newly developed art. So beloved and admired was she that she won the title of "La Señora" (the Lady), and later the epithet, "The Crowned Lady."

The most dramatic incident in the book is Dr. Roth's exciting account of "the

Ancona boycott," in which the Jews under the leadership of *La Señora* sought to fight for freedom of conscience by boycotting the Republic of Ancona, then under papal rule, because the new ruler, Pope Paul IV, violated every promise sacredly given the Jews by his predecessors. It was the first time in Jewish history, possibly in world history, that the economic boycott was so used. The Jewish communities, however, could not be united to this end. Rabbi Joshua Soncino led the opposition, basing his stand upon the Jewish law. His interpretation of the law is open to grave doubt and questioning. Despite the Lady's wealth, power, prestige, and good sense, Rabbi Joshua held his ground and ultimately defeated her—perhaps an unfortunate victory.

One definite contribution that Dr. Roth has made to scholarship is his successful solution of the familial relationship—hitherto somewhat obscure—of Joseph Nasi, duke of Naxos, and Doña Gracia. In a special note to Chapter I, Dr. Roth has established securely that "Joseph Nasi's father was not one of the Mendes brothers. If, therefore, he was Beatrice's (Gracia's) nephew, he must have been the son of a brother or sister of hers" (pp. 17-18).

For the general reader, this volume presents the brilliant portrait of a remarkable woman who lived in an age of remarkable women, but showed none of their notorious weaknesses. It gives an excellent account of how international trade was conducted by Jews in the Middle Ages, the general spiritual tone of Europe as it related to Jews in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, how the Roman Catholic Church ruled the lives of individuals and nations, and how the Inquisition became a cruel instrument for purposes far from religious and otherworldly.

The author draws a vivid contrast between the civilization and culture of Mohammedan East and Christian West. He records the use of the boycott as an instrumentality of spiritual warfare, describing it as a Jewish forerunner of the Mahatma Gandhi's boycott of English cotton cloth in the struggle for India's freedom. He discloses the valiant struggle of the Jews of that age to keep burning the flame of free conscience, when that flame was threatened with extinction and, in some places, had actually been put out.

In writing this book, Dr. Roth has whetted our appetite for its companion volume which will deal with the continuing fortunes of the House of Mendes of which Doña Gracia was the supreme head and influence at the beginning and which, in later times, was ruled and guided by her nephew, Joseph Nasi, the duke of Naxos, and the first European to make one of the earliest efforts to resettle the Jews in Palestine.

MORTIMER J. COHEN

The Christian Faith and Secularism, edited by J. Richard Spann, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 296, $2.50.

This book consists of twenty-two articles by different contributors. Dean Leroy E. Loemker in the opening article says that secularism, which is old enough to be denounced in Plato's *Laws,* has now become "the supporting atmosphere of our culture." "Secularism is our failure to let God be God in our lives. Its nature is neither to affirm nor to deny religious faith, but to live indifferently to it." Professor John T. McNeill recognizes the antiquity of secularism, and gives an historical sketch of its development in western lands down to the present time. The theological contributors to this volume complain that we are too much concerned with this world to think enough about the next. However none desires a theocracy, although some naïvely suppose that more attention to religion would mean universal submission to the will of God and Christ as interpreted by their own particular sects.

Carl W. Miller, professor of physics at Brown, tells us that few competent scientists believe that recent discoveries make impossible a theistic philosophy of life, but that there are fewer still who do not feel that a critical revaluation of current religious ideology is called for. Scientists do not regard miracles with favor, nor the authoritarian approach of most religious groups. "The very idea that ultimate authority is to be found in ecclesiastical body or ancient manuscript is utterly foreign to the thinking of an increasingly large fraction of our people." President George N. Shuster, a Roman Catholic, believes "that the clergy of no age has been more devoted and saintly than is the ministry of our own time," both Catholic and Protestant. "When millions of Americans discover that the church can minister to souls, and that it will do so gladly and gratuitously, out of reverent affiliation with the boundless charity of Christ, they will strive to put secularism out of their hearts." The layman can help most by rededicating himself to religious practice, which for him is primarily prayer; he should seek to carry prayer out of the church into his daily life. The renewal of some kind of family worship in the home would be most desirable.

Professor Pitman B. Potter, an authority upon international law, warns us that "if we wish to avoid secularism in international affairs, we shall have to be willing to transcend not only the boundaries among denominations and sects in the Christian Church, but also the boundaries between Christians and Jews, Christians and Mohammedans, Christians and Buddhists, and other religious faiths." Sherwood Eddy gives an interesting report upon his recent travels in Russia and elsewhere in Europe, and he hopes that a third world war can be avoided. Professor Don D. Lescohier remarks that there was a time when the church could have led the labor movement, but most of the clergy then concentrated more upon individual religion and the hereafter than the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth. Although the labor movement has now developed in a secular manner, the church can still make a limited contribution. However, "the ethics which religion contributes must be supplemented by analyses and decisions which are essentially technical." Dean Bertram W. Doyle, a Negro, informs us that most Negroes still believe in God, the church, and the principles of Christianity, and expect that their wrongs will ultimately be righted through the church rather than secular agencies. J. Edgar Hoover observes that if Christians generally would support law enforcement, go to church, and read the Bible, we should not have the appalling amount of juvenile crime with which the F.B.I. has to contend.

Part V, "Christianity's Witness in a Secular World," treats of such topics as foreign missions, church unity, contemporary literature, and home life, and ends with an essay by Bishop Oxnam who gives an account of a four-years' program for deepening religious faith and making it effective in the activities of the Methodist Church, a program which could be imitated by other churches, each in its characteristic manner.

This book is certainly interesting. It will afford every reader new points of view. The contributors are eminent and competent. However, it may be doubted whether this will prove to be one of the most important books of the year. So I have given a somewhat extended account with the thought that it may assist busy readers to decide whether to spare time to study the book itself.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, by Edward John Carnell, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. 379, $3.50.

From time to time prize-winning volumes appear. In this book we have another such, since it won first prize in the Eerdmans Evangelical Book Award Competition for 1948. Having been led to expect much more from a book so honored, one is considerably disappointed by much that is found within the pages of this treatise which purports to be, as its subtitle indicates, "a philosophic defense of the Trinitarian-Theistic faith."

First of all, the author professes to have a clear-cut biblical and supernatural point of view. He seeks to defend the position of conservative Christianity, which is "that system of theology which is founded wholly upon the will of God Who has revealed Himself in Scripture." To that he clings tenaciously, refusing to make any adjustment in biblical material which might in any way weaken the sovereign action of God with men. In this he leans strongly to Calvin's view, one whom he terms the greatest Christian theologian. Philosophically, his point of view represents what he calls "a Christian rationalism." By that he means that that is true which is systematically consistent. But systematically consistent with what? Obviously, not necessarily with that which is logical, since he writes, "for the Christian, God, not logic, is the ultimate reason for things, for God is the author of logic himself" (p. 39). Apparently, then, that which is "systematically consistent" need not necessarily be "rationally consistent." Hence the author's Christian rationalism turns out to be fraught with the possibility of logical inconsistency. Like many another conservative, Mr. Carnell seems willing to place his premise above whatever facts may be discovered. That premise is the unerring scripture. Christian rationalism turns out, accordingly, to be nothing else than that which is systematically consistent with the body of scripture.

Now that the point of view is established, one need not be told in this review what Mr. Carnell does with biblical criticism, the scientific method, miracles, natural law, evil, ethics, resurrection, and immortality, all of which are dealt with in some two hundred pages of the volume. What the scripture proclaims about these matters becomes the norm for determining whatever is admitted into the system of Christian rationalism. Whatever in the scripture seems to contradict the idea that God can be known through the world (empiricism, which the author rejects entirely) is accommodated to the view that God can only be known supernaturally. Thus Paul's contention in Rom. 1:20 that we know God through the things in the world is explained away in this fashion: "Paul truly taught that God is known through sense perception, but that does not involve us in empiricism. May it not equally be that, *knowing* God (by innate knowledge, which Paul teaches) we are *reminded* of Him in His works?" (p. 149). Few will be taken in by that type of intellectual *legardemain.*

The difficulties in which the high supernaturalist position inevitably lands the Christian thinker are evident throughout the volume. The period of biblical writing must be stretched back to Moses, making the total fifteen hundred years instead of the thousand on which practically all biblical scholarship is agreed. The plan of salvation is found given by Moses in Gen. 3:15 "thousands of years before its fulfillment." Rom. 16:20 is cited as the fulfillment of that plan of salvation "to the last jot-and-tittle." To explain manual errors in the infallible scripture, it is contended that "the first writers of the Bible were immediately inspired by God, while the copyists were providentially preserved from disturbing the doctrinal content of the Scripture while transcribing it. They were not preserved from textual errors,

however" (pp. 192 f). (Parenthetically, one might ask, *"Rationally,* how does Mr. Carnell know all this?") The original manuscripts of scripture are lost not because of human carelessness or the ravages of time, but because God "elected to have them lost, even as He decreed the dissolution of Noah's ark. . . ." Moreover, they were lost because "man is too depraved to be trusted with holy things" (p. 198). No reason is given for God not extending inspiration to the copyists of scripture as well as to the original writers except that "He elected not so to do, even as He elected to let his perfectly created universe fall into partial corruption" (p. 199). Evolution, in any adequate meaning of that term, is eschewed because "Moses is clearly committed to a theory of man's origin which is other than that of modern science" (p. 237). Making no allowance for psychological factors it is stated that "the reason why Uzzah lost his life was because he disobeyed the commands of God" (p. 31). These and similar crudities throughout the text will cause the intelligent reader to wonder how all this adds up to a view called "Christian rationalism." Frankly, it does not, unless one wants to abuse the term rationalism, stripping it of its generic meaning.

In summary, the present reviewer feels it necessary to say that, for the purposes of Christian apologetics (more modernly, a philosophy of the Christian religion), this volume is practically useless.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Chinese Student Movement, by Wen-han Kiang, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xi, 176, $3.

Education has, for many centuries, played a more important part in the culture of China than in that of any other country. Under the old examination system, it was the means of attaining any office in the Chinese civil service, and the scholar class has been more respected, and wielded more power, than in any other land. The ancient system has gone, but the influence of the *literati* remains, and so far as an observer can tell, will continue. Not only mature graduates possess this power, but undergraduates, and even students in high schools, possess considerable influence upon public opinion in China—a power that is greatly increased by the organization of the students into unions. Consequently a student of things Chinese is obliged to take student movements into consideration, and it is impossible to understand the events that have taken place in China during the last three decades without a knowledge of the attitude of the students.

Dr. Kiang has written an excellent book, which should be read by everyone who desires to understand recent Chinese history. It is fully documented, with admirable notes and a bibliography, as well as a map on the inside of the cover. The author has been executive secretary of the student division of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in China, and in a position to observe what he writes about at first hand. There is a brief foreword by Professor Latourette.

The book is divided into four sections: the Chinese renaissance, the revolt against religion, the nationalist revolution, and the united front during the recent war, as well as a summary. While the author is a Christian, he writes objectively, and is to be congratulated not only on his arrangement and selection of materials, particularly his quotations from magazine articles and essays, but even more on his presentation of anti-Christian reactions of Chinese thinkers, of a sort that seldom appears in books published in the West. Missionaries have many good qualities, but they seldom do justice to their opponents. As Christians in America receive their information on China from missionaries, or from newspapers, or from Chinese who cater to American public opinion, it is seldom possible for us to learn the thoughts

of leading men in missionary lands who do not agree with us. Most Americans will be surprised to read the reactions of leading Chinese to such matters as the Treaty of Versailles or the systems of education in China developed by the missionaries. The criticisms of the West, and of mission schools in China, appear to the reviewer to be thoroughly sound.

The limitations of the book do not lie in what it says, so much as in what it does not say, and particularly in its failure to criticize the weaknesses of the Chinese student movement. Boys in their teens or early twenties, no matter what their initial patriotism and general purposes may be, are not ready for the power that has come to the leaders of the Chinese students. The reviewer looked in vain for accounts in this book of the breakdown of discipline in the schools—of schools where no student could be flunked; of schools where members of the faculty could not leave or enter without a pass from the head of the student's union; of the heads of institutions forced to resign when they endeavored to enforce discipline; of senseless strikes and false accusations; of bribery and graft. There are many fine features to the student movement in China, but these defects have been present also. There are probably good reasons why Dr. Kiang did not care to emphasize this side of the picture; and what he has given us is a splendid piece of work, which is essential to any student of modern China.

JOHN K. SHRYOCK

Christian Voices in China, edited by Chester S. Miao, New York, Friendship Press, ©1948, pp. viii, 216, $2.

This volume is a collection of fourteen essays on a wide variety of subjects, dealing with the present situation of Christianity in China. Eleven of the authors are Chinese, two are Americans, and one is a Scot. After a preliminary essay by the editor, who also wrote one of the other essays, the material is grouped under three heads: "The Christian Spirit Tried by War," "Special Problems and Difficulties in China Today," and "New Opportunities and Challenges in the Postwar Period." There are three allegorical drawings by Jim Lee, an index, and a map, but no bibliography or notes, except notices concerning the contributors.

In such a collection, the value of the various essays will not be uniform, and the earlier essays are better than the later ones. Dr. Miao appears to be a very able writer, and his essay, "Christianity in Communist Areas," is the best treatment of the subject the reviewer has seen. He has a balanced, fair, and objective mind, admitting that at present there is not adequate evidence for generalizations on the communist attitude, which seems to vary considerably with local commanders. The communist leaders have made statements not unfavorable to Christianity, but in practice, where the local authorities are antagonistic, there have been instances of serious persecution. In other essays, the Chinese authors admit that the general situation is extremely dangerous, and they do not try to place the blame entirely on foreigners, but acknowledge the mistakes of their own people. In spite of this, the effect of the book is much more hopeful than the accounts we are getting from the press, although many of the fundamental problems are not discussed, perhaps because they have no direct connection with religion.

Some of the treatments are superficial, and important facts are omitted. For example: in "Rebuilding Devastated Villages," the Reverend Kimber H. K. Den tells how many thousands of trees were planted in a certain area. This is all very well, but the important fact is not given, which is, how many of those trees are still there? Anyone familiar with China knows that the great difficulty with planting young trees is to prevent them from being cut down for firewood by poor people

during the winter, and so far as the reviewer knows, all efforts at reforestration in the general area described by Mr. Den have failed for this reason.

The last group of essays seem to represent pious hopes and attractive paper plans of the sort familiar to us in America, which blossom every year from the central offices of religious organizations. There are a multitude of needs, but the reviewer is skeptical as to how far such needs will be met by general secretaries who travel around telling other people what they ought to do, and who make vast plans which are never carried out. One essay presents ambitious designs for publishing Christian literature, but admits that there are few original works published by Chinese Christians, and does not state at all that in a country where literary ability counts for more than in any other land, the Christian movement has practically no one who can write Chinese in a way that will command respect and attention from well-educated non-Christian Chinese.

The volume as a whole is interesting, and does show that the Christian church is producing intelligent and able Chinese leaders, but the treatment in most cases is not fundamental, and the book has only a temporal value. JOHN K. SHRYOCK

The Cloud of Unknowing, New York, Harper, [1948], pp. xxvii, 146, $1.50.

This exquisite little book is an excellent example of what one might call "creative imitativeness." It is nearly, though not quite, an *original* treatise on the art of interior devotion. Its model, faithfully reproduced here in basic tone and essential substance, is the fourteenth-century classic entitled *The Cloud of Unknowing,* the work of an anonymous monk whose piety and mystical theology is of the same type that later flowered in the great Spanish Carmelite, St. John of the Cross. This modern "interpretation" of that ancient document has been produced by an unnamed member of the Quaker spiritual community at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pennsylvania. What is so uncommon about it is that without literal translation or even extensive paraphrase, we are provided with a highly faithful mirror of the original treatise. The result is an absorbingly fresh and relevant statement of the case for contemplative prayer and devotion to God which speaks as meaningfully to modern men as the original did to the fourteenth century.

The fourteenth-century background is here all right, with its deep frustrations and disillusionments forced upon men by the breakup of mediæval culture and civilization. Here also in the foreground is the twentieth century, with its profound shock over the rebuffs to progress and peace that we have suffered. One feels both the parallels and the differences between the two centuries in their invincible surmise that beyond sense and reason there is an order of love and reality which is man's true and ultimate environment. But fourteenth-century man's thinking was still pervasively conditioned by the overarching real presence of the grace of God and the real truth of the Christian story of salvation. The mystical longing in twentieth-century man more often springs up together with an impulse to evade or ignore the forms and traditions of historic Christianity.

The Cloud of Unknowing—both in its original form and in this modern "digest"—is Christian mysticism at a very high level of doctrinal clarity and purity. There is everywhere in it a sharp sense of the creaturely and an equally clear and decisive acknowledgment of the cruciality of Jesus Christ. Always and everywhere there is a constant and pervasive consciousness of God's grace, both prevenient and redemptive. There is also an exaggerated anti-intellectualism and a disparagement of "reason"—though always in the interest of a higher intelligibility.

The real significance of this little book lies in its challenge and direction to the highest levels of Christian prayer and love. Its real rewards are reserved for the reader who will follow the general pattern here outlined of self-knowledge, self-denial, and self-restoration-in-the-pure-love-of-God which is here set forth with eloquence, personal verity, and moving power. ALBERT C. OUTLER

A Call to What Is Vital, by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. ix, 143, $2.

In this last volume from the pen of the Quaker mystic we find a book characterized by the forward look. Always eager and expectant for fuller truth to break forth, Dr. Jones lets that mood pervade this volume. Religion is no static plateau, but a mountain whose ascension brings ever more expansive vistas. Religion is, accordingly, a growing, enlarging reality within human experience and, as such, is capable of meeting the needs of a scientifically trained generation. Hence the reason for writing the book. In his preface Dr. Jones tells us that the book was called forth by a suggestion of a prominent Quaker of New England who said to him, "You must write one more book. . . . You must write a book that will help the college-trained persons who have the scientific outlook to find their way back to a vital religion. They will not accept any interpretation of religion which is inconsistent with what their minds hold as *established truth.* Hosts of youth that I know have stopped going to church because what they hear is at sharp variance with *what they know.*" Those words caused Dr. Jones to project this small volume which he hopes will help these scientifically trained youth to appreciate what is vital in religion.

What is found to be vital in religion is firsthand religious experience in great and ordinary people alike; the nature and purpose of God, as these are slowly disclosed in the experience of the Hebrew people culminating in Jesus Christ who is "the supreme revelation"; and the power of religion to render men effective servants of the divine Spirit. In this latter connection he gives a marvelous account of how Quaker youth, since the days of the first world war, have translated their " 'spiritual inwardness' into outward moral and social reconstruction of the world's areas of suffering." That work has continued down to the present moment, spreading from its expressions in Europe out to such lands as Mexico and China.

In a very true sense this little book presents a last exposition of the principles of religion which have perennially underlaid the mystical theology of the author. He stresses the fact that religion is not a one-way traffic from God to man, but that there is "the way up and the way down." When man does his part in spiritual aspiration, moral cleansing, and appreciation, then God reliably gives himself to him. Religion is a double search: man searching for God and God seeking man. Again, it is stressed that religion has its most vital and compelling expression in the mystical. God is open to man's sincere approach. Once more, the conception of man's depravity is eschewed and in its place is expressed a staunch faith in "the divine possibilities of the human nature we bear." These are among the emphases which run through all of Dr. Jones' writings. He has found good reason to hold to them to the last. GEORGE W. DAVIS

Selected Mystical Writings of William Law, edited by Stephen Hobhouse, New York, Harper, second edition revised, 1948, pp. xxiii, 425, $4.50.

William Law has frequently been called "the greatest English prose mystic." That title is ascribed to him largely because of his famous work, *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.* The present volume does not attempt to reproduce any of

that well-known work, published in 1729, or Law's other famous work on *Christian Perfection,* published three years earlier. In place of beating over such familiar material, Mr. Hobhouse wisely concerns himself with presenting Law's mystical thought by bringing together nine of his later mystical writings, the first of which was written in 1737 and the last in 1761, the year of his death. These works are: *A Demonstration of the Errors of A Plain Account, An Answer to Dr. Trapp's Discourse, The Grounds and Reasons of Christian Regeneration, An Appeal to all that Doubt the Truths of the Gospel, The Spirit of Prayer, The Way of Divine Knowledge, The Spirit of Love, A Collection of Letters,* and *An Address to the Clergy.* For collecting these later mystical writings of William Law, together with his interpretation of their mystical message plus his study of the dependence of William Law upon Jacob Boehme, the German mystic, students of mystical theology must be truly grateful to Hobhouse. Both Law and Boehme are properly presented as theosophic mystical philosophers; *i.e.,* as men who are concerned with that divine wisdom which, it is held, embraces all phenomena and personal spirits, and which is revealed through spiritual intuition. Both of these men, moreover, were nature mystics, abandoning the horror which the mystics of the Neoplatonic tradition have expressed at the thought of finding God through the natural. Law and Boehme, on the contrary, have found symbols of the divine power and love in the varied life and forces of the visible world.

The primary purpose of Mr. Hobhouse in making the nine selections that he did from Law's later mystical writings is "especially to emphasize Law's treatment of the indwelling Christ in the soul, of His 'atoning' life and death, of the wrathless love of God, and the profound doctrine of His 'wrath' as suggested to him by Jacob Boehme." As one looks back in contemplation after reading the volume with care, one must admit that this multiple purpose has been accomplished. Moreover, one must agree that the heart of Law's mystical theology is found in these major emphases, on a few of which we comment.

Notable among Law's principles is his doctrine of the eternal, unbroken love of God. He refuses to acknowledge any principle of wrath as being eternally and inherently a part of the divine nature. His basic declaration about God is that he is "all Love." Being such, "from eternity to eternity no spark of wrath ever was or ever will be in the holy triune God." God, accordingly, can be conceived only as the source of that good through which he has eternally sought to benefit all his creatures. "God is unwearied patience, a meekness that cannot be provoked; He is an ever-enduring mercifulness; He is unmixed goodness, impartial, universal love; . . . He is the good from which nothing but good comes, and resisteth all evil only with goodness." Law stoutly refuses to compromise or abandon that basic intuition derived from mystical insight. He holds that since God did not have wrath or rage in him before man fell, he cannot have it after the fall, since "nothing can begin to be in God or to be in a new state in Him."

As to man, he was not made evil by God, since God, who is entirely Love, "can will nothing in the life of the creature but a creaturely manifestation of His own goodness, happiness, and perfection." Hence, man is evil because he has turned his will from God. He makes his own hell and, as a fallen creature, is himself the source of evil. "God casts no soul away, unless it cast itself away. Every soul is its own judgment."

Man can never be redeemed from his fallen condition through any external institutions or rites, but only as he has Christ, the redeeming love of God, as an inward, purifying power. As Christ is allowed to arise within us, manifesting his

nature, life, and spirit therein, then we possess "an inward new man." That alone constitutes Christian redemption. Through such a process God completes the work which he undertook as soon as man fell; namely, that of raising man back into union with himself. Accordingly, it is Law's conviction that "nothing but the incarnate life of God's eternal Son, passing through all the miserable stages of lost man, could regenerate his first divine life in him."

This volume will be of considerable value to all who desire to deepen their perceptions of the mood and character of Christian mysticism and Christian mystical theology at their best. Here is the mystic's stubborn affirmation, repeated in a dozen ways, that wrath has never sullied or erased the eternal, unquenchable love of God; here is the Christian mystic's assurance that though sullied by evil, man's life still contains an ineradicable spiritual ground which enables it to remain open to God's ever-willing giving of himself to the contrite and prepared heart; here is the basic Christian perception that what man has lost is restored in Jesus Christ. The student of theology will find these affirmations fruitfully repeated and elaborated in a dozen ways and never renounced.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Jew of Tarsus, by Hugh J. Schonfield, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 255, $2.50.

At the outset, I felt suspicious of this book, perhaps because the subtitle boldly proclaimed "an unorthodox portrait of Paul." But suspicion gradually gave way to approval and admiration. The thesis is not "queer," nor is the book so unorthodox. It is a careful and critical reconstruction of Paul's career. Broad knowledge and wise selection of many current critical views have here produced one of the keenest characterizations.

One immediately expects a distinctive treatment of Paul when the author tells in his preface that he is a Jew, not an orthodox Christian but a Nazarene who holds Jesus to be the Messiah. Paul "holds a place next only to that of Jesus in the enunciation of the Christian Faith." "I find myself much the Jew that Paul was," having grown up in an "entirely English, but Jewishly fairly orthodox home." Such a distinctive treatment is realized in the book—more sympathetic than Klausner, more scholarly than Asch, yet with a Jewish insight often lacking in the Christian interpreter.

Much of the story is conjectural, as indeed it must be. Most of the conjecture impresses one as reasonable and wise. The basic outline is, as usual, drawn from Acts. There is no deliberate attempt to solve the problems of "introduction" of Paul's letters. But incidentally one notices that the author considers the Thessalonian letters to be the earliest, that Galatians was written after the second journey although the Jerusalem Conference occurred after the first, that "Ephesians" is treated as an encyclical by Paul, and that the Pastorals also are genuine. Titus is assigned to the third journey with the Corinthian correspondence; and the letters to Timothy, to the Roman imprisonment. It is concluded that Paul was never able to leave Rome after his arrival as a prisoner in 60, and there he died in 63.

Schonfield quite properly emphasizes the influence of esoteric Judaism, even esoteric Pharisaism, and of apocalypticism on Paul. Yet he does not sufficiently recognize the influence of gentile hellenism. The reader is not likely to be persuaded by the argument that Paul derived his doctrine mainly from the occult "Lore of Creation" of the Jews. Furthermore, there is too ready a tendency to credit Paul with ideas found in the later apocryphal writings, and to describe Paul physically (and his "passport" or *eikon*) from *Paul and Thecla.* But the most uncertain, and

unnecessary, hypothesis of the whole book is the proposition that Paul first came to believe that he himself was the Messiah. It has been difficult for scholars to develop a rational argument for the Messianic consciousness of Jesus, but this should be easy beside the attempt to do so for Paul.

The author is at his best when he adds observations from the Talmud. His comparison between Romans and the Jewish liturgy is intriguing. He waxes particularly romantic about Jerusalem the Queen which alone was "Rome's true rival." An especially fine presentation is made of the "man of conflict" in the chapter on the Damascus Road. Indeed, the basic fabric of this book is good, though a few minor exotic figures have been interwoven.

KENNETH W. CLARK

War, Politics, and Insanity, by C. S. Bluemel, Denver, World Press, 1948, pp. 117, $2.

The author, who is a psychiatrist, encountered so many breakdowns among Republican politicians after the Democratic victory of 1932 that he felt that there must be some inherent instability in them as a class. Further study has led him to the conclusion that the qualities of political leadership that make for success in our American democracy are themselves evidence of imbalance. "The compelling urge to leadership is in itself an abnormal trait and it seldom associates itself with judgment or wisdom." The leadership of which he is speaking is that which comes from an insatiable desire to dominate and functions through intimidation. It becomes especially dangerous when it is combined with an obsessive-compulsive component in the personality, such as one finds in those who cannot be deflected from a once-determined course of action. The leadership he contends for is that of the competent, emotionally balanced individual whose superiority is recognized and accepted by a grateful people.

In the course of his presentation he gives interesting information on the patterns of dominance among animals; an outline of the major personality disorders, with comment on those most likely to be found among politicians; and brief psychiatric analyses of Gandhi, Stalin, Mussolini, Goering, Hitler, Joan of Arc, Cromwell, Napoleon, King George III of England. The analyses are illuminating and show the futility of attempting to deal with leaders without an understanding of their particular personalities and their approach to personal relationships. The difficulty in applying this method in the heat of political struggle arises from the fact that information essential to an intelligent appraisal of a leader's inner life is so often not available to the general public. Furthermore, the physicians, the psychiatrists, and the psychologists, on whom we must depend for help, are not immune to the distortions of judgment wrought by partisan bias.

There can be little quarrel with the author's thesis that, since history is made by men, any attempt to improve the course of history must concentrate on the improvement of the quality of leadership, especially on the national level. However, when he makes concrete proposals as to how this is to be achieved, he betrays a political naïveté of an appaling character. Leaders, in his Utopia, are to be chosen by lot from the body of "Senior Citizens." A "Senior Citizen" is a man or woman between the ages of forty and sixty-five, who, as a student in college, specialized in those courses that would fit him for political leadership. Furthermore, he had been certified by his instructors to be free from abnormal traits of personality, including undue aggressiveness. Even after a "Senior Citizen" has been chosen by lot he must be acceptable to the leaders in power before he can become a leader. Leaders give their whole time to their political functions and are paid salaries commensurate with

their importance. These salaries are continued after their retirement at the age of sixty-five. Thus, as a substitute for the present American democracy, which he condemns because it favors the aggressive leader, the author offers us a self-perpetuating aristocracy of socially minded, adequately informed, psychologically normal, mature individuals who are free from any desire to exploit their fellow men.

The author is completely oblivious to the way the exercise of power can pervert the judgment of otherwise normal people. He shows no appreciation of the democratic process as a factor in checking the aggressive leader. He seems unaware of the necessity of the free expression of variant points of view for the achievement of even an approximation of truth. In fact, beyond the horizons of his own specialization he shows a lamentable inability to see anything but the most superficial aspects of the subjects he discusses.

J. HOWARD HOWSON

Seeds of Redemption, by Bernard Eugene Meland, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 162, $2.50.

Bernard Meland's *Seeds of Redemption* had its beginning in a series of lectures delivered at the Annual Pastors' Institute of the University of Chicago in the summer of 1945. These have been revised and chapters added to constitute the present book. It makes no claim to be a treatise on theology or a systematic elucidation of philosophical ideas. It is essentially a theological "tract for the times," directed to those who have ceased to find nourishment in the traditional offerings of liberal theology, and yet are not receptive to a neoörthodox point of view.

According to Professor Meland the major need of our culture is the recovery of man's capacity to be creative. Our civilization has mistaken the power of science and industry for elemental values. It has dwarfed the individual, stifled and confused his aspirations for the good life, and ignored the rootage of the values of life in the reality of God. As a consequence, men fail to be aware of their own predicament and of their incapacity for creative living.

The "way out" will be found by those who have the imagination, sensitivity of feeling, and willingness to share in the suffering of the world. It is such people whose dedication to values will include but go beyond their personal satisfactions. These will find not only personal fulfillment, but will become builders of a true community of relationships among men.

Of special interest are chapter three, in which Professor Meland takes issue with liberal theology for its inadequate grasp of these problems, and chapter four, in which he discusses, in contrast, the contribution of certain current philosophies. Liberal theology has reached a *cul de sac*, he explains. Its stress upon ethics to the exclusion of other religious values has led to mere activism; its effort to make religion rationally acceptable and empirical has excluded from the concern of religion those values which lie beyond the compass of intellectual comprehension. Liberal theology thus has failed to value the experiences of life which lie beyond rational comprehension and provoke men to question "why," "whence," and "to what end." Out of such questioning comes the motivation for newness of life.

For further understanding of the way to social and personal recreation Professor Meland turns to the metaphysicians. Bergson, S. Alexander, Whitehead, and Wieman stand in the stream of philosophic thought which includes but goes beyond ethics with its humanistic frame of reference and beyond empiricism with its limited data. The philosophy of Wieman, to whom Meland is greatly indebted, is discussed at greater length than the others.

There is yet another source of spiritual renewal, namely, a new understanding of the Bible. Here the author merely suggests the desired approach. Historical criticism is necessary, he explains, but it is not enough. The Bible must be studied for the understanding it offers of man's struggle to understand life. Meland pleads here for a much needed corrective to the arid and limited frame of reference characteristic of so much of current biblical scholarship.

A third resource, which Meland himself exemplifies, is the participation in and appreciation of the arts. Meland makes frequent allusions to experiences of music or literature to illustrate what it means to be pricked awake to the feeling side of life. The inclusion of his own poem, "God and the Morning," shows the integration of the beauty and imagery of poetry with his own metaphysical concepts.

Least satisfactory to this reviewer is Professor Meland's discussion of sin. He falls back upon definitions of sin which have the familiar sound of the liberal theological point of view which Meland himself had criticized. It seems to the reviewer that an opportunity here is lost to reinterpret and relate this age-old subject to the critical analysis of contemporary culture ably presented in the opening chapter. The discussion also ignores the insights of depth psychology and the possible light which research in this field could throw on a modern reinterpretation of the doctrine of sin.

This small volume is well worth the reading by both clergymen and laymen. If its limitation is its fragmentary and somewhat unsystematic treatment of great ideas, it has the ring of honest reflection and the contagion of genuine experience.

ELIZABETH P. LAM

A CORRECTION

On p. 352 of the October, 1948, issue several lines in the last two paragraphs of Professor Bundy's review of Schweitzer's The Psychiatric Study of Jesus *became disarranged, with the concluding line and signature breaking into the text of the next review. The pied paragraphs should have read:*

Schweitzer's published works exhibit a fascinating contrast in his picture of Jesus. In his earlier technical studies (1901-1913) we meet the academic, the all-too-historical Jesus of pure eschatology. In his later writings, especially those with the background of his work in Africa, we meet the confessional, communal Jesus, the Teacher and Master who is the inspiration of Schweitzer's humanitarian life and work. These two pictures seem to exist side by side in the same mind without confusion of thought or purpose.

Those who do not read German will be grateful for this translation of one of the lesser-known works of Albert Schweitzer.

WALTER E. BUNDY

BOOK NOTICES

Christianity: How it came to us; What it is; What it might be, by Charles Edwards Park, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 121, $1.75.

In spite of its brevity this is a difficult book to review. It contains three lectures given at the First Church (Unitarian) in Boston under a new foundation. The first incumbent of the Minns lectureship was appropriately the church's long-time minister, now *emeritus*. The lectures are informal, full of fresh illustration, and well adapted to a popular audience. Central to the author's thought is the contrast between the religion of Jesus and that of Paul. With some modern exceptions orthodox Christianity has taken up the latter. Dr. Park prefers the former. His interpretation of it is attractive. It is humanism but it has something more, for Dr. Park does not rest content with humanism. He believes that fellowship rather than solitariness is the craving to be satisfied by religion, and that fellowship can be with a reality greater than Humanity. Dr. Park disowns any claim to be more than an "amateur historian" and one may question some of his judgments. He says of the religions of Jesus and of Paul: "The two were more unlike than alike" (p. 50). Yet I think they were more alike than either is like what Dr. Park pictures it. He implies that Paul's elaboration was selfishly fashioned to meet his own personal need and was "just another mystery religion." Are these judgments better based than such minor implications as that Paul was his Jewish name (p. 27) or that he gave the gospel to Thessaly (p. 31)? Is it fair to say that Paul's adaptation of Christianity "is more pagan than Christian, more self-defensive than self-constructive, more defeatist than optimistic, and more sacrilegious than complimentary to God" (p. 70)? Here and often the author is plainly striving to shock and challenge his readers. In the religion of Jesus he emphasizes among other features his mysticism or God-consciousness, and his sense of purposiveness. These seem to me less conspicuous. Yet one can agree that Jesus did not aim to establish a new religion, and that it would be worth while if Christianity today could re-establish some of the values that were central to Jesus.

HENRY J. CADBURY

Christianity and the Children of Israel, by A. Roy Eckardt, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xvi, 223, $3.

Here we have a résumé of a variety of modern Chirstian ideologies, their influences on anti-Semitism, and general conclusions therefrom. Following a glimpse into the Jewish plight and an enumeration of some of its causes (pp. 1-65), important theological systems are discussed. These are presented under two quite antithetic categories, absolutism and relativism. Under the absolute comes the Roman Catholic Church, in which the church itself is infallible, final, and absolute (pp. 66-73); the orthodox Protestant (fundamentalist), in which the Bible, as interpreted by each local group, is absolute, and apart from its acceptance there is no salvation (pp. 74-82); the Neo-Reformation leaders, Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Piper, each one differing from the other in minor points, but all insisting on a Christology that is absolute, that is, Christ is the only Saviour (pp. 83-89); the Continental Church, which in general, in the early days of Nazism, insisted that biology and politics lay beyond the bounds of religion, and that each

nation should worship God in its own way (pp. 89-103). It follows that in absolutism, in any of its forms, there is always by implication, and in many cases by official pronouncement, a definitely anti-Semitic (anti-Judaistic) attitude. However, individuals and groups are often more kindly than officialdom, and even church organizations show a tendency to soften the asperities of their theologies. Relativism, as represented by leaders such as Goethe, Lessing, Harnack, Ritschl, John Hayes Holmes—and the list, with profit, could have been greatly enlarged—in its essential spirit is tolerant and has no place for anti-Semitism (pp. 108-118). Even the Neo-Reformation leaders, insisting on the absolutism of Christ, so develop their Christology that it may be inclusive of Judaism, as well as of other religions (pp. 118-131). The general conclusions are clear. Any type of Christian absolutism is likely to breed persecution, while relativism is always definitely opposed to intolerance. Political Zionism, as a possible solution to the problem, is given scant treatment, and the warning is given that even here absolutism is not without grave dangers (pp. 152-172). The volume seems to be a synthesis of graduate studies and gives an excellent glimpse into the methods, attitudes, and conclusions of one of our great seminaries. It is well documented, probably one half of the book consisting of quotations, some of which lack cogency, and not a few of which are quite inconsequential. The main outline and conclusions are valid.

I. G. MATTHEWS

General Evangeline Booth of the Salvation Army, by P. W. Wilson. New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 264, $3.50.

This is the first full-length biography of the dynamic, colorful fourth general of the Salvation Army, the "white angel of the slums." She is now eighty-three years old and living in retirement, and all her letters and papers were turned over to her biographer. What are his qualifications for a task that must have been anything but easy? Philip Whitwell Wilson, now on the staff of the New York *Times,* served for twenty-one years with the London *Daily News,* covering, for example, the enormous funeral service of Evangeline's father, General William Booth. Prior to Mr. Wilson's career as a reporter he was for four years in the House of Commons. He brings out very effectively the amazing gifts of the Booths. This family has been responsible for the creation of an organization which in just over eighty years numbers nearly four million persons in ninety-seven countries and territories. Evangeline Booth never lived outside the Salvation Army. Impulsive, a born leader, with a heart for all humanity, she was easily one of the outstanding women of her day. Kings and presidents paid her their personal tributes. Now, does this book make her live before the eyes of the reader? Does one involuntarily determine to acquire her finest qualities? Is the portrait objective, clear, and lifelike? These are the marks of biography at its best. Let us admit that the book is not "definitive" biography. It is relatively short (264 pages). Wilson chose rather to write on a popular level—probably where the biographee, who loved people, wishes it to be. There are many excellent qualities in the telling of the story. It does not gloss over the break in the Booth family which resulted in the establishment of the Volunteers of America. It relates frankly the steps which led to the removal of Bramwell Booth, in his old age and illness, as the Army's general. The old criticisms levelled at the Salvation Army, concerning the question of the careless use of money and an alleged tendency of the leaders to quarrel, are effectively answered. Not only the humanitarian but the highly spiritual work of the organization are clearly brought out ("God Shall Have All

That There Is of William Booth," p. 8). But one need not overlook some defects. Terms like "penitent form" are meaningless to some who will read these pages, and there is no explanation. In a few cases slang mars the vocabulary. There are several sentences that are not entirely clear (pp. 85, 119, 122, 231). "Calligraphy" is misspelled. Sometimes the biographer gets ahead of his story. Does Evangeline Booth, then, really live before the eyes of the reader? To a certain extent. This reviewer is hoping that a longer, more careful, and more detailed work will be written; based, if possible, on the correspondence of *all* the members of the family. In the meantime many will find Mr. Wilson's book very readable and highly informative, giving a quick acquaintance with a highly colorful person who was mightily used of God. It is, as the jacket says, "a human document about an extraordinary personality."

JOHN H. SCAMMON

Wellsprings of the American Spirit, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Institute for Religious and Social Studies, [distributed by Harper], ©1948, pp. ix, 241, $2.50.

In this volume we have a series of sixteen addresses by as many Americans from different fields, delivered before the Institute for Religious and Social Studies in New York City. The names of the lecturers are significant: Henry W. Schneider, John T. McNeill, Ralph Henry Gabriel, Robert C. Hartnett, O. Frederick Nolde, Louis Finkelstein, Harold Rugg, John Herman Randall, Jr., Odell Shepard, James Marshall, William G. Constable, Lyman Bryson, Elinore M. Herrick, Channing H. Tobias, Mark Starr, and F. Ernest Johnson. Speaking out of their fields of specialization—history, philosophy, religion, literature, education, art, technology, race, woman's rights, and labor—they seek to discover what the wellsprings of the American spirit are. They find the sources of that spirit in the right to disagree (dissent), the thirst for knowledge, religious faith, individualism, equalitarianism, adaptability, justice, and diversity. All of these have expressed themselves through the democratic tradition, producing the values of that tradition and therewith a pattern of life not duplicated in its fullness anywhere else upon the earth. What is the American spirit? "The essence of the American spirit," asserts Randall, "is to be cosmopolitan, to be free from the provincialism, the parochialism, and the prejudices of European lands, with their tight unified national traditions bred of a millennium of competition and warfare" (p. 122). Thus there has been a type of freedom and liberty which has expressed itself practically in allowing a man to do what he wants to do insofar as he does not harm others thereby. Another finds the most compact expression of the American spirit in Emerson's famous saying, "Hitch your wagon to a star." There is found at once the action, the practicality, and yet, withal, the "infinite room . . . for individual aspiration and freedom" that have been so characteristic of America. To that observation of Odell Shepard let us add these words in which Lyman Bryson seeks to gather up the genius of America: "Our system has the growth and development of human personality as its goal and we believe that choice is a way of learning and growth and that it is better for men to choose for themselves even if they make the wrong decisions than it is to have those decisions made for them. We chose freedom and freedom is not a solution of problems. It is a way of action that is in itself more important than the results" (p. 177). These and equally penetrating insights into the nature of the American and his spirit make this a valuable book for one who wants to understand the riches of our democratic heritage in America.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Ancient Christian Writers: St. Augustine's The Lord's Sermon on the Mount, translated by John J. Jepson, Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1948, pp. 227, $2.75.

Ancient Christian Writers: Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, Epistles and Martyrdom of Polycarp, Fragments of Papias, Epistle to Diognetus, translated by James A. Kleist, Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1948, pp. vi, 235, $2.75.

Here are two more excellent and usable volumes in this estimable patristic series. Augustine's study of the Sermon on the Mount has long been regarded, and properly, as one of his most influential writings. He saw the Sermon, not as a counsel of perfection for the few, but as the authoritative statement of the perfect rule for Christian life, containing the answers for all the human problems of life, thus essentially and effectually replacing the older legislation from Sinai with this New Law. The average nonprofessional reader will be particularly caught by his insistence that the beatitudes, which he regarded as seven in number and arranged in ascending order of importance, correspond to the "sevenfold operations" of the Holy Spirit, as found in descending order in Isa. 11:2 f. Nor are we to stop here; according to the bishop of Hippo an essentially similar relation is to be found in the Lord's Prayer with its seven petitions. But the value of this work of Augustine, which found its consummation in the writings of the Seraphic and Angelic Doctors, Bonaventura and Aquinas, must not be confused with or limited to these excursions into the realms of sacred arithmetic so dear to the ancient church. Father Jepson is to be congratulated on his felicitous translation and judicious notes of a writing which still remains revealing and instructive.

Volume VI continues the translation of the Apostolic Fathers, begun in Volume I. The same uncanny vividness and aptness of phrasing which characterizes all of Father Kleist's translations are found in the present volume. Introductions which really introduce and notes which are worth while and pertinent make this another almost indispensable addition to the work shelf of serious students of Christian beginnings.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Choice Is Always Ours, edited by Dorothy Berkeley Phillips, New York, R. R. Smith, 1948, pp. xxii, 511, $4.50.

The subtitle describes this volume well. It reads, "An Anthology on the Religious Way. Chosen from Psychological, Religious, Philosophical and Biographical Sources." Anthologies, whether of poetry, prose, or this unusual kind, are not like small islands, to be explored completely and quickly, leaving a decided impression upon the explorer. They are rather like large countries, or even continents, filled with variety of interest; there are charming places where one would linger a while, and there are deserts to be endured or avoided. In this skillfully edited volume 170 authors are represented, some of them many times. That the editor's selections will not always please the reader goes without saying; it is instead an indication of the richness of the volume. Reading on, one comes to regions "where every prospect pleases." A book of this type indicates how important literary skill is in securing attention. The professional religionists and psychologists represented are not the ones who compel reading, however genuine their religious or psychological insight is. Without exception, professional writers such as Middleton Murry, Gerald Heard, and Aldous Huxley write more convincingly than professional psychologists like Fritz Kunkel and Carl Jung, and certainly with more grace and force than the theologians and philosophers. In a time when increasing numbers are becoming sensitive about themselves in relation to the greater world, seen and unseen, a book like this must fill a deep need. It provides

sources for regular reflection, methods for spiritual discipline leading to spiritual growth, insights into the interaction of body, mind, and soul. And, best of all, so comprehensive a book permits the seeker to choose for himself.

HARMON M. GEHR

Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, by H. Dooyeweerd, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. ix, 80, $1.50.

The author is professor of the philosophy of law in the Free University of Amsterdam. He has written many books upon philosophy, law, and related subjects, and he has edited several journals. Now for the first time he has published a short book in English in order to introduce his philosophy to those who have been inquiring about it, but who cannot read Dutch. Unfortunately for such a purpose this treatise is at once highly technical in thought and extremely condensed in exposition. The author's command of English is fairly good, but not perfect, and once or twice one suspects that use of complex disjunctive sentences has betrayed him into affirming the opposite conclusion from that which he intended. The principal thesis of this book appears to be that a completely accurate transcendental critique of philosophy in its relation to the sciences reveals what Kant called "I think" accompanying all our representations, and that this latter really implies the presence of God. So a purely objective and accurate introspective philosophy inevitably implies religion, and ultimately revelation—and I am afraid in the author's opinion an austere type of Calvinism which some of us would not like at all. However, this book sufficiently attests the author's competence and importance as a philosopher. It is to be hoped that this little treatise will be followed by translations into English of his principal books. He is evidently a constructive thinker with whom the English-speaking philosophical and theological public should become acquainted.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Pastoral Counseling in Family Relationships, by Leland Foster Wood, Commission on Marriage and the Home, 1948, pp. 96, 60 cents (paper).

The author has been a teacher in the fields of sociology and ethics, and, for the past sixteen years, has served as secretary of the Commission on Marriage and the Home of the Federal Council of Churches. In this useful pamphlet he reminds the minister that, although he is a counselor by the very nature of his calling, he cannot expect to be provided miraculously with the necessary skills for this "exacting art," but must seek help through special training, reading, and the exchange of experiences with others. He calls his booklet "an introductory approach to counseling," and warns the reader against trying "to function as an amateur psychiatrist." After indicating various types of cases which are brought to ministers, he describes the "areas in which domestic difficulties arise." The pastor's functions as a counselor are defined and suggestions made as to how he should proceed in carrying them out. The final chapter is devoted to the matter of helping husbands and wives "meet each others needs." The section on the possibility of transforming "forced" marriages into genuine ones is helpful in meeting situations usually looked upon as hopeless. The manual is compact, practical, and well-illustrated with actual counseling experiences. It should meet the needs of multitudes of pastors who crave this sort of help. In these days of high-priced books, it is cheering to find such a worthy one so moderately priced.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

How We Got Our Denominations, by Stanley I. Stuber, New York, Association Press, pp. 224, $2.50.

This little Y.M.C.A. book is scarcely profound enough for the learned theologians and professors who read the CROZER QUARTERLY. It is easily read, easily understood, and contains, for the scholar at least, only rudimentary information. That is why, I suppose, Dr. Enslin, thinking that it might possibly be within the scope of my cultural achievements, gave it to me to review. Dr. Stuber, the author, is director of public relations of the Northern Baptist Convention and head of its world relief activities. The book is what it purports to be—a primer in church history and a very useful one. In presenting the histories of various American communions, the author gives us also a simple statement of the denominational theological position. At the end of each chapter are "helps for study" making it easy for the reader to review and, if desired, memorize the principal points discussed. Whether Christian denominations so important as the Church of the Nazarene and the Evangelical and Reformed Church will enjoy being classified in the catchall chapter at the end with Mormons and Christian Scientists, we will leave to them and the proponents of a very broad ecumenicity.

ALEXANDER MACKIE

Last Chance: Eleven Questions on Issues Determining Our Destiny, edited by Clara Urquhart, Boston, Beacon Press, 1948, pp. viii, 182, $2.50.

A social worker asked a group of distinguished people other than political leaders what they thought in general about the world situation: about the prospect of "one world"; about American-Russian relations; about a middle way between the Russian and American ways of life; about unbiased teaching of history as a means to peace; about using science for the benefit of all peoples; about overpopulation, education, and spiritual regeneration. The answers from such respondents as Trygve Lie, Bertrand Russell, Pearl Buck, J. B. S. Haldane, Emil Brunner, Charles Journet, and Dos Passos are lifted out of their letters and reassembled under the headings indicated above. The result is an uninspiring collection of brief remarks that are either clichés or special pleading for a peculiar personal view, or simple negatives, as when Bertrand Russell, asked about the fruits of science for the peoples of the world, says, "I have nothing to say on this head." The only common conclusion to which the editor can point is "that the most pressing problems are no longer a matter for philosophical elucidation, but for conscious effort on the part of individuals and governments." Someone may find a few "quotable quotes" here.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Way, the Truth, the Life, selected by John Scholte Nollen, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 64, $1.

This is a dignified and lovely little book, vastly more appealing, at least to me, than most books intended for private devotion. Professor Nollen, following the memorable example of Thomas Jefferson, has selected from the gospels what most readers will probably find the heart of the gospel message in words for nearly two millennia attributed to Jesus. He has arranged them under a few definite topics, without thought for a will-o'-the-wisp chronological correctness and without any obtrusive interpretation or comment. It will be a rare reader who does not agree: "Whatever the theological system or the Christology we may profess, here is a test none of us may escape." Instead of being printed in conventional type, the volume reproduces the readable and unornamented calligraphy of Edward A. Carr and is

pleasantly reminiscent of the style of writing employed in early New Testament manuscripts. The low price and its sterling worth should make it one which many will want to have on their own intimate shelf of books especially beloved and also to give to their discriminating friends.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Is God Evident? by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xx, 254, $3.

This book is another of the many attempts to use the devices of scientific disciplines to prove the existence of God. For this reviewer it was dull reading. On the wrapper of this book it is stated that the subject of "natural theology" has been much neglected. Perhaps it would be better if it were completely neglected, for it seems strange to attempt to use the transitory findings of physics, astronomy, and biology for such a purpose. In his argument, the author simplifies matters by assuming that if it can be shown that life has a pattern, then it follows that life has a meaning, and it further follows that God is evident. To illustrate the technique of the thesis, it is shown that the present form of life could not exist on our planet if it were not for the presence of a number of physical factors, and it is contended that these factors were arranged to make life possible. The skeptic could always contend that the conditions for life were accidental (the result of "probabilities") and that life itself is an accident. There is no rational basis for choosing the right answer, and it seems a pity to spend so much time and thought on such indeterminate problems. The number of subjects covered by the book is large, including such diverse things as Darwinism, moral evil, biochemistry, metaphysics, the taming of birds—to mention only a few. The treatment is necessarily superficial. The author says, "I found it impossible to avoid the conclusion that some vast purpose has shaped the environment, developed life and has, finally, in man its latest if not its final instrument." Many of us would agree with him, but not because of the reasons he has presented. They are all far too controversial, and the treatment is too perfunctory.

EUGENE AYRES

The Deer Cry, by William G. Schofield, New York, Longmans-Green, 1948, pp. ix, 307, $3.

The life of Patrick, patron saint of Ireland, is involved in considerable obscurity. There is no single biography on which all scholars and historians agree. How can there be when his birthplace is disputed, his age at death variously given as anywhere between sixty-five and one hundred and twenty years? Yet there is general agreement on the authenticity of certain of his writings, conservations, and prayers. From these facts and fancies, using the novelist's skill and privilege, Schofield (who is best known as the author of mystery stories) has written a fictionalized biography of Patrick of Eirinn. "History supports most of this tale; logic and the ways of ancient Eirinn support the rest" (p. viii). Perhaps a novelist is the best person to write about such a character; he has the skill necessary for blending effectively the elements of fact and the contributions of fancy. At any rate, here is a well-told tale of engaging interest, that remains credible even while creating an atmosphere of the unusual. It is for the reader of fiction who desires to relax without abdicating.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Masterpieces of Religious Verse, edited by James Dalton Morrison, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xiv, 706, $5.

Twenty-five years ago *The World's Great Religious Poetry* was the *vade mecum* of the minister. Even then Morrison was beginning to collect the material that has

become the present anthology. The result is 2,020 poems by nine hundred poets. So to designate it is as ineffective and as incomplete as to call the Globe edition of Shakespeare thirty-seven plays and seven poems by one author. It is so much more. In fact, this reviewer will risk being either disbelieved or discredited by saying that *Masterpieces of Religious Verse* is the best collection published in the twentieth century. It has everything: magnificent coverage; discrimination and good taste; ancient and modern poets; completely adequate and efficient indices; and, with the inevitable exception of size, a thoroughly readable format. It is itself a masterpiece. The cost is insignificant in the light of its value. Since it will be the recognized anthology for many, many years to come, be among those who recommend it to others.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Rhetoric as a Dramatic Language in Ben Jonson, by Alexander H. Sackton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. ix, 182, $2.50.

Modern critics insist that Elizabethan plays are to be considered as dramatic poems and place the primary emphasis upon their language. The age of Jonson was an age when rhetoric was the common possession of the playgoer and the sharp tool he brought to the theatre by which to fashion his enjoyment of the play. Elizabethan theatregoers had a lively interest in words and took a craftsman's pleasure in language. Rhetoric is not itself dramatic, but in the hands of a Jonson becomes the medium of dramatic expression and representation. When the dramatist not only uses rhetoric to indicate character, but ridicules the rhetorical speech and takes the audience into his confidence, he has created irony and so employed rhetoric as a dramatic language. The present volume illustrates Jonson's usage with two forms, jargon and hyperbole. His development from the early plays when his art is immature, through the great dramas and the height of his skillful use of language, to the works of his later and declining years is convincingly presented and abundantly illustrated. Thus Jonson, in accordance with modern judgment, is further established as a dramatist in his own right, rather than as merely another writer of the time of Shakespeare.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Human Race, by Emil Froeschels, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1947, pp. 197, $3.

In this small volume the author discusses the relationship of time, motion, mathematics, medicine, art, and religion. He devotes considerable space to the affirmation of the concept of infinity as positive rather than as negation of finity. In the opinion of this reviewer he has added nothing of value to the literature of philosophy, and leaves the reader with nothing of concrete value.

EUGENE AYRES

The Modern Message of the Psalms, by Russell A. Peterson, Boston, Meador, ©1948, pp. 165, $2.50.

Under a title which suggests commentary and analysis, appears a new translation of the Psalms from Hebrew into Basic English. There are no footnotes, no alternate readings, few of the archaisms of speech to which English readers have long been accustomed, and no commentary. The Psalms are presented in a form which neither looks nor sounds like poetry.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

BOOKS RECEIVED

* *Essays on Freedom and Power,* by John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. lxvi, 452, $5.

* *Christian Paths to Self-Assurance,* by Robert H. Bonthius, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xiii, 254, $3.25.

Let's Act Now! by Richard Terrill Baker, New York, Friendship, ©1948, pp. 124, 50 cents (paper).

A Bibliography of Bible Study, Princeton, Princeton Theological Seminary Library, 1948, pp. 85, 85 cents (paper).

A useful list of many of the most important books about the Bible arranged under convenient heads and subheads. Intended primarily for theological students, it should prove of distinct value to ministers. It aims at being selective and representative rather than exhaustive. It is in no sense limited to recent books. Save for texts, grammars, and lexicons the volumes are limited to those in English.

The Authorized Daily Prayer Book, edited by Joseph H. Hertz, New York, Bloch, 1948, pp. 1120, $5.

A revised edition in one volume of a notable and important work on Jewish liturgy, first appearing in 1941. Complete with Hebrew text (right-hand pages), English translations (left-hand pages), commentary, introductions, and notes, it should prove a very welcome addition, together with the *Book of Common Prayer,* for the library of every minister, quite independent of his particular communion or polity.

The Discipline of Prayer, by Frederick J. Tritton, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1948, pp. 32, 25 cents (paper).

An explanation and evaluation of various forms of prayer and designed for devotional reading.

* *Understanding Adults,* by Donald R. Gorham, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1948, pp. viii, 162, $2.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1949, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. vii, 428, $2.

The twenty-ninth annual volume of Sunday-school helps, continuing last year's innovation of illustrative material from history and contemporary events.

* *The Best of John Henry Jowett,* edited by Gerald Kennedy, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xix, 167, $2.

* *A Study of Psalm 72 (71),* by Roland E. Murphy, Washington, Catholic University of America, 1948, pp. vii, 144, $150.

* *Clouds of Thought,* by Lucette M. Prichard, New York, Smith, 1948, pp. 47, $2.

* *The Changing Scene in China,* by Gilbert Baker, New York, Friendship, ©1948, pp. vii, 152, $1.

* *Gandhi's Autobiography,* by M. K. Gandhi, Washington, Public Affairs, ©1948, pp. xi, 640, $5.

* *The Most-Favored-Nation Clause,* by Richard Carlton Snyder, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xi, 264, $2.75.

* *Gaining the Faith You Need,* by James Gordon Gilkey, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. ix, 118, $2.

* *Thinking Christianity,* by W. Burnet Easton, Jr., New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xii, 136, $2.50.

* *Learning and World Peace,* edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maciver, New York, Conference on Philosophy, Science and Religion, [Harper], 1948, pp. xix, 694, $6.50.

* *Christian Science and Philosophy,* by Henry W. Steiger, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xi, 234, $3.75.

* *A Guide Book to the Bible,* by Alice Parmelee, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xix, 331, $3.50.

* *Psychology and Religion,* edited by Joshua Loth Liebman, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. xix, 202, $3.

* *Modern Man's Conflicts,* by Dana Rudhyar, New York, Philosophical Library, 1948, pp. viii, 228, $3.75.

* *Hasidism,* by Martin Buber, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. 208, $3.75.

* *Our Protestant Heritage,* by members of the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, John Knox Press, ©1948, pp. 224, $3.

Saint Peter, the Apostle, by William Thomas Walsh, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. viii, 307, $3.50.

The familiar stories, principally from the New Testament, uncritically combined and presented in the form of a biography of "the Prince of the Apostles and Keeper of the Keys."

The Drugs You Use, by Austin Smith, New York, Revere, ©1948, pp. xii, 243, $3.

A distinctly readable and apparently reliable guide to the intelligent use of drugs and medicines by the director of research and therapy of the American Medical Association.

* *Prayer in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha,* by Norman B. Johnson, Philadelphia, Society of Biblical Literature, 1948, pp. iv, 77, $1.

* *Art and Religion,* by Von Ogden Vogt, rev. ed., Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. xvii, 280, $4.50.

* *Can Protestantism Win America?* by Charles Clayton Morrison, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. viii, 225, $2.50.

* *Selected Poems of John Oxenham,* edited by Charles L. Wallis, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xxvi, 178, $2.

The Africa of Alfred Schweitzer, by Charles R. Joy and Melvin Arnold, New York and Boston, Harper and Beacon, ©1948, unpaged, $3.75 (illustr.).

Another item for the collectors of Schweitzeriana. The story of the eminent doctor's work at Lambarene is here retold again, this time in text and pictures.

* *Doors into Life,* by Douglas V. Steere, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 189, $2.

* *Purity of Heart,* by Soren Kierkegaard, rev. ed., New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 220, $2.50.

* *Voices of Liberalism: 2,* Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. viii, 273, $2.50.

* *A Study of the* SUMMA PHILOSOPHIÆ *of the Pseudo-Grosseteste,* by Charles King McKeon, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. xii, 226, $3.25.

* *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Thought,* by F. A. Iremonger, New York, Oxford University Press, ©1948, pp. xv, 663, $6.50.

* *Power for Action,* by William A. Spurrier, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xii, 200, $2.50.

* *Conscious Clay,* by William Allison Shimer, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xii, 199, $2.50.

Christian Missions Meet the Cultures of East Asia, by Earl H. Cressy, New York, Friendship, © 1948, pp. 48, 50 cents (paper).

A pamphlet designed to serve as an introduction to the study of Christian missions in East Asia.

* *Preaching and the Dramatic Arts,* by E. Winston Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. ix, 123, $2.

Thoughts of God for Boys and Girls, edited by Edith Frances Welker and Aimée Angus Barber, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. viii, 369, $2.

Stories, poems, prayers, pictures, songs, and other materials which experts apparently feel will interest both children and adults in revived family worship.

* *Transformation in Christ,* by Dieterich von Hilderbrand, New York, Longmans-Green, 1948, pp. ix, 406, $4.50.

* *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos,* by Cecil Roth, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1948, pp. xvi, 250, $3.

* *The Ethics of Israel,* by Israel H. Weisfeld, New York, Bloch, ©1948, pp. xvi, 360, $2.75.

* To be reviewed.